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ABSTRACT 
Many historians of the first American occupation of Cuba (1898-1902) assert that the 
military government of the island began and ended with a single strategic objective in mind: 
annexation.  This assertion, however, ignores critical aspects of the first year of American 
operations under the direction of Major General Brooke that pursued more limited goals. To 
fill this historical void, this thesis examines two questions about the American Army of 
Occupation in Cuba. First, was the occupation government of Major General Brooke 
pursuing a strategy designed to lead to annexation?  Second, how did the U.S. military 
government in Cuba exercise power in pursuit of Brooke’s strategic vision? This thesis 
combines traditional sources like the manuscript collections of James H. Wilson, Leonard 
Wood, Elihu Root, and William McKinley found in the Library of Congress in Washington 
D.C. as well previously unexamined reports and correspondence of individual post and 
garrison commanders found in Record Group 395 in the National Archives in Washington 
D.C. to answer these questions.  
The American Army of Occupation pursued political stability during its first year, not 
annexation.  Brooke and his subordinates practiced cooperation with, not control of, Cuban 
leaders and institutions.  Furthermore, the direction of American policy was not always a top-
down process.  Commanders at the post and district levels innovated solutions to problems 
that the central administration in Havana, while slow to recognize, eventually adopted as 
their own.  By December of 1899, when Brooke turned over command to General Wood, 
Cuba possessed a functioning civil government at both the national and local level. 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: AN OCCUPATION BY INDUCTION 
When Major General James H. Wilson arrived in Cuba in late December of 1898, he 
decided to call on Major General John R. Brooke, the commander of the American Army of 
Occupation in Cuba. As the last of the department commanders to arrive, Wilson was 
anxious to understand the direction and basis of U.S. policy on the island before moving on 
to take command of American forces in the provinces of Mantanzas and Santa Clara.  Wilson 
had his own ideas about the future of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.  An 
ardent expansionist, Wilson had embarrassed President McKinley by publicly advocating the 
annexation of Canada while hosting a Presidential visit to his corps.1 In private, Wilson 
advocated similar policies for America’s recently acquired overseas possessions.2  When 
Wilson asked Brooke what the U.S. government’s policy and ultimate purpose in Cuba were, 
Brooke replied, “that he did not know except by ‘induction.’”3 This answer astounded 
Wilson.  For the majority of American troops in Cuba, however, “induction” is perhaps the 
best description of their experiences.  The strategic ambiguity surrounding McKinley’s 
attitude toward Cuba forced the Army of Occupation to make inferences about the direction 
and purpose of American policy based only on the general principles Brooke outlined for his 
subordinates.  Thus, Brooke’s reply was perhaps more fitting than even he understood.   
  An ongoing process of experimentation in policy contradicts much of the current 
scholarship on the American army in Cuba.  Many historians of the occupation assert that the 
military government began and ended with a single strategic objective in mind: annexation.  
This assertion, however, ignores critical aspects of the first year of American operations 
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under Brooke’s direction that pursued more limited goals. The bulk of the historical 
scholarship, however, has virtually ignored this period in the development of U.S. policy and 
instead focused on the pro-annexationist administration of Governor-General Leonard Wood, 
Brooke’s eventual replacement. To fill this historical void, this thesis will examine two 
questions about the Army of Occupation and its role in Cuba.  First, was Brooke’s 
government pursuing a strategy designed to lead to annexation?  Second, how did the U.S. 
military government in Cuba exercise power in pursuit of Brooke’s strategic vision? The 
American Army of Occupation pursued political stability during its first year, not annexation.  
Brooke and his subordinates practiced cooperation with, not control of, Cuban leaders and 
institutions.  Furthermore, the direction of American policy was not always a top-down 
process. Commanders at the post and district levels innovated solutions to problems that the 
central administration in Havana, while slow to recognize, eventually adopted as their own.  
By December of 1899, when Brooke turned over command to Wood, Cuba possessed a 
functioning civil government at both the national and local level. 
 There are several key pieces of evidence that indicate that American commanders at 
every level were not pursuing a policy of annexation.  First, McKinley’s instructions to 
Brooke included references to preparing Cuba for independence, not annexation.  There is 
every indication that not only did Brooke understand his instructions this way but that the 
President tacitly re-affirmed his support for such a policy by refusing to intervene in the 
design of the military government for the island. Brooke appointed Cubans to oversee and 
run the civil components of his administration and allowed his appointees considerable 
autonomy to govern.  In some cases, he even subordinated his own senior commanders to 
Cuban authority in questions related to Cuba’s civil government.  Furthermore, at the 
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municipal level, Cubans maintained almost total control of municipal business even where 
American garrison commanders did not believe it wise to allow.  Brooke prohibited 
American intervention in municipal affairs except on an emergency basis.  As events would 
show, not even the prospect of potential violence was enough to warrant U.S. interference in 
local matters.   
 Other evidence also contradicts the idea that the United States pursued a deliberate 
policy of annexation.  When discussions of annexation arose, these deliberations were almost 
solely confined to Brooke and his senior subordinates in department command.  These 
discussions are revealing, however, not because they occurred but because they indicated that 
the United States had to make fundamental changes in the direction and scope of the current 
military government in order to pursue a policy of annexation.  Below the department level, 
almost no American commanders at either the district or garrison level discussed annexation.  
Instead, the middle and lower levels of the American chain of command believed their 
mission was to assist the Cuban people in establishing a stable and independent government.  
Likewise, the U.S. Army in Cuba did not seek to resurrect Spain’s moribund colonial 
architecture by protecting Spanish elites and currying their favor in exchange for political 
support for annexation.  Instead, American commanders at all levels consistently refused to 
accord Spanish residents or elites any special status in the newly developing Cuban state.  
Even where U.S. authorities at the garrison and department level supported the maintenance 
of existing Spanish privileges, they were unwilling to use force to preserve them. 
 The real policy that the U.S. Army in Cuba pursued was the maintenance of political 
stability.  The military government exercised its power with restraint and generally in 
conjunction with existing Cuban leaders and institutions, especially in its management of 
 4 
situations likely to lead to direct confrontation with elements of Cuba’s population.  At the 
top of the chain of command, Brooke and his advisors in Havana carefully managed the 
problem of collecting back taxes and the initiation of foreclosures in order to avoid 
precipitating a conflict between Cuba’s local governments, their creditors, and the Cuban 
citizens who owed money to the government. American commanders at the department level, 
although consistently antagonized by radical elements of the local press, generally confined 
their responses to verbal protests and requests for action from Cuba’s judicial system.  
Finally, at the garrison level, commanders responded to indigenous provocations and 
challenges by asking for support from Cuba’s judicial officials in order to defuse these tense 
situations and re-establish boundaries these challenges and provocations transgressed.  At 
nearly every level, the  army viewed the maintenance of public order and stability as their 
most important task. 
 The Army of Occupation also demonstrated its commitment to stability by allowing 
the development of bottom-up driven policy innovations.  Local post commanders in 
conjunction with their Cuban counterparts discontinued economically burdensome taxes in 
an effort to revive the economy, a necessary pre-condition to any lasting political stability.  
Furthermore, with almost no support from the central administration in Havana, American 
commanders and Cubans cooperated extensively in finding new and innovative ways to both 
create and fund a new public school system.  Lastly, the lowest levels of the American chain 
of command led the way in curbing the Catholic Church’s political power in its relations with 
Cuba’s newly secularized government, a complex and politically charged task.  In each of 
these areas, Brooke and his government followed where his post commanders led. Brooke’s 
toleration of such a decentralized approach enabled his subordinates to respond to local 
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conditions as needed.  More importantly, it indicated that Brooke was not wed to any 
particular policy except the pursuit of stability. 
 The final way that the American Army of Occupation demonstrated its commitment 
to preserving order was through the types of reforms that the military government initiated in 
Cuba’s judicial system.  The system of justice practiced in Cuba was an inquisitorial system 
where judges and other court officials took an active role in the investigation of criminal 
wrongdoing.  Despite tremendous political pressure, Brooke and his subordinates resisted 
calls to replace Spanish criminal procedural law with a system more akin to the Anglo-
American adversarial system, where judges are more neutral in criminal proceedings.  The 
only major functional change Brooke allowed was the prohibition of the practice of 
incommunicado (or the holding of a criminal suspect in confinement without counsel).  Even 
here, however, the general tried alternatives to a direct ban on the practice.  Brooke feared 
that even small changes to Cuba’s legal system could through sheer quantity lead to 
instability.     
   Given the complexity of the task before the Army in Cuba and its dual civil-military 
purpose, an examination of the first year of the Army’s operations in Cuba may yield 
valuable insights for several different lines of scholarly inquiry. For historians of American 
politics and diplomacy, tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army’s policy in Cuba informs 
scholars about the development of the McKinley Administration’s attitudes toward American 
empire.  As the primary cause of the war with Spain, Cuba occupied an important symbolic 
place in American domestic political opinion. American support for colonial projects abroad 
required success in Cuba in order to balance the early setbacks associated with the 
pacification of the Philippines. Brooke’s battle over policy with his ambitious subordinates 
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and their mobilization of political patrons in Washington to support or attack Brooke, reflect 
the broader concerns about the viability of America’s colonial ambitions. 
 The U.S. Army’s efforts in Cuba also offer military historians important insight about 
America’s involvement in so-called “small wars.”  The American Army in Cuba never 
numbered more than 43,000 and yet pacified a population of 1,600,000 people dispersed over 
44,000 square miles of unevenly developed terrain.4  Nor was this effort a small one 
proportionally.  At the apex of its power, American forces in Cuba represented just under 
half of the army’s available authorized strength in March of 1899.5  Beyond considerations of 
scale, the complexity of the task that confronted the army in Cuba begs for a more detailed 
historical analysis.  The island’s decades of guerilla warfare left the U.S. Army of 
Occupation to deal with a civilian population afflicted with rampant starvation and disease 
and an army of 48,000 former insurgents with political ambitions of their own.  The military 
government under Brooke negotiated the demobilization of the Cuban Liberation Army and 
maintained stability so successfully that it could afford to reduce its presence from its peak 
strength of 43,000 men in January of 1899 to only 11,000 men by January of 1900.6  These 
achievements alone warrant closer scrutiny given the enormous challenges associated with 
the management of civil government by an occupying foreign military power. 
Like other small wars, the McKinley Administration’s lack of strategic clarity for the 
purpose and scope of American involvement in Cuba often confused American commanders 
on the ground.  The U.S. Army in Cuba possessed only a vague outline of a mission and an 
uncertain timeline in which to accomplish it.  Despite these challenges, Brooke and his 
subordinates developed a unique model of military government that provided Cuba political 
stability and maximized the McKinley Administration’s political options. How the U.S. 
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Army’s commanders in Cuba dealt with this strategic ambiguity can inform military 
historians about the challenges of command and the dynamics of civil-military relations in 
the United States during the transition between the 19th and 20th centuries. 
  Previous studies of the occupation of Cuba have generally fallen into one of three 
groups of literature: Progressive, imperial, or military. Progressive historians focus on how 
Leonard Wood and Elihu Root instituted modern administration to America’s “backward” 
dependencies and the necessity of maintaining American control to continue this 
modernization effort.   Students of American empire concentrate on the motivations and 
methods the United States developed for controlling Cuba. Military histories of Cuba 
scrutinize the development of American strategic policy on the island and in general place 
American achievements during the occupation in the context of other American efforts at 
occupation and intervention. 
 The earliest Progressive accounts of the American occupation in Cuba emphasized 
the benefits of American rule overseas.7 These histories served as exhibitions of the success 
of American reform programs, lending “tremendous impulse to the work of national reform” 
at home.8 Additionally, these histories and their emphasis on the humanitarian benefits of 
American rule served as effective propaganda for the colonial project abroad. The effort to 
mobilize domestic support for similar reforms and colonialism within the United States 
naturally led most Progressive literature to focus on Leonard Wood’s administration.  Wood, 
according to these historians, turned Cuba into a “workshop” for American Progressive 
ideas.9   He reformed Cuba’s judicial system, created its’ first charter of rights in his Santiago 
Constitution, implemented modernized municipality charters, broke up Spanish colonial 
franchises, zealously crusaded against corruption and unnecessary municipal expenses, 
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undertook massive public works in sanitation and expanded access to education. Wood’s 
place in these histories is so dominant, that most historians of this school of literature fail to 
even acknowledge that anyone other than Wood had any influence in Cuba!10  Representative 
of this glaring omission in these types of history are Byron Williams’ The Continuing 
Revolution and John Kendrick Bangs’ Uncle Sam Trustee.  Williams ignored Brooke and the 
rest of the army in Cuba completely but offered an evaluation of Wood’s efforts. Bangs 
curiously offered a history of the Brooke administration that completely excluded any 
discussion of Brooke.  Instead, Bangs analyzed the general’s chief subordinates, later 
transitioning the focus of his study to the central administration after Wood’s elevation to 
command.  The common assumption in all of these histories is that American policy in Cuba 
was adrift before Wood and that he was the chief architect of the military government’s 
humanitarian successes, particularly in sanitation and education.   
 Wood’s biographers have also contributed to his central position in the accounts of 
American military government in Cuba. They often uncritically parroted Wood’s 
assessments of his predecessor’s administration.  Herman Hagedorn called Brooke a “narrow 
military pedant” who handled his responsibilities in Cuba in a purely “mechanical 
conception” of preparing Cuba for self-government.11  Jack McCallum accepted Wood’s 
assessment that Brooke simultaneously centralized all the power yet practiced a “laissez-
faire” administration that impeded governance.12  Jack Lane argued that Brooke was a 
cautious administrator who was gradually undermined by the collusion of his ambitious 
subordinates and American expansionists.13  Taken as a whole, Progressive literature on the 
American military government in Cuba neglects almost an entire year of American efforts 
and virtually ignores the Cuban people’s role in the development of their own government.  
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 Reacting to much of the Progressive literature, most historians of American empire 
and the occupation of Cuba examine questions of American motivation and strategy to 
control the island.  Philip Foner argued that the McKinley Administration and its military 
leaders developed a coordinated strategy to defeat Cuba’s independence movement.  Foner 
maintained that the main element of this strategy was to relentlessly attack and discredit 
Cuban efforts at self-government in order to bring about an indefinite military occupation of 
the island.  Foner’s account emphasized the role of American domestic politics, particularly 
expansionists and the business community. As other historians have observed, however, 
these voices were not the only ones heard in the halls of power in either Washington or 
Havana.  Foner exaggerated the unity of American annexationists, overlooking that those 
officials remained divided not only over what to do but how to do it.14 
Another imperial historian, David Healey, argued that America’s inability to annex 
Cuba during the occupation prompted it to develop indirect methods of control. Healey 
contended that the elements of informal control that the American Army adopted were: the 
establishment of an informal protectorate, binding economic ties to the United States, and the 
economic penetration of the Cuban economy by American capital.15  Healey characterized 
the early period of the occupation under Brooke as a stage of experimentation that allowed 
the McKinley Administration and its surrogates in Havana to adjust its policies in order to 
maximize American political control, albeit through oblique methods. Healey’s account of 
the American military government is the most nuanced interpretation of the occupation 
available.  Nonetheless, Healey’s study leaves unexamined how this ongoing process of 
increasingly refined indirect control worked.  If American leaders in Havana and Washington 
were receiving feedback about what methods of control worked best and how to implement 
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them, where did this feedback come from? Was this feedback the same across the island?  
And finally, how did the lowest levels of the chain of command interpret and influence the 
direction of strategic policy in Cuba?  Healey’s study leaves most of these issues 
unaddressed.  
 Perhaps the most prolific scholar of American empire in Cuba is Louis Pérez.  Pérez 
has offered three studies of the first American intervention in Cuba.  In two works, Cuba 
Between Empires and Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, Pérez argued that the United 
States relentlessly pursued annexation in Cuba and that the intervention and occupation 
marked “the climax of one hundred years” of U.S. policy.16 According to Pérez, the 
American Army of Occupation manipulated Cuba’s existing political divisions in order to 
foster political support for Cuba’s voluntary annexation to the United States. Pérez claimed 
that the army’s leaders wanted Spain’s remaining colonial elites on the island to transfer their 
allegiance to the United States in exchange for the maintenance of their old colonial 
privileges.17  Cuba’s strong nationalist sentiment is what ultimately thwarted American 
efforts to manipulate the island into annexation. 
In The War of 1898, Pérez expanded on this view of American motivations during the 
occupation.  Pérez suggested that the re-interpretation of the Teller Amendment’s 
“pacification” clause to mean “stability” is indicative of American intentions to remain in 
Cuba indefinitely.18 In addition to rhetoric, Pérez offered two other important elements of 
proof in evaluating the ultimate purpose of the United States in Cuba. McKinley’s lawyerly 
support for Cuban liberation (not independence) and the Platt Amendment’s limitations on 
Cuban sovereignty seem to validate Pérez’s interpretation that U.S. intentions were 
motivated by more than humanitarian regard for the island. Pérez’s conflation of rhetoric 
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with action, however, ignores that some Americans disagreed with this attempt to creatively 
re-interpret the legal meaning of the Teller Amendment. Some elements of the military 
government in Cuba wanted to honor Congressional intent, despite their disagreement with 
the wisdom and sentiment behind it.  Additionally, in all three of Pérez’s studies of American 
operations and their role in Cuba, Pérez maintained a discriminatory perspective, focusing 
only on the relationships between top U.S. military leaders and senior Spanish elites.  
 Military historians’ accounts of the American occupation of Cuba have shared themes 
with both the Progressive and imperial literature but generally focus on explaining the 
elements of the military government’s strategic thought, its implementation in Cuba and in 
offering evaluations of the occupation’s success, or lack thereof. Historian Andrew Birtle 
contended that despite the lack of a formal written doctrine, the U.S. Army possessed a loose 
body of military thought and informal practices on how to successfully engage in small wars. 
Birtle argued that, broadly speaking, the U.S. Army developed a dual civil-military approach 
to pacification designed to reshape the targeted population’s society.  The United States 
Army would offer political benefits to cooperative elements of the population while 
discouraging opposition through the application of increasingly severe forms of military 
control to anyone who resisted.  Birtle suggested that the army employed this traditional 
theory of pacification in Cuba but found the results disappointing.  American inspired 
reforms of Cuba’s government failed soon after the Army of Occupation withdrew. He 
attributed this failure to the unrealistic timeline U.S. troops and their leaders had to effect 
change.19  Birtle did not discuss whether the traditional elements of pacification his study 
identified were actually practiced by the American military government.   
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 Taking an equally dim view of the American army’s operations in Cuba, David M. 
Edelestein’s Occupational Hazards argues that occupations are politically and militarily 
risky operations whose success depends more on international conditions than any particular 
strategic policy adopted by occupying military powers. In his analysis of Cuba, Edelstein 
dismissed the efforts of the Brooke administration and the military government as aimless 
and unimaginative.  He argued Wood adopted a viable strategy for success but failed due to 
the external conditions of the occupation, i.e. the absence of a viable external threat, and 
Cuba’s strong nationalist sentiment.  He concluded that U.S. efforts in Cuba failed since the 
occupation produced neither a stable government nor a government capable of defending 
itself from internal threats.20  
  One of the more passionate defenders of American interventions overseas is Max 
Boot.  In his study of American involvement in military operations abroad, Boot concluded 
that not only are armed interventions militarily feasible but politically expedient as well. 
Boot defends his enthusiasm for aggressive international engagement by illustrating that, like 
the occupation of Cuba, these military expeditions frequently achieve important American 
strategic objectives.  Among the benefits that Boot lists are: enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, 
securing lives and property, furthering free trade, and in general safeguarding American 
interests. The only criticism that Boot offered of U.S. military occupations in general is that 
they are usually too brief to have a lasting effect.21  Like other historians, Boot virtually 
ignored the Army’s efforts under Brooke and instead focuses on the development of Wood’s 
humanitarian reforms. He concluded that the American efforts were a success.   His analysis 
of American strategic policy is limited to a brief explanation of the Teller and Platt 
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Amendments.  Aside from Wood, the U.S. Army’s role in the development and 
implementation of policy in Cuba remain unexplored. 
 Each of these broad categories of historical interpretation have important limitations 
in their discussion of the development of American strategic policy and the actual practice of 
pacification in Cuba.  Progressive and military historians have never evaluated the Brooke 
administration or the performance of his subordinates on their own merits.   The strategic 
environment in Cuba was not static from 1898-1900.  Cuba’s people, its economy, and its 
culture all changed in important ways during the occupation’s first year.  Without a thorough 
investigation of the U.S. Army of occupation and the role it played in these changes, 
historical understanding of the decisions and the challenges the United States faced in its 
foundational attempt to conduct nation building abroad remains distorted.  
Equally important to remember, Wood did not start in Havana with a blank slate. 
Cuban civil administration and institutions were functioning for almost a year before Wood 
took command.  Any changes in how that system operated and how it incorporated or 
excluded Cubans from political control of their own communities was likely to engender 
opposition in some form or another.   The restoration of the U.S. Army in Cuba to the 
historical record promises to reveal the dynamics of how the military government exercised 
political power, illuminate our understanding of Cuban opposition to U.S. policy, when and 
how it occurred, as well as offer insight into why American hopes for annexation ultimately 
failed.  In short, by interrogating our assumptions about the Army under Brooke, its 
intentions and effectiveness, the well-developed body of literature surrounding the Army’s 
operations in Cuba, especially those of the Army’s later efforts under Wood, can finally be 
appropriately contextualized. 
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The primary sources that this study will rely on to offer this reassessment of the 
army’s performance in Cuba will be a combination of traditional and previously unexamined 
sources.  Important in developing the strategic context of the Army’s mission and its 
implementation are Elihu Root’s Papers and William McKinley’s Presidential Papers.  
McKinley’s papers contain most of the relevant correspondence between McKinley and his 
commanders in Cuba.  Additionally, McKinley’s instructions and strategic guidance to 
Brooke are found there.  Invited to join McKinley’s Cabinet explicitly for helping the 
President manage the civil administration of America’s overseas dependencies, Root’s papers 
and correspondence are critical to understanding how the McKinley Administration 
conceptualized the situation in Cuba and its range of strategic options.  Additionally, Root’s 
extensive correspondence with Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt help develop 
historical understanding of the growing influence of Wood’s views within the McKinley 
Administration. Wood’s and James H. Wilson’s Papers remain central to understanding the 
developing rivalry between and among Brooke’s subordinate department commanders.  Both 
collections of papers contain critical correspondence that offers important observations and 
accounts of conversations that exist nowhere else in the historical record.  Furthermore, both 
men wrote extensively about what they observed in Cuba.   
The previously unstudied sources that this thesis incorporates are the records and 
correspondence of the Military Division of Cuba related to civil affairs found in Record 
Group 395 at National Archives I, Washington, D.C. At the department level, these records 
include the correspondence, order books, and a diary related to the civil administration of the 
military government districts of Matanzas and Santa Clara, Pinar del Río and Havana, 
Santiago and Puerto Principe and the district of Trinidad. These departments are 
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geographically and racially diverse and reflect the variety of rural and urban communities 
found outside of Havana.  They are also representative of the various economic conditions 
within the island.  Additionally, the selection of these particular provinces helps 
contextualize the divergent strategic assessments made by Wilson, Lee and Wood in June of 
1899.   
Similarly, at the garrison and post level, this study examines the correspondence, 
situational reports, and orders of the officers located in a dozen individual outposts located 
across the breadth and depth of Cuba.   These garrisons ranged in size from approximately 
twenty-four to one hundred soldiers.  Most, but not all, of these posts were commanded by 
either a captain or major.  Furthermore, the communities in which they attempted to maintain 
order reflected a broad range of attitudes toward American garrisons and their authority. 
Only by examining the reports and correspondence of these individual garrisons, is it 
possible to understand how the United States exercised control in Cuba. The correspondence 
and reports of these outposts capture the challenges, opportunities, and obstacles posed by 
local conditions to American authority.  Moreover, they provide historians insight into 
moments of cooperation and conflict between U.S. troops and the people they lived among.  
Thus, by combining these new sources, alongside the traditional sources historians have 
already explored, this study will offer a long over due assessment of General John R. Brooke 
and his subordinates in America’s inaugural attempt at democratizing a foreign people.  
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CHAPTER II 
CUBA AND REVOLUTION 
The story of American intervention in Cuba begins in 1878 at the conclusion of the 
Ten Years War, an insurrection by eastern Cuba’s rural population against Spanish rule. It 
was the first major revolt in the colony Spain had been unable to completely crush using 
military force.  The struggle, while uninspiring in a military sense, irrevocably changed Cuba 
and its relationship with the world. Four important consequences attended the negotiated 
peace that concluded the Ten Years War.   
The most important outcome of the war was Spain’s agreement to allow the process 
of gradual emancipation of the colony’s slaves to continue across the island.  This course, 
already begun during the war, continued until the 1880s when Cuba’s last slaves were freed.  
Like the American experience of emancipation, Cuba’s transition to a wage labor economy 
was fraught with social and economic uncertainty.  Cuba’s predominantly agricultural 
economy made wage labor on the island vulnerable to long periods of seasonal 
unemployment following the harvest of Cuba’s principle cash crops: sugar and tobacco.  This 
cyclical unemployment created a pool of destitute laborers desperate for work and became an 
endemic social problem for the Spanish government as it sought to restore the island to its 
pre-war prosperity.1 
The war also exacerbated the problems attending the transition from slavery to a 
wage labor economy by damaging the island’s agricultural production.  Insurrecto strategy 
during the war called for the elimination of any asset or commodity that enriched Spain, 
including its sugar production.  Property destruction was also a method of punishing the 
planter class’ complicity with the Spanish regime in Havana.  Lukewarm support by Cuba’s 
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planters for the revolt and rebel tactics combined to create the conditions for a first rate 
disaster for the colony’s agriculture.  For many towns, sugar growing and production all but 
vanished.  In 1861 Sancti Spíritus operated forty-one sugar mills to facilitate the area’s 
booming sugar production for export.  By the end of the war in 1878, only three of these 
sugar mills remained in operation.  In Bayamo, none of the city’s twenty-four mills survived 
the war.  In the east, the principle theater of conflict during the revolt, only one sugar 
plantation out of a hundred remained operational in Puerto Principe.2 
The destruction of much of the sugar industry led to the third important consequence 
of the war, the economic penetration of the island by American capital.  The widespread 
destruction of Cuba’s sugar production capacity deprived planters of the necessary funds for 
them to rebuild.  Their only alternative was to try and seek foreign investment and capital.  
Many planters sought this capital from American merchants in exchange for liens against 
their plantations and production facilities. They took on these financial obligations just as the 
price of sugar collapsed. The resulting foreclosures brought American investors directly into 
contact with Cuba’s economy and affairs on a large scale for the first time in the colony’s 
history.3  Increased financial interests in Cuba now incentivized American interest in 
maintaining order and stability on the island. 
The final important consequence of the Ten Years War for Cuba and a factor in 
eventual U.S. intervention was what the insurrectos and their leaders learned from the 
rebellion.  The chief lesson that the insurgents drew was that any future revolt’s success 
remained contingent on the insurrection becoming island wide.  Western Cuba’s dominant 
place in the island’s economy, its population density and resources dictated that the future 
struggle for Cuban independence lay in its western provinces.  Furthermore, the rebellion’s 
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leadership learned that even when confined to the east, their strategy of targeting the colony’s 
sugar industry for destruction had brought Spain to the brink of ruin.  If the strategy could be 
duplicated on a larger scale, a future revolution might succeed in winning independence by 
turning Cuba into a financial black hole for Spain.  All of these factors now combined to 
shape the next Cuban uprising. 
 War Must Be Answered With War 
By 1894, the political and economic situation in Cuba remained ripe for another 
rebellion.  Jose Martí had been clandestinely working to unite Cuba’s civilian and military 
revolutionary leadership from the Ten Years War behind the banner of his Cuban 
Revolutionary Party (PRC). Most importantly, Martí had garnered the support of the two 
most important insurrecto commanders of the previous war, Máximo Gómez and Antonio 
Maceo.  When Martí began a new revolt in February of 1895, it happened at the most 
propitious moment possible.  Cuba was deep in the throes of an island wide depression, 
begun when the United States terminated Cuba’s special access to its domestic sugar markets 
in retaliation for Spain’s re-institution of mercantilist trading barriers against the United 
States.  Sugar production, and by proxy the demand for wage laborers, plummeted. This left 
many of the colony’s agricultural workers angry and idle at just the moment the latest revolt 
was about to begin.4 
Martí orchestrated simultaneous uprisings across the island.  His initial efforts in 
western and central Cuba failed; Spanish forces moved quickly and ruthlessly to stamp out 
insurgent support in these better developed provinces. In the east, however, Martí succeeded, 
and the new rebellion survived. By April of 1895, Maceo and Gómez were both on the 
ground organizing insurrectos in eastern Cuba.  Spain quickly realized both the seriousness 
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of the revolt and the need to end it as quickly as possible.  Thus, Spain assigned General 
Arsenio Martinez Campos the mission of suppressing Cuba’s latest revolutionary movement.  
Campos had served Spain successfully as both a soldier and a diplomat as one of the 
principle negotiators in the Peace of Zanjón, the treaty that ended the previous war.5   Thus, 
by April 1895, Spain and Cuba’s insurrectos prepared for another long struggle for control of 
the island’s future. 
As the insurrection intensified, both sides attempted to apply the lessons they had 
learned from the Ten Years War to the new revolt. Campos sought to isolate the rebellion in 
eastern Cuba, defeat it where he could, and to be prepared to negotiate once these efforts had 
exhausted the insurrectos revolutionary fervor. To this end Campos re-established the 
Júcaro-Morón trocha, a series of fortified blockhouses intended to quarantine eastern Cuba 
from the rest of the island.6  The rebels, in applying their own lessons from the Ten Years 
War, thwarted Campos’ efforts at containing the uprising by passing their forces through 
Campos’ trocha in the summer of 1895. This maneuver allowed the insurrectos to operate in 
Cuba’s central and western provinces just as the sugar harvest was about to get underway.7  
The revolt was now island wide.   
Spain’s conservative ministry in Madrid, disgusted with Campos’ inability to end the 
insurrection, relieved Campos in December of 1895.  His replacement, General Valeriano 
Weyler was Campos’ strategic antithesis and quickly repudiated his predecessor’s affinity for 
negotiation, declaring, “war should be answered by war.”8  Weyler immediately set about 
trying to reverse Spanish military fortunes by pursuing an aggressive build up of Spanish 
military power and by fine-tuning Campos’ isolation of the insurrectos.  Additionally, 
Weyler began to recruit a “Corps of Volunteers” from Cuba’s Spanish Peninsular population 
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in an attempt to gain parity with the insurgents in their familiarity with the local terrain.  
Moreover, Weyler concentrated Spanish forces and began to dispatch columns to chase 
bands of guerillas through Cuba’s remote interior areas in an effort to deny them safe places 
to resupply and reorganize.  Finally, Weyler reinforced the Júcaro-Morón trocha and 
constructed another trocha from Mariel to Majana in an effort to separate the most active 
insurrecto regions from the more prosperous and stable portions of western and central 
Cuba.9 
Weyler knew, however, that these efforts alone were likely to still end in defeat.  
Spanish forces remained unable to separate the PRC’s guerillas from ordinary Cubans, 
making their isolation almost impossible.  In order to address this problem, the Governor-
General announced his now infamous re-concentration policy.  He declared martial law and 
ordered everyone in Cuba to report to the nearest Spanish military garrison or to be subject to 
execution upon discovery by Spanish forces.  All food stocks were to be relocated to Spanish 
garrisons or subject to destruction.  Export of food from these newly established enclaves 
was forbidden.  Weyler intended this policy of social and economic isolation to work in 
tandem with his increasingly aggressive military operations.10 
The trouble with Weyler’s reconcentration strategy is that Spanish forces had not 
made adequate preparations to deal with the logistical implications of such a policy.  The 
Spanish Army failed to adequately plan for how Spanish garrisons would feed the massive 
influx of Cubans to Spanish controlled towns.  In the short term, Spanish troops authorized 
the cultivation of small food plots to mitigate food shortages but these efforts were 
completely insufficient to meet the demands required by reconcentration.  Equally 
problematic, economic life on the island ceased to exist.11  This meant no jobs, no wages, and 
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that the Cuban people could not pay for food, even if authorities could arrange for its 
importation.   
The result was a slowly unfolding humanitarian disaster of biblical proportions.  
Thousands of Cubans slowly starved to death.  Those who did not succumb to starvation 
became increasingly susceptible to disease due to the prolonged effects of malnutrition and 
the unsanitary over crowding in Spanish controlled garrisons. The rudimentary sanitation 
systems available in these towns were not capable of sustaining the massive influx of people.  
As disease began to take its toll on the weakened population, conditions in Cuba soon 
garnered international attention and condemnation, particularly within the United States.  
Americans, watching events in Cuba, began to openly sympathize with Cuba’s insurrectos 
and to push their government to intervene.12 
In the spring of 1896, both houses of Congress passed non-binding resolutions 
supporting recognition of Cuban belligerency in its war against Spain.  While public opinion 
and an influential element in Congress remained sympathetic to the cause of Cuban 
independence, few Americans in the executive branch entertained similar sympathies.  Both 
the Cleveland and McKinley Administrations remained indifferent to Cuba’s independence 
movement due to its deliberate destruction of the island’s sugar production (now subject to 
American ownership).  Both administrations remained skeptical of the insurrectos’ ability to 
both meet its international obligations (i.e. compensate American property owners for their 
losses) and to maintain order on the island to prevent further destruction. In 1896, Secretary 
of State Richard Olney estimated the value of American trade with Cuba at $100,000,000 and 
the value of American investments in Cuba at somewhere between $30,000,000 and 
$50,000,000.13 In both Cleveland and McKinley’s opinion, Spain still seemed best positioned 
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to restore order and to protect American economic interests.  Consequently, both 
administrations officially maintained a wait and see attitude toward Spanish military efforts.   
American patience was not unlimited and both Cleveland and McKinley warned 
Spanish representatives that if it became obvious that Spain could not put down the 
insurrection, that intervention might be necessary to protect American interests.  In August of 
1897, an Italian anarchist assassinated Spain’s Prime Minister and General Weyler’s political 
patron.  Recognizing the seriousness of American threats, Queen Regent María Cristina 
asked Spain’s Liberal Party leader Práxedes Mateo Sagasta to form a new government and to 
give Spanish policy a new direction in Cuba.  Sagasta relieved Weyler and installed Cuba’s 
final Spanish Governor-General, Ramón Blanco, who attempted to mitigate the worst aspects 
of Weyler’s disastrous policies on the island.14 
Initially, the American response was favorable.  In December of 1897, McKinley 
offered Congress three different courses of action for the United States in Cuba (recognition 
of Cuban belligerency, recognition of Cuban independence, or neutral intervention) but 
rejected all three options.  The President recommended to Congress that the United States 
wait and see if Sagasta and Blanco’s efforts in Cuba would be any more successful than their 
predecessors.  Meanwhile, American public opinion remained firmly in support of 
recognizing Cuban belligerency, if not independence.15 
In January of 1898, General Blanco inaugurated the last of Spain’s attempted reforms 
in Cuba in a bid to placate the insurrectos and maintain some semblance of Spanish control.  
Blanco released many of the colony’s political prisoners while simultaneously distributing 
supplies to the reconcentrado population.  Blanco also reallocated Spanish military forces to 
the island’s sugar plantations in an effort to restart the economy and promised even more 
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troops to protect harvests.  Additionally, Blanco offered the insurrectos a blanket amnesty 
and a small cash reward if they lay down their arms.  The combination of Blanco’s reforms 
and military stalemate demoralized the Spanish Army in Cuba.  The cash reward was 
particularly unpopular with Spanish troops on the island since they had not been paid in 
months.  As a final measure to encourage a political settlement, Blanco instituted a new 
autonomist constitution.  The autonomist constitution offered island wide popular elections to 
provide half of the colony’s new ministers.  The Governor-General would appoint the other 
half.16 
Cuba’s government under Blanco, however, changed very little. The first and lowest 
level of government was the city or municipal council called an ayutamiento. An alcade or 
mayor administered the ayutamientos and in general remained accountable to the Spanish 
colonial government for the governance of the municipalities.  Above the ayutamientos and 
alcaldes were the provincial governments, seven altogether.  Overall, the provincial 
governments under Spanish administration served mainly as intermediaries between the 
colonial administration in Havana and the local municipalities and were administered by a 
governor.  The highest level of government was the central colonial government in Havana 
for which the other two levels of government acted more or less as direct appendages.  In 
fact, Spanish authorities in Havana continued to foster this style of administration despite the 
officially maintained fiction of “autonomy.” 17   
 The executive branch of the central colonial government consisted of various 
departments whose responsibilities varied according to the administrative needs of Spanish 
authorities.  By the time of the American invasion, most of these departments were controlled 
by the Spanish military.  The Spanish, however, concentrated the colony’s executive powers 
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into four departments: the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice and Public 
Instruction, the Department of State and Government and finally the Department of 
Agriculture, Industries, Commerce and Public Works.18  Governing, however, was a 
secondary concern for the Spanish in Cuba, winning the war against the insurrectos came 
first.  Spanish government authority remained confined to the enclaves protected by Spanish 
military garrisons.   
 Cuba also possessed a well-developed judicial system modeled after Spanish legal 
traditions, maintaining an inquisitorial system where judges participated in the investigation 
of crimes. At the municipal level, two courts existed to administer colonial law.  Each 
municipality maintained a municipal court responsible for trying minor criminal offenses.  
Courts of the First Instance and Instruction investigated and tried more serious criminal cases 
and initiated civil proceedings. These courts were the lowest levels of the central 
government’s judicial system.  Courts of the First Instance and Instruction answered to 
Cuba’s audencias, or the provincial courts.  The audencias in Havana, Santiago, and 
Mantanzas retained both civil and criminal jurisdiction, while the audiencias in Pinar Del 
Rio, Santa Clara and Puerto Principe possessed jurisdiction solely on criminal matters.  
Judges referred civil proceedings in Pinar Del Rio, Santa Clara and Puerto Principe to the 
audencias in Havana, Mantanzas and Santiago respectively.  The Spanish Supreme Court 
(tribunal supremo) oversaw appeals from the audencias.19   
It did not take long to see that the autonomist constitution and its minor modifications 
to the status quo failed to attract any significant political support from any of the principal 
political parties in Cuba.  The insurrectos, seeing themselves on the verge of total victory, 
viewed Blanco’s offer of reforms as not only insincere but unnecessary.  They only needed to 
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hang on a little while longer and Spain would be forced to concede total defeat.  Compromise 
would not serve the Cuban Republic’s interests.  Spanish loyalists also opposed the 
autonomist constitution; the idea of sharing power with former Cuban insurrectos was not 
something that the island’s conservative political elites thought compatible with their 
interests.  Many, despite all evidence to the contrary, continued to believe that a total Spanish 
military victory remained possible if adequately supported by Madrid.  Neither side saw any 
reason to compromise and the autonomist constitution, while remaining in effect, failed to 
achieve any lasting political compromise between Spain and the rebels.20  The war continued. 
The United States began more vigorous diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the 
conflict as a result.  American diplomats and financiers attempted to find ways to negotiate a 
final settlement to the conflict.  In February of 1898 the United States backed several efforts 
(one by the United States and one by the PRC) to purchase Cuba from Spain with American 
financing. These negotiations were undermined, however, by the publication of letters from 
Spanish Ambassador Señor Don Enrique de Lome to the Spanish Foreign Minister that 
mocked the United States and President McKinley.  Further complicating American 
diplomatic efforts was the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana’s harbor on February 
15, 1898. By the end of March 1898, the United States had lost confidence that the Spanish 
government was negotiating in good faith and began to prepare to go to war.21    
The Teller Amendment And Intervention 
On April 11, 1898 President McKinley sent Congress his war message asking 
authority to intervene in Cuba.  The President cited four reasons for intervention: for 
humanitarian ends, to protect Cuban lives and property, to protect American commercial 
interests, and to end the “constant menace to our peace.” McKinley asked Congress for 
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authority to end the fighting in Cuba, to establish a “stable government” and to ensure 
tranquility on the island.22  He still did not believe that recognizing Cuban belligerency or 
independence served American interests and thus left those provisions out of his requested 
authority in his war message. The President remained silent as to his plans for Cuba’s 
political future after American intervention. 
Congress, however, was unhappy with the Administration’s ambiguous intentions and 
did not want to give McKinley a blank check. The House resolution authorized the President 
to intervene but called for McKinley to allow the Cuban people to found their own “stable 
and independent government.” The Senate offered four resolutions to provide the McKinley 
Administration the power to deploy American forces to Cuba.  The first two resolutions 
called on Spain to surrender its control of the island and authorized the President to compel 
the removal of Spanish forces from the colony. The third resolution declared that Cuba had a 
right to be a free and independent nation and called on McKinley to recognize the Cuban 
Republic as “the true and lawful government of that island,” a policy McKinley had long 
opposed.23 Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado offered the fourth and final resolution that 
the Senate accepted.  Teller’s Amendment specified famously that the United States 
renounced “any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over 
said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is 
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.”24  The one 
thing that Congress clearly wanted was to ensure was Cuba’s right to independence 
following any intervention by the United States.  This was not only due to the overwhelming 
direction of public sentiment but a military necessity.  The PRC warned American 
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representatives that without such a guarantee, the Cuban Liberation Army would take a 
hostile view of U.S. intervention.25 
The House attempted to avoid going to a conference committee by approving the 
Senate’s resolutions except for their recognition of the Cuban Republic as the lawful 
government of Cuba.  The Senate, however, could not come to an agreement about how to 
word a new war powers resolution and the issue went to a conference committee.  In the 
interim, the Senate debated the meaning of the Teller Amendment and the ultimate purpose 
of intervention in Cuba.  Some senators had noted the ambiguous language associated with 
Teller’s proposed Amendment and asked whom exactly the United States was going to 
pacify in Cuba?  After some debate, the Congressional Conference Committee removed 
recognition of the Cuban government but retained everything else, including the Teller 
Amendment and its vague passage authorizing the island’s “pacification.”26  On April 20, 
1898, Congress authorized McKinley to intervene in Cuba and to do what was necessary to 
fight and win against the naval and land forces of Spain. 
The army that the United States deployed for this mission was in the midst of a period 
of intellectual and professional transition.  The defeat of the last of the Indian tribes out on 
the plains left America’s frontier army without a clear mission for the first time in its 
institutional history. While there were elements of the American Army that did not foresee an 
offensive role for the United States in international affairs, a new generation of young 
intellectuals recognized the increasing importance of commercial interests in American 
diplomacy.27  At their most ambitious, however, these intellectuals viewed the Army’s future 
role as essentially acting in support of the United States Navy.  Naval strategists, led by 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, believed that America’s future lay in maintaining control of the sea 
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and with it access to the world’s commerce. According to Mahanian inspired naval thinkers, 
the Army needed to defend America’s coastline and homeland, protect strategic locations 
(such as a future trans-American canal) and provide small expeditionary forces to seize or 
protect critical strategic points abroad, chiefly as a means of enabling the Navy to take the 
offensive against America’s enemies.28  Occupation, pacification, and nation building abroad 
were not considered likely missions for the U.S. Army.  Former Commanding General of the 
Army John M. Schofield confirmed this view claiming, “Foreign conquest and permanent 
occupation are not a part of the policy of this country.”29 
The majority of the Regular Army officer corps during this period were long serving 
officers who had considerable experience both during the Civil War and the periodic Indian 
Wars along the frontier.  Even with the expansion of the Regular Army to fight Spain and 
govern America’s newly won dependencies, in December of 1899 all of the army’s infantry, 
artillery and cavalry colonels were still Civil War veterans.  This experience level extended 
to the field grade officers as well.  More than 70% of the army’s lieutenant colonels and 
majors were Civil War veterans.30  Thus, these officers tended to be older, experienced in 
their current grades, and capable of operating in small, decentralized detachments much as 
the army had done for decades after the Civil War, during Reconstruction, and along the 
frontier.   
 The experience of those officers who served in the wartime federal volunteer 
establishment widely varied.  Many of these volunteer officers were West Point educated or 
Civil War veterans.  Some of these officers, like General James Harrison Wilson, had  served 
as civil administrators during Reconstruction.31  Others, like Theodore Roosevelt, were 
amateur enthusiasts whose only qualifications were their political connections.  Thus the U.S. 
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Army that prepared for intervention in Cuba, while not specifically prepared for its mission, 
was not entirely unfamiliar with what army life and operations might entail. 
While even the Regular Army could not yet be considered a professional force in the 
modern sense, it had made some tentative strides in that direction before intervening in Cuba.  
In the late 1880s, the army had introduced efficiency reports and examinations for 
promotions.  In 1891, General Schofield mandated the creation of lyceums at every army 
post with the purpose of stimulating officer development in the technical and theoretical 
aspects of warfare. While these efforts predominantly influenced the junior officers, it helped 
create a sense within the service that officership was a professional vocation requiring 
conscious cultivation and study.32   While the culmination of this trend still remained years 
away, the seeds of the nascent movement toward professionalism were already present in 
1898 and undoubtedly made the Regular Army, especially its junior officers, much better 
prepared for the challenges that lay ahead of them. 
The American Army’s efforts in Cuba, despite landing unopposed at Daiquirí, 
quickly ran into complications.  The expedition, led by the morbidly obese Civil War veteran 
Major General William R. Shafter, suffered from serious shortfalls in planning and 
organization. When Shafter’s staff planned the invasion’s logistics, the army’s objective was 
Havana, which possessed flat or gently rolling country and a well-developed road network. 
The change in the campaign’s objective to Santiago, in Cuba’s mountainous east, caught 
army logisticians off guard.  Eastern Cuba’s primitive road network made wagon based 
transport nearly impossible.  Further complicating matters, the U.S. Navy expected Shafter to 
approach Santiago along the most direct route along Cuba’s coastline.  The problem with the 
navy’s plan for the army was that this would throw Shafter’s Army headlong into Santiago’s 
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prepared defensive fortifications.  Shafter, now cooperating with the CLA under General 
Calixto García, preferred to avoid the main prepared lines of Spanish defenses by flanking 
them on an overland route through eastern Cuba’s interior. In order to march on Santiago via 
Shafter’s preferred route, ammunition, medicine, food, and shelter all had to be left on the 
beaches and moved forward later, leading to extraordinary hardships and deprivations in 
Shafter’s Army.33  Shafter’s decision to proceed overland to Santiago had important 
implications for the U.S. Army in Cuba. 
The most serious and troublesome consequence was the deterioration in the relations 
between the CLA and the American Army.  Due to the unfamiliarity of the terrain, Shafter 
and his men relied on the CLA to both provide guides and to continue isolating Spanish 
garrisons on the island to prevent Spanish forces from concentrating to defend Santiago, 
obstructing Shafter’s advance, or both.  While García’s men proved able guides, the 
Americans were contemptuous of their guerrilla tactics.  García’s men failed to block the 
arrival of Spanish reinforcements to Santiago just before the siege got underway.34  American 
criticism of the CLA, however, was misplaced.  Not only did Shafter meddle in the 
disposition of García’s forces—most critically in the composition of the blocking force sent 
to prevent the arrival of reinforcements headed to Santiago—but he assigned them a task 
more suited to conventional operations, something that García’s men were ill prepared both 
organizationally and logistically to undertake.35 Thus, the advance to Santiago and the 
hardships of the movement had placed these two erstwhile allies increasingly at odds with 
one another.   
American racial and class based views made relations between the U.S. Army and the 
CLA even worse.  The Americans were shocked at how dirty the Cuban rebels were.36  
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Teddy Roosevelt observed that they were “as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes ever 
looked on.”37  Another observer serving with the Red Cross commented, “if their rifles and 
cartridge belts were taken away. . .they would look like a horde of dirty Cuban beggars and 
ragamuffins on the tramp.”38  This was not how the Cuban Army had been portrayed in the 
American press.  The American Army expected to find an army similar to their own, 
organized and equipped to undertake a conventional land campaign against the Spanish 
Army.  As American cooperation with the CLA revealed that this was not the case, American 
war correspondents began to change the characterization of the CLA. The American press 
now depicted the insurrectos as more interested in American rations than in Cuban liberty.39  
Race, too played an important role in how the Americans perceived the Cubans.  Prior 
to the landing at Daiquirí, Americans believed that the Cuban Liberation Army was a white 
dominated movement.  Roosevelt again set the record straight, recording that the Cuban 
rebels were almost all former slaves. The racial composition of the Cuban Army mattered, 
because as Wood observed the Cuban Army “is made up very considerably of black people, 
only partially civilized, in whom the spirit of savagery has been more or less aroused by 
years of warfare.”40 American observations of the CLA’s treatment of Spanish prisoners 
seemed to validate American racial assumptions.  In a few instances, insurrectos executed 
Spanish prisoners of war, a practice that the Americans found barbaric and representative of 
Cubans’ inability to control their predisposition to violence.41  
For their part, the CLA’s view of the U.S. Army was not much better.  Even before 
the American intervention, the CLA’s leaders looked suspiciously on their occupiers’ 
motives.  Martí memorably asked, once the United States was in Cuba, who would get it out?  
Prior to American intervention, the insurrectos only wanted American material support.42 
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The Teller Amendment only partially allayed Cuban fears, but was sufficient for the PRC to 
order the CLA to subordinate its efforts to those of the U.S. Army.  Cuban perceptions of the 
U.S. Army darkened considerably when Shafter asked General García to employ his men as 
laborers instead of soldiers.43  Relations between Shafter and García were not improved by 
the conditions of the siege of Santiago where the inadequate logistics of both armies 
continued to contribute to the hardship and strain between the allies. 
The final blow to Cuban-American relations during the Santiago Campaign came at 
the siege’s successful conclusion.  Angry at the Cubans for their inability to fight in a 
conventional style and for their refusal to act as laborers, Shafter decided to exclude the CLA 
from the surrender ceremony of the city.44 Participation in the ceremony would have 
implicitly involved recognition of the Cuban Army as a legitimate co-belligerent.  
Additionally, Cuban exclusion from the ceremony reflected not only American doubts about 
the Cuban rebel’s contribution to the campaign but the rebels’ claims to legitimacy and 
recognition as a civilized people. 
Clearly suspecting both motives behind Shafter’s exclusion of Cuban forces from the 
surrender ceremony, García protested:  
I have not been honored, sir, with a single word from yourself informing me about the 
negotiations for peace or terms of capitulation. . .I only knew of both events by the 
public reports. . . a rumor, too absurd to be believed, General, ascribes the reason of 
your measure and of the orders forbidding my Army to enter Santiago, to fear of 
massacres and revenges against the Spaniards.  Allow me, Sir, to protest against even 
the shadow of such an idea. We are not savages ignoring the rules of civilized 
warfare.  We are a poor, ragged Army, as ragged and poor [as] was the Army of your 
forefathers in their noble war for independence, but as [did] the heroes of Santiago 
and Yorktown we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and 
cowardice.45 
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García offered his resignation to General Gómez and withdrew his Army back into the 
interior of the island.  Embarrassed by the now public dispute between Shafter and García, 
the PRC’s representatives in the United States assured the American public that García spoke 
only for himself, and not the Revolution.  The PRC continued to publicly proclaim their 
gratitude for American intervention and assistance.46 The PRC’s gestures, however, were too 
late to change American opinion of the CLA.  In less than a month of joint operations, the 
Cuban Army had transformed in American opinion from the institutional embodiment of a 
kindred civilization to a worthless ally. Or as one newspaper’s correspondent observed, “the 
noble army of Cuban martyrs had become an armed rabble as unchivalrous as it was 
unsanitary.”47  When American correspondents asked Shafter about Cuba’s political future as 
an independent self-governing nation, Shafter replied that, “Why those people are no more fit 
for self-government than gunpowder is for hell.” It was an inauspicious beginning to Cuban-
American relations. 
 After the fall of Santiago, Spanish resistance collapsed and the American Army now 
confronted the problem of how to establish control over the island.  The American Army at 
Santiago was a spent force.  Even before the conclusion of the siege, disease had ravaged 
Shafter’s weakened men.  More than 4,000 men were confined to hospitals and many more 
dangerously ill men remained in the ranks (dying at a rate of fifteen a day) to avoid being 
separated from their comrades.48  Clearly, more troops would be needed to establish order in 
the war’s aftermath.   
Initially the War Department estimated that it needed about 50,000 men to occupy 
Cuba and complete its pacification.  Terrified that more American troops would be 
vulnerable to the ravages of tropical disease, the McKinley Administration carefully 
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introduced additional men into Cuba.  The War Department timed their arrival to coincide 
with the evacuation of Spanish forces by January 1, 1899, while simultaneously attempting to 
manage the spread of disease in Shafter’s Army. Ultimately, the continued negative publicity 
over the condition of Shafter’s troops forced the War Department to evacuate Shafter’s men 
to the United States, prompting another scandal over their inadequately prepared quarantine 
camp in Montauk, New York.49  Despite the evacuation of Shafter’s troops, American forces 
nearly doubled, reaching the apex of their strength at 43,000 men by February of 1899.  The 
size of the army, larger than the initial invasion force and almost half of the entire Army, was 
a measure of American determination to both maintain order and to discourage a 
confrontation with the CLA. 
Despite the successful evacuation of Spanish forces, important issues remained 
unresolved for the U.S. Army in Cuba.  The CLA maintained a sizeable force and controlled 
many of Cuba’s interior towns and provinces.  What was American policy toward them and 
the Cuban PRC that they ostensibly answered to?  What was American policy toward 
Blanco’s autonomist constitution and the institutions he created?  Finally, to whom would the 
Army transfer sovereignty in Cuba?  These questions remained very relevant to the Army’s 
mission of pacification. 
Before the invasion of Cuba, the United States Army had already established a 
traditional understanding of what the term pacification meant and how to apply it.  
Pacification was a dual civil-military process where the Army, by eliminating actual or 
potential resistance, established order, maintained peace, and allowed the American 
government to exercise its authority.50  American pacification efforts during the Civil War, 
Reconstruction and a few of the Indian Wars began with an attempt to initiate modest 
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political reforms to end potential unrest.  If this failed, anyone who aided or participated in 
opposing American rule was subject to arrest, exile, or death.  If resistance continued, the 
Army would widen its retaliation to include the destruction of crops and homes.51  The key to 
this conception, however, was the Army usually employed force or the threat of force in 
conjunction with political measures designed to lessen resistance.   
This traditional view of the importance of political diplomacy in military operations 
also made inroads into the more formal venues of American strategic thought, albeit on a 
limited basis.  In his widely studied text on strategy published during this era, John Bigelow, 
a former instructor at West Point, reinforced this dual civil-military view of pacification 
operations.  Bigelow concluded that British General Henry Clinton’s failure to subdue the 
American South during the Revolution had primarily been a political one. Clinton’s reliance 
on military force to bolster support from the population had engendered so much resentment 
that it led to British defeat at the battle of King’s Mountain, which made the campaign 
irretrievably lost. Bigelow also offered U.S. strategic planners another important insight, that 
irregular forces could pose a significant threat to conventional forces if commanders did not 
manage their pacification efforts with skill and diplomacy.52 
American commanders in Cuba were cognizant that the political situation on the 
island called for a high degree of political tact.  Although some leaders did look abroad for 
examples of colonial pacification, for the most part, the U.S. officers rejected these methods 
as fundamentally incompatible with American intentions in Cuba.53 The Army would look to 
its own experiences to guide it.  Although the U.S. Army did not give its definition of 
pacification official sanction in the form of official military doctrine, many, if not most, 
commanders subscribed to the customary definition and usage of the term.  Circumstances in 
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Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines soon provided the American Army its first real test of 
how these traditional practices might be applied abroad. 
The Army Of Occupation And Its Chain Of Command 
Conditions in Cuba after the surrender of Spanish forces reflected the chaos inherent 
in years of brutal guerilla warfare.  The U.S. Army estimated that some of Cuba’s most 
devastated regions had lost as much as a third of their population.  Agricultural production, 
with few exceptions, was non-existent. The Americans characterized almost every level of 
government and means of order in Cuba as left in a “complete state of abandonment” by 
Spanish authorities.  It seemed that almost every aspect of Cuban life had been adversely 
affected by the war.  In short, the U.S. Army confronted “a state of desolation, starvation and 
anarchy.”54 
In order to prevent the situation from continuing on its nightmarish trajectory, the 
President appointed several American generals to command different regions in Cuba in 
order to organize the island’s recovery and reconstruction.  Each general was to oversee two 
of Cuba’s provinces, commonly referred to as “departments” by American officers.  Many of 
the appointments merely recognized the already existing command hierarchies, in place at 
the beginning of the American occupation. 
In Pinar Del Rio and Havana (excluding the city) provinces, McKinley appointed 
General Fitzhugh Lee to oversee the reconstruction of two of Cuba’s wealthiest provinces. 
Robert E. Lee’s nephew began his military career in the cavalry after graduating from West 
Point in 1856, serving along the Texas frontier subduing the Comanche.  Lee resigned his 
commission and rose in Confederate service to brigadier general.  After the war, he served as 
the governor of Virginia and as the Cleveland Administration’s consul in Havana where he 
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became famous for his unstinting advocacy of American interests in Cuba.  Upon the 
outbreak of the war with Spain, President McKinley awarded him command of the U.S. VII 
Corps and a commission as a major general of volunteers.55  The war ended before Lee’s VII 
Corps saw any action against Spanish forces. 
In Havana (the city), General William Ludlow commanded American forces.  
Ludlow, unlike his peers in department command, was the sole career army officer.  An 1864 
West Point graduate, Ludlow served in both the Civil War and the wars against the tribes of 
the Great Plains in the Dakotas.  Ludlow’s combat record and his abilities as an engineer 
drove his ascent to prominence. Ludlow’s commitment to honest and efficient management, 
particularly during his time in Philadelphia, where he defeated efforts to manipulate 
contracts, further elevated his visibility within elite political circles.56  During the war with 
Spain, Ludlow commanded a brigade and saw action at El Caney and the siege of Santiago.  
Before becoming responsible as a civil administrator in Havana, Ludlow had overseen the 
city’s security as it prepared for the upcoming transfer of sovereignty ceremony between the 
United States and Spain.57 
Of the department commanders in Cuba, Leonard Wood’s path to command was the 
least traditional.  Wood was originally commissioned as a contract surgeon for the Army’s 
campaign against the Apaches under Geronimo in 1886.  Wood served for the duration of the 
campaign and received the Medal of Honor for his role in carrying dispatches through hostile 
Apache territory and his command of an infantry detachment that engaged the Apache in 
hand to hand fighting.  In 1891, Wood continued to serve as a captain in the Regular Army 
and as President McKinley’s personal physician.  When war with Spain became imminent, 
Wood, in conjunction with Theodore Roosevelt, organized the Rough Riders and earned a 
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volunteer commission as a colonel.  After Wood’s performance at Las Guasimas and the 
opening of a vacancy in a brigade command, he was field promoted to brigadier general of 
volunteers.  Soon after, Wood was appointed as the military governor of the city of Santiago 
in eastern Cuba and, after the surrender of Spanish forces, as governor of Santiago and 
Puerto Principe provinces.58 
In central Cuba, McKinley appointed General James H. Wilson to supervise the 
Army’s efforts in Mantanzas and Santa Clara.  Wilson, a West Point graduate, saw extensive 
service during the Civil War as a cavalry officer and became an intimate friend and protégé 
of Ulysses S. Grant. Grant appointed Wilson to several key commands that resulted in his 
meteoric rise to fame after his defeat of Nathan Bedford Forrest. Wilson briefly participated 
in Reconstruction in Georgia where his men captured Jefferson Davis and the infamous 
commandant of Andersonville Prison, Henry Wirz.  After the war, Wilson left the Army and 
turned to business and politics.  In Delaware, he became a prominent member of the 
Republican Party and maintained extensive political and social contacts that garnered him 
enough prominence within Republican circles to enable his return to the Army as a brigadier 
general during the outbreak of the war with Spain.  Wilson’s command never reached Cuba 
before the fighting ended but McKinley ordered  him to Cuba in advance of his men to take 
control of the Army’s reconstruction efforts in central Cuba.  He was the last of the American 
department commanders to be appointed and the last to arrive in theater.59 
To unify the U.S. Army’s efforts in Cuba, the President appointed Major General 
John R. Brooke to command the newly created Military Division of Cuba.  Brooke was an 
experienced soldier.  Originally commissioned as volunteer officer during the Civil War, 
Brooke rose to prominence through his actions at Fair Oaks, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Cold 
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Harbor.  After the war, his record of wartime service earned his eventual promotion to brevet 
major general of volunteers, which Brooke later traded for the brevet rank of brigadier 
general in the Regular Army.60  After the Army’s draw down, Brooke lost his brevet rank and 
eventually worked his way back up to the rank of colonel and commanded the 13th Infantry 
and 7th U.S. Cavalry.  While in command of the 7th Cavalry, Brooke participated in the 
suppression of the Ghost Dance, which culminated in the Battle of Wounded Knee.61  Brooke 
weathered the controversy surrounding the battle and continued his career.   
When hostilities broke out with Spain, Brooke was in command of the I Corps and 
participated in the relatively bloodless invasion and conquest of Puerto Rico, an operation 
designed to facilitate American operations in Cuba.  After Spain’s capitulation, he remained 
in command in Puerto Rico until President McKinley recalled him to serve as the military 
governor of Cuba.62  At the age of sixty, Brooke was near the end of his career in the Army.  
His appointment to command in Cuba baffled many contemporary observers.  According to 
some, Brooke, while an honorable man, appeared to lack the energy and vigor of some of his 
younger colleagues in service.  His subordinates in Cuba viewed his promotion to command 
with a mixture of envy and venom: General Wilson termed him a “stupid and inexperienced 
person in all matters pertaining to civil life or the administration of government.  He is close, 
also, to the retiring age, and very torpid in his intellectual operations.”63 Thus with Brooke’s 
arrival in Cuba, the Army began to plan for its first international reconstruction mission 
abroad. 
 
 
 
 42 
                                                
1 Healey, United States in Cuba, 7. 
2 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 18-19. 
3 Healey, United States in Cuba, 7. 
4  Ibid, 8. 
5 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 42-45. 
6 Ibid, 47. 
7 Ibid, 49; Jack Cameron Dierks, A Leap to Arms: The Cuban Campaign of 1898 (New York: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1970), 11. 
8 Weyler is quoted in Pérez, Between Reform and Revolution, 165. 
9 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 53-55. 
10 Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 1: 77. 
11 Pérez, Between Reform and Revolution, 165-68. 
12 Healey, United States in Cuba, 9. 
13 Ibid, 10-12. 
14 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 144-48. 
15 Healey, United States in Cuba, 13. 
16 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 148. 
17 Healey, United States in Cuba, 57. 
18 John R. Brooke, Civil Report of Major-General John R. Brooke: Military Governor, Island of Cuba 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 8.  General Brooke included many of his subordinates’ 
reports in his finished Civil Report. Where there is a different author for a document other than General Brooke 
the citation will read: author name, “document title,” date (where applicable), Civil Report, page number.  After 
the initial citation of a subordinate’s report, an abbreviated title for the report will be used.  Where General 
Brooke is the author, standard Chicago style citation will be followed.  
19 Edgar S. Dudley, “Report of Major Edgar S. Dudley, U.S.V., Judge Advocate Division of Cuba,” 30 
September 1899, Civil Report, 164. 
20 Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 148. 
21 Healey, United States in Cuba, 13-15. 
22 William McKinley, message to the Congress of the United States on Intervention in Cuba, on April 11, 1898 
to the United States Senate, 55th Cong., 2nd sess.: 3702, accessed August 5, 2014, 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/congressional/docview/t19.d20.cr-1898-
0411?accountid=7082. 
23 Quoted in Healey, United States in Cuba, 23-24. 
24 Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the 
Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land 
and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect, Res. 24, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., (April 
20, 1898), accessed August 5, 2014, HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/congressional/docview/t53.d54.00030-stat-0738-000024?accountid=7082. 
25 Pérez, War of 1898, 20-21. 
26 Healey, United States in Cuba, 27-29. 
27 William R. Roberts, “Reform and Revitalization,” in Against All Enemies, ed. Kenneth Hagan, William 
Roberts (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 197-202; James Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century 
(New York: Free Press, 1981), 187.   
28 Cosmas, United States Army, 31.   
29 John McAllister Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 526-
28, accessed December 14, 2014, EBSCO E-book. 
30 Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 
51. 
31 Wilson, Under the Old Flag, 2:344-45. 
32 Coffman, The Regulars, 170-71; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in 
Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 276; Timothy K. Nenninger, “The Army 
Enters the Twentieth Century, 1904-1917,” in Against All Enemies, 227-28. 
33 Cosmas, The United States Army, 204-06. 
34 Dierks, A Leap to Arms,175-76. 
 43 
                                                                                                                                                  
35 Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:362-65. 
36 Dierks, A Leap to Arms, 87. 
37 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders: An Autobiography (1899; repr., New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 
2004), 65. 
38 Gerald F. Linderman, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1974), 138; Djerks, A Leap to Arms, 87. 
39 Linderman, Mirror of War, 140; Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:356. 
40 Wood is quoted in Linderman, Mirror of War,138-139. 
41 Linderman, Mirror of War,138-139; Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:360-62. 
42 Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:339. 
43 Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:356-58. 
44 Linderman, Mirror of War, 141; Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:368. 
45 Calixto García, “Gen. García’s Withdrawal,” Washington Post, July 23, 1898, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.lib-
ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/docview/143986438?accountid=7082. 
46 Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 2:373. 
47 Linderman, Mirror of War, 144. 
48 Cosmas, United States Army, 255-57. 
49 Cosmas, United States Army, 258-63. 
50 Birtle, U.S. Counterinsurgency, 4-5. 
51 Brian Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 9; Birtle, U.S. 
Counterinsurgency, 48. 
52 John Bigelow, The Principles of Strategy Illustrated Mainly From American Campaigns, 2nd ed. (1894; repr., 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 241-5. 
53 Wilson, Under the Old Flag, 2:492. 
54 Brooke, Civil Report, 9. 
55 John H. Eicher and David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 343. 
56 Gillette, “Workshop of Progressivism,” 412. 
57 Healey, United States in Cuba, 59. 
58 McCallum, Leonard Wood, 4-5. 
59 Eicher and Eicher, Civil War High Commands, 574. 
60 Eicher and Eicher, Civil War High Commands,145. 
61 “John Rutter Brooke Papers,” The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, accessed January 5, 2015, 
http://www2.hsp.org/collections/manuscripts/b/brooke0078.html#ref3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Wilson to John J. McCook, 10 December 1898, 245-48, Box 43, Wilson Papers.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
CHAPTER III 
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY AND THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION 
On July 11, 1899 Captain Francis P. Fremont, the U.S. commander in Sancti Spíritus, 
received a letter from the local alcalde.  Relations between the town’s ayutamiento and the 
local garrison commander were tense as usual. The municipal council was jealous of its 
authority and worked to exclude the post commander from the town’s business as much as 
possible. In the past, Fremont ignored these tensions and tried to maintain constructive 
relations with the ayutamiento by grudgingly deferring to the council’s authority in civil 
affairs.  Recently, however, Fremont’s chain of command directed him to order the city to 
restore a local Spanish resident’s right to collect fees from vendors using the town’s local 
market, a privilege that the ayutamiento strenuously opposed.  Fremont had delivered those 
orders and the letter he now held contained the city council’s response.  The mayor’s 
message informed Fremont that the city council voted unanimously to reject the American 
military government’s orders to re-instate the local Spaniard’s concession and instead chose 
to appeal to the audencia in Havana for a decision.1   
After Fremont received the alcalde’s communication, he requested a meeting with the 
town’s mayor to search for a solution to the impasse that the council’s position presented.  
The meeting did not go as he intended. The mayor explained that Cuba’s civil government 
was superior to the island’s military government and that Fremont lacked the legal authority 
to order the ayutamiento to do anything.  He also informed Fremont that until the provincial 
court made a decision, the ayutamiento intended to ignore any further orders on this subject 
from the American Army in Cuba.2  The city council and the town’s troublesome alcalde 
frequently dared Fremont to use force to impose his will on the local municipal government.  
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Fremont believed that this confrontational strategy was intended to make the imposition of 
American policy, “a military act so as to render it null in the eyes of the law.”3 Fremont, as 
was his usual habit, appealed to his commander for additional guidance.  Meanwhile, the 
defiant local government remained free to run the town and its affairs.     
This result stands in contrast to the established narrative of the role of the American 
Army in Cuba.  Critics of the U.S. intervention allege that the Army of Occupation’s real 
objective was to maintain some form of indefinite rule over the island. The evidence from 
Cuban civil officials, however, suggests that this is an overly simplistic view. As Captain 
Fremont could attest, U.S. commanders found their exercise of even modest political control 
contested during the first year of the occupation. Cubans regularly challenged their authority 
and ignored directives from the army when it suited local interests.  If the United States 
pursued a policy designed to control the island’s affairs, how and why did situations such as 
the one in Sancti Spíritus develop?   The next section of this thesis contends that the United 
States Army in Cuba was not pursuing a policy of annexation or indefinite rule and that this 
in part explains how and why the ayutamiento of Sancti Spíritus remained able to defy 
American preferences about their local affairs.    
There are four important arguments that challenge the dominant annexationist 
account of American policy toward Cuba.  First, President McKinley’s instructions to 
General Brooke contained no references to annexation.  Instead, the President emphasized 
the necessity of preparing Cuba for future independence.  While the debate over McKinley’s 
intentions toward Cuba will likely never end conclusively, this thesis contends Brooke 
observed a narrow interpretation of his guidance.  Accordingly, the military government that 
he designed gave Cubans considerable autonomy both in their national and local affairs.  
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After the initial months of the occupation, Cuban civilians possessed authority that enabled 
them to set the direction and organization of important aspects of Cuba’s developing civil 
institutions and affairs.  This remained true even where the exercise of this authority ran 
contrary to the Army of Occupation’s preferences.  
Two other arguments also dispute the idea that the American Army of Occupation 
followed a fixed policy of annexation. Whenever military officials considered annexation 
these discussions remained confined to Brooke and his top subordinates and indicated only 
one of several future possible directions for U.S. strategy on the island, not its present course. 
Equally important, garrison commanders maintained a much different interpretation of their 
mission, namely to assist Cuba in founding an independent government. Finally, this thesis 
maintains that the Army of Occupation did not preserve the island’s former colonial elites’ 
status or privileges in exchange for indigenous political support for an American program of 
annexation. Instead, U.S. commanders terminated many of these special dispensations and 
refused to even consider using troops to maintain the few remaining Spanish legal privileges 
that the Army of Occupation considered legitimate.  If the American Army pursued a 
strategy of co-option, it was not by preserving these elites’ economic and social status. 
Form A Free And Independent Government 
The conclusion of Spanish-American War placed the American Army’s authority to 
remain in Cuba on ambiguous legal footing. Congress’ declaration of war only provided a 
narrow definition of the purpose of intervention, to drive Spanish forces from the island and 
to provide “for the pacification thereof.”  Thus, before any military occupation could be 
undertaken, President McKinley had to explain why the American Army possessed the right 
to maintain control of Cuba’s sovereignty. McKinley offered this justification as well as a 
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“few unofficial suggestions” to his new commander in Havana. These instructions 
constituted the only official and comprehensive guidance the President provided to the Army 
in Cuba during the first year of the occupation.4   
McKinley defended his right to maintain American forces in Cuba by claiming U.S. 
authority to govern Cuba originated in “the right of the belligerent over conquered territory.”5  
The President’s language was less a statement of ideological intent than an invocation of 
important legal precedent. His discussion of belligerent rights offered a paraphrased version 
of President Abraham Lincoln’s General Order 100 which declared, “A place, district, or 
country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the Martial 
Law of the occupying Army. . .Martial Law is the immediate and direct effect and 
consequence of occupation or conquest.  The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial 
Law.”6 After the Civil War, General Order 100 and its basic philosophy of the rights and 
obligations of occupying powers gained considerable legitimacy in international law. 
Consequently, the War Department re-issued it in an abbreviated form to commanders during 
the war with Spain to govern American conduct over seas.7 Thus, rather than a justification 
of territorial aggrandizement, McKinley was informing his subordinate that the Army’s 
continued control of Cuban sovereignty was sanctioned by both American and international 
law.  
 McKinley also offered his senior commander a brief statement of his intent for U.S. 
troops in Cuba.  The President ordered Brooke to provide military government on the island 
until a “firm and stable government” capable of fulfilling its “international obligations” could 
be formed or Congress provided for an alternative policy. McKinley’s timeline for the 
creation of such a government remained unclear but Brooke’s Commander-in-Chief warned 
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that American political control of Cuba was “temporary.”  Furthermore, the President 
concluded his instructions by unequivocally stating that it was America’s duty, “to assist 
them [Cuba] to form a government which shall be free and independent, thus realizing the 
best aspirations of the Cuban people.”8 McKinley’s language was not a mistake and if he had 
wanted to indicate a policy of annexation or a variation of it, he would have said so.  
McKinley, had in fact, communicated just such a policy the day prior to the U.S. commander 
in the Philippines, referring to annexation as “benevolent assimilation.”9 Whatever 
McKinley’s personal views, his guidance and its affirmation of Cuban independence 
demonstrated that, at least on an official basis, the President intended to follow the spirit of 
Congressional law governing American relations with Cuba.   
  McKinley’s instructions also included directions about the basic organization of 
Cuba’s legal system.  The President ordered Brooke to maintain the civil and criminal codes 
that existed prior to the end of Spanish sovereignty.10  Scholars of American empire have 
never adequately explained how this portion of McKinley’s instructions and Brooke’s 
subsequent implementation of it figured into McKinley Administration designs for 
annexation.  The Spanish legal system remained alien to many Americans and fundamentally 
incompatible with the United States’ English inspired system of justice in both its 
organization and function.  The retention of Spain’s legal system and customs would act as 
an impediment to annexation, not facilitate it.  Furthermore, by preserving Spanish style 
justice in Cuba, the President made any advocacy of annexation vulnerable to racist 
opposition. U.S. commanders in Cuba viewed the Spanish legal system as incompatible with 
basic human rights and indicative of Spain’s decadent civilization.11  The broader public’s 
reception to the maintenance of Spanish legal traditions was not likely to be any more 
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positive.  This concern was prevalent enough that General Wilson felt compelled to defend 
Cuba’s system of justice to influential members of the Senate by comparing it favorably with 
the courts in the American South.12 Consequently, McKinley’s decision to maintain Spain’s 
legal system demonstrated an important way in which the President prioritized order over the 
pursuit of territorial aggrandizement by the United States.   
Likewise, McKinley issued Brooke a list of political priorities that he believed were 
important to Cuba’s future.  The President admonished Brooke that despite the character of 
the occupation government that he needed to exercise military authority in the best interest of 
people with rights and property on the island.  This included encouraging municipal reform, 
improvements in sanitation and education, and ensuring that the Cuban court system 
executed justice in a “pure and impartial” manner.13  What all of these concerns have in 
common is their ability to enhance stability.  The effective administration of the law 
safeguarded society against disorder by prosecuting crime and by maintaining the integrity of 
contracts, a key element in the functioning of the economy.  Additionally, sanitation 
improvements prevented the spread of disease.  Disease, criminality, and economic 
dislocation are common harbingers of disorder and disruption in civil society.  The 
President’s list of priorities addressed each and illustrated that McKinley viewed these issues 
as a top concern that required Brooke’s specific attention.    
Brooke’s Commander-in-Chief also discussed his view of Cuba’s political situation.  
McKinley suggested that Brooke socialize with the leaders of the island’s different social and 
political elements in order to encourage their confidence in America’s humanitarian purpose 
in occupying Cuba.  McKinley warned his subordinate to avoid alienating any group or 
faction during the course of his administration.14  The President’s instructions demonstrate 
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that, at least initially, McKinley was not looking to mobilize political support for any 
particular political settlement in Cuba.  Any plans—such as annexation—required his 
commander in Cuba to be partial about his political affiliations. In a letter much later in his 
administration, Brooke confirmed this assessment.  He complained to the President that his 
instructions to remain politically neutral hampered his ability to mingle with Cuba’s political 
elites.15  Thus, despite whatever previous policies or strategic interests McKinley envisioned 
for Cuba, his guidance to Brooke hindered rather than facilitated any future plans to maintain 
indefinite American rule on the island.     
 Once the President issued his orders, their implementation was now up to his 
subordinates in Cuba. Commanders are guided by more than just instructions from their 
superiors; their prejudices and professional experiences direct the manner and methods 
soldiers use to pursue their assigned objectives. Consequently, how General Brooke, as the 
President’s most important representative in Cuba, construed McKinley’s guidance is critical 
to understanding how the American Army of Occupation initially envisioned its role and 
purpose.   
Upon his assumption to command of the Military Division of Cuba, Brooke issued a 
proclamation that outlined the basic framework of his military government.  He began with 
an explanation of the purpose and scope of the army’s efforts.  Brooke maintained that the 
reason for American intervention was to end the “distressing condition” of the people of the 
island.  He then claimed the purpose of the military government was, “to give protection to 
the people, security to the person [sic] and property, to restore confidence, to encourage 
people to resume the pursuits of peace…and to afford full protection in the exercise of all 
civil and religious rights.”16  Every reason that the general enumerated was a direct quotation 
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from the President’s original orders.17  Additionally, he ordered Spanish civil and criminal 
law to remain in effect.  Finally, Brooke invited all of Cuba’s people to cooperate with his 
administration without regard to any of their previous affiliations and declared himself 
available for consultation over matters of public interest with anyone.  Brooke did not add 
any new ideas or language that indicated any deviation from McKinley’s original guidance.  
His statement of American intentions and the general direction of his government in Cuba 
was the first sign that he intended to implement an almost literal interpretation of the 
President’s orders.     
While Brooke’s proclamation omitted any reference to how long the United States 
would retain troops on the island, it is clear Brooke viewed McKinley’s commitment to a 
future free and self-governing Cuba seriously. In his edict, Brooke proclaimed that it was his 
desire to carry out the island’s governance through civil channels “although under military 
control.” The civil channels Brooke envisioned were Cuban, not American. The general 
appointed Cubans to fill the vacancies in the island’s civil institutions and announced to his 
subordinates that it was his desire to transition the island to civil rule as quickly as a civilian 
led government could be organized. This was not a transitory view either. He maintained his 
emphasis on prioritizing the development of a Cuban controlled civil administration and 
described his government’s initial efforts as a “stage on the highway of progress” as late as 
October of 1899, implying that Cuban control over the island’s affairs remained his ultimate 
goal.18 Thus, the vision of military government that Brooke outlined at the onset of his 
command was not a temporary expedient but an affirmative expression of the American 
Army’s mission in Cuba as assigned to him by the President.   
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Brooke’s proclamation also illustrated the complexity of the situation by what it did 
not carry over from McKinley’s instructions. Significantly, his public edict omitted any 
reference to Cuba’s future political status and instead declared that, “our humanitarian 
purposes will insure kind and beneficent government.”19 This language was hardly an 
endorsement of Cuban independence and lacked any real indication of what American 
authorities in Havana intended. This absence is even more notable because the President had 
vetted Brooke’s declaration of military government.20 How much McKinley edited Brooke’s 
speech is unclear, but at a minimum the President endorsed his commander’s evasive 
wording on the subject of Cuba’s political future.  For whatever reason, the President wanted 
to avoid a public commitment to Cuban independence and yet from his initial instructions to 
Brooke, it is not certain that McKinley remained committed to a policy of annexation either.  
Although there are several possible explanations for the divergence between McKinley’s 
public and private stances on Cuban independence, McKinley’s guarded style of politics 
renders most of these explanations speculative.   
The existence of contradictory evidence of McKinley’s real position on Cuban 
independence has not prevented historians from offering their own interpretations of the 
President’s actions and remains the subject of intense historical debate. Despite McKinley’s 
instructions and Brooke’s careful observance of them, many historians continue to view 
American policy as animated by a secret desire to annex Cuba.  Most of these historical 
accounts fail to acknowledge McKinley’s affirmative commitment to a “free and 
independent” Cuba and are dismissive of the value of his instructions to Brooke as guidance 
for the island’s political future since his guidance offered no definitive outline of how a 
transfer of sovereignty would work.21 While it is true that the President failed to address 
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important questions about how and when the United States would transfer sovereignty to a 
Cuban government that is not proof of U.S. intentions to remain in control of the island 
indefinitely. Many of McKinley’s biographers observed that he demonstrated a preference 
for policies that emphasized order and encouraged political consensus.22  McKinley’s 
“unofficial suggestions” to Brooke seem well within that tradition, underscoring the need to 
restore and maintain order on the island while simultaneously avoiding publicly antagonizing 
either the annexationist or the anti-imperialist movement in the United States.  In effect, 
McKinley’s decision not to publicly commit to any particular course in Cuba allowed him 
maximum political flexibility at home and seems the best explanation of his willingness to 
endorse Brooke’s evasive wording on Cuban independence.  
 If McKinley did have a secret agenda to annex Cuba, there is no evidence that 
Brooke was a party to it.  Rather, Brooke interpreted McKinley’s instructions literally and 
envisioned a military government predicated on the transfer of authority from the United 
States Army to Cuban civil authorities as quickly as possible.  Furthermore, he informed 
McKinley about how he intended to implement his guidance, offering his superior a chance 
to make any modifications to Brooke’s scheme of government.23 The President did not veto 
or even adjust Brooke’s proposal for the island’s administration.   If McKinley continued to 
plan to annex Cuba, then why allow Brooke to empower Cuban civilians at the army’s 
expense? As other annexationists observed, Cuba’s civilians could strengthen their own 
political factions while weakening support for annexation. When Brooke’s ideas are viewed 
in the entire context of the President’s guidance, the simpler and more likely explanation is 
that Brooke’s plan fulfilled McKinley’s intent enough that the President declined to intervene 
in the details of the island’s governance any further.  Thus, a balanced evaluation is that 
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American policy toward Cuba’s future might best be characterized as ambiguous, but that its 
immediate priority was the maintenance of public order.   
A Cuban Close Corporation 
For the organization of the civil administration of the central government in Havana, 
Brooke assumed control of Spain’s colonial administration without any substantial changes 
and appointed Cuban civilians to head each department. He chose Domingo Méndez Capote 
to lead the Department of State and Government, Pablo Desvernine to supervise the 
Department of Finance, José Antonio Gonzáles Lanuza to oversee the Department of Justice 
and Public Instruction, and finally Aldolfo Yanez to manage the multi-purpose Department 
of Agriculture, Industries, Commerce and Public Works. Brooke withheld control of the 
island’s postal system and its customs revenues (upon the orders of the Secretary of War).24 
American commanders throughout the island referred to Brooke’s department heads as his 
“Cuban Cabinet.” As a body, these men held broad authority to govern despite continued 
U.S. control of the island’s revenues.  Brooke both sought their contributions in the 
development of policy and used his Cabinet to implement his guidance.  Moreover, he 
respected their opinions on important political matters enough that they even assisted Brooke 
with sensitive political tasks in the United States.25 Brooke intended the Cabinet to fulfill 
McKinley’s order to “maintain the forms and rules that pertain to civil government” while 
also providing the general an administration of the civil character that he believed necessary 
to prepare Cuba for self-government.26   
At the provincial level, Brooke inherited a district system already partially designed 
by President McKinley.  McKinley organized Cuba’s provinces into military departments 
and assigned a general officer to assist Brooke in their governance. Two provinces composed 
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each department (except for the city of Havana which was administered by itself).27 The 
President suggested that Brooke consult with these department commanders in order to 
secure “uniformity of purpose” but left unstated any particular role or responsibilities Brooke 
should assign to them.28 For the civil administration of Cuba’s provinces, Brooke did not 
attempt to mirror McKinley’s military department structure.  Instead, he re-constituted 
Spain’s provincial governments and appointed Cuban civilians to manage each of the 
provinces and to implement the administrative orders of the Cuban Cabinet.29  In theory, each 
provincial governor remained answerable to both the central government in Havana and the 
U.S. commanders at the department and provincial levels responsible for ensuring that they 
administered the government effectively.  
At the municipal level, Brooke maintained the basic form and functions of civil 
administration as it existed under Spanish rule.  City councils (ayutamientos) and mayors 
(alcaldes) administered government business. Brooke also continued the Spanish practice of 
selecting or at least confirming the authority of existing municipal officials.  Unlike the 
relatively few number of provinces, there were far too many municipalities to cover with the 
existing amount of American troops. As a result, U.S. garrisons occupied only the most 
strategically important municipalities in an effort to economize their efforts.  While 
municipal governments were hardly independent entities under Spanish colonial 
administration, they still controlled important aspects of daily Cuban life.  These 
responsibilities included the regulation of local businesses and the enforcement of elements 
of the island’s byzantine tax system.  Consequently, under Brooke, municipal governments 
continued to be an important component of the island’s governance.30 
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Since Brooke maintained the Spanish practice of appointing civil officials to fill 
government vacancies, he needed help in identifying and certifying officials for positions 
throughout his government. His desire to employ Cuban civilians to these offices made his 
vision of government vulnerable to passive resistance to American authority. Cubans could 
defeat the general’s purpose simply by refusing to accept jobs in his administration.  To 
ensure that none of Cuba’s major political factions boycotted participation in his government, 
Brooke conferred with Cuba’s major political parties in his selection of personnel to assign to 
the central, provincial, and municipal governments.31 He recognized the intense distrust of 
American motives by both Cuba’s political class and the CLA and decided that soliciting 
Cuban opinion on his appointments would reduce this suspicion.32 Thus, with the dual civil-
military government established, Brooke and his subordinates, both military and civilian, 
turned to the business of governing. 
The ponderous structure of the military government created many instances of 
overlapping authority between American commanders and Cuban appointees.  By late 
February, tensions between the Cuban Cabinet and U.S. department commanders forced 
Brooke to clarify the appropriate roles for each component of his administration. He decided 
that Cuba’s civil government now took primacy. His guidance also refined the role of the 
military departments.  Brooke charged them with supervising every aspect of Cuba’s 
government within their jurisdictions and to report on the efficiency and competence of the 
Cuban civil administration.33  This decision to elevate the Cuban civil government over his 
commanders mitigated much but not all of the confusion. Brooke’s department commanders 
frequently challenged his Cabinet’s authority leading to frequent headaches for the general.   
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The implications of Brooke’s order did not take long to manifest themselves. The 
Cuban Cabinet began to take the lead on questions of national importance in Cuba.  Two 
concerns in particular confronted the central government that required resolution.  First, how 
would the island’s government sever its relationship with the Catholic Church?  Under 
Spanish law, the Catholic Church retained significant legal and economic privileges that 
required examination by the central administration in Havana.  Second, how would the 
Cabinet deal with the re-organization of Cuba’s municipal government and in particular its 
excessive number of employees? Both issues were complex and defied easy solutions.  
Nevertheless, Brooke’s Cuban Cabinet seized the opportunities these problems represented 
and used them to establish their authority. 
 At the conclusion of the war with Spain, the Catholic Church maintained significant 
influence within Cuba and was growing in potential political significance back in the United 
States.34 Brooke remained cognizant of the necessity of respecting the legitimate “legal rights 
of the Catholic Church” while balancing these rights with the powers of Cuba’s budding civil 
institutions. Spain’s frequent delegation of power to the Church in areas traditionally 
managed by secular officials in the United States became an endemic legal problem for 
Brooke.35  One of the areas of overlap in authority between the Church and the state lay in 
marriage and divorce.  Spanish law entrusted responsibility for regulating Catholic marriages 
to the Church, which had to conform to canonical practices in Spain. The Spanish 
government recognized non-Catholic marriages but these ceremonies had to be performed by 
Spanish municipal officials in order to obtain recognition under Spanish law.  In both cases, 
however, only Catholic ecclesiastical courts could nullify marriages or grant divorces and 
these courts’ decisions retained the power of civil law.36 
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 The island’s Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction reviewed the legal status of 
the Catholic Church’s control over marriage and divorce proceedings and provided Brooke 
recommendations on how to appropriately limit the Church’s authority. Secretary Gonzáles 
Lanuza attacked the philosophical premise of the Church’s meddling in the legal aspects 
marriage.  He contended that the Church’s ability to recognize the formation or dissolution of 
families and to lend their interpretation the power of law gave the Church tremendous 
influence over the basic building block of Cuba’s society: the family.  Gonzáles Lanuza 
concluded that this power was best controlled by the new Cuban state.  He advised Brooke to 
only offer legal recognition to marriages contracted in accordance with the island’s civil laws 
and certified by its secular officials, eliminating any legal powers for the Church.  Similarly, 
Gonzáles Lanuza recommended that divorce proceedings likewise be evaluated by Cuba’s 
civil code, not ecclesiastical law.37 
 Needless to say, this was a radical change loaded with political consequences, not 
only in Cuba but also back in the United States.  The Catholic Church, led by the Bishop of 
Havana, opposed Gonzáles Lanuza’s proposed reforms and lobbied Catholic officials in the 
United States to pressure the McKinley Administration to preserve the Church’s authority.  
The Bishop succeeded; Catholic opposition rose both in Cuba and in the United States. The 
Catholic public’s outrage was deep and sustained.  Almost a year later, the issue remained 
resonant.  General Wood described Catholic opposition to changes in the marriage law as, 
“one of the greatest difficulties which my predecessor left me.”38 Whatever the outcome, the 
Church refused to let Brooke’s Cabinet make changes without a fight.   
Gonzáles Lanuza’s critics condemned the practical and religious implications of his 
recommendations.  The plan’s detractors objected that civil authorities in the United States 
 59 
recognized religious marriage ceremonies as legally valid. Why should the Church not be 
allowed the same status in Cuba?  Additionally, any proposal that forced Catholics to 
recertify their marriages to secular officials or to face the prospect of having their unions 
invalidated infuriated many Catholics.39  More practically, Gonzáles Lanuza’s reforms could 
potentially lead to legal complications.  In Cuban law, proving a marriage’s legal validity 
remained an important component of resolving inheritance disputes and estate settlements.  
Any changes to the current system threatened to make the current ponderous litigation 
process even worse.  
Despite the furor, Brooke sustained Gonzáles Lanuza and issued General Order No. 
66.  This directive declared all marriages performed by any religious officiate as legally valid 
as long as the marriage applicants believed themselves lawfully wedded and the couple met 
the government’s minimum burden of proof.40  Additionally, in General Order No. 57, he 
mandated that only Cuba’s civil code would govern Cuba’s divorce proceedings.41  Brooke 
appears to have adopted all of Gonzáles Lanuza’s original recommendations.  The Cuban 
Cabinet had spoken and on the issue of the Church’s legal authority, Brooke listened and 
gave their recommendations the force of law.   
 Like the issue of curtailing the power of the Catholic Church, Brooke and his Cabinet 
also confronted the peculiar problem of what to do about Cuba’s municipal employees who 
held their positions as a form of property purchased from the government.  Brooke knew that 
Cuba’s municipal civil service needed serious reform. Cuba’s western provincial and local 
governments were bankrupt and the combination of corruption and ineffective civil 
administration hindered the island’s recovery.42 Local governments needed to streamline 
their budgets and increase their revenues. The problem, however, was that most 
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municipalities could do neither.  They lacked the power to terminate civil servants who held 
office as property.  Further complicating matters, the Spanish government promised many of 
these employees a fixed percentage of the revenues they collected as a part of their duties.  
The situation required intervention by the central administration, but how was this to be 
effected without making the provincial and local governments dependent on the financial 
resources of the central administration in Havana?   
Before Brooke’s civil administration was organized enough to assume its authority, 
elements of the American Army of Occupation attempted to simplify Cuba’s municipal 
budgets by eliminating unnecessary expenditures, including purging excessive municipal 
employees.   These efforts, however, ran afoul of Spain’s legal code. Civil servants who 
owned their positions could only be dismissed by the determination of a “competent 
authority.”  Normally, this was a judge or a high-ranking executive official.  The fired 
municipal employees petitioned audencias around the island to reinstate them, arguing that 
American commanders did not qualify as a “competent authority.” González Lanuza agreed 
and openly doubted that Cuba’s courts would recognize U.S. military officers as meeting the 
legal qualifications to nullify these civil employees’ property rights. Instead, the Secretary 
recommended that his department file legal briefs denying any obligation on the part of the 
U.S. government to preserve privileges granted by Spanish authorities after their transfer of 
sovereignty to the United States.43  
The Secretary of State and Government, Domingo Méndez Capote, offered an 
alternative solution.  He claimed that Spanish law empowered his department to credential 
and dismiss mayors, city councilmen, re-organize municipalities, and in general to provide 
decisions “arising from interpretation of municipal laws, and all others affecting the general 
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locality.”44 Thus, the Department of State and Government, could in theory, act as the 
competent authority the military government needed to re-organize Cuba’s municipal 
employees.  Méndez Capote’s recommendation provided a neat solution to what otherwise 
might become a protracted legal battle with an uncertain outcome.    
While it is unclear how the central government in Havana decided to handle these 
specific petitions, what is clear is that Méndez Capote jealously guarded the prerogatives of 
his department when it came to dismissals.  U.S. commanders could not fire any civil official 
until Méndez Capote’s department approved it.  Leonard Wood complained in March of 
1899 that American military department commanders were becoming objects of “contempt.” 
Wood characterized the consequences of the Secretary’s assertion of authority as 
“disastrous” and claimed that his review process, “destroys the exemplary character of the 
punishment effected by the ultimate removal of dishonest or incompetent officials.”45 
Wood’s complaints to the Secretary of War did have some effect.  In April of 1899, Brooke 
gave his military department commanders the power to immediately suspend civil officials 
but sustained Méndez Capote’s authority to investigate the suspension and make a final 
determination.46  Thus, Brooke’s support for Méndez Capote and his authority demonstrated 
yet another way in which the Cuban Cabinet exercised important authority to govern the 
island.  
Wood’s subordination to the Cabinet’s authority over this issue and others led Wood 
to complain to Theodore Roosevelt that the Cuban Cabinet was deliberately sabotaging 
American efforts on the island.  The Cabinet, Wood believed, desired a withdrawal of the 
U.S. occupation.47 Whatever their real intentions, the Cuban Secretaries clearly possessed 
significant authority within Brooke’s administration.  The Cabinet made key 
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recommendations that defined important boundaries in the occupation government’s relations 
with the Catholic Church.  Similarly, Méndez Capote’s defense of his department’s 
traditional responsibilities served to insulate Brooke’s regime from legal scrutiny, as well as 
provided Cubans the final say in the organization of their own civil service.  Neither of these 
responsibilities was trivial.   
The broad authority that Brooke afforded his central administration also allowed the 
individual municipalities considerable independence in the development of their own affairs.  
The officers of the Army of Occupation in Cuba interpreted Brooke’s guidance from 
February in a literal fashion.  Various echelons of the chain of command issued orders not to 
interfere with the civil administration of local government except on an emergency basis.48  
Cuban local governments exercised their power through several avenues.   
One of the most important ways that municipalities exhibited control over their affairs 
was through their management of their finances.  In the town of Sancti Spíritus, the town’s 
mayor, Dr. F. Canncio, an ardent Cuban nationalist, refused to divulge any information about 
the town’s spending or its level of indebtedness to the local garrison commander.  Fremont 
frequently resorted to speculation about the town’s spending priorities and in some cases 
only learned about the completion of major public works by accident.49  He described the 
mayor’s financial transparency as that of a “close corporation.”50  Nor was this just one 
quarrelsome Cuban official.  After Canncio’s resignation from office, the incoming 
ayutamiento and alcalde still asserted their right to certify the municipality’s debts and to 
control municipal spending.51  The U.S. commander had no role in either process. Thus, 
Fremont’s inability to determine how Sancti Spíritus expended its funds and the alcalde’s flat 
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refusal to brook American interference in the city’s financial decisions illustrated that Cuban 
civil officials in Sancti Spíritus ran their city and its budget according to their own priorities.   
Another way that Cuba’s municipalities exercised their authority was by controlling 
contract work within their towns.  Ayutamientos and the alcaldes often began significant 
public projects without any prompting from local U.S. garrisons.  The alcalde of Sagua La 
Grande negotiated and implemented a contract to improve the local orphan asylum that 
installed new sinks, latrines, baths, and a sanitary white washing of the facilities.  When the 
American commander at Sagua La Grande barracks notified the alcalde that additional funds 
for sanitation projects were available, the alcalde and his town health officer developed a 
plan to spend the funds sanitizing the town, much to the local garrison commander’s 
approval.52  A similar situation prevailed in Cienfuegos.  American medical personnel, 
working in cooperation with the town’s officials, inspected the town and its charitable 
institutions’ sanitation infrastructure. The alcalde corrected the worst deficiencies without 
any further American intervention.53  In both Cienfuegos and Sagua La Grande, the town’s 
civil officials and their development of their communities’ contract work demonstrated not 
only their continued capacity to manage their own affairs but their willingness to do so 
independent of the army’s direction.   
Perhaps the most significant example of this, however, was in Sancti Spíritus.  The 
local commander and the alcalde clashed over who should control the town’s sanitation 
work.  Fremont reported to his superiors that in early August his post surgeon observed 
contract workers emptying the privy vault of the local yellow fever hospital.  His surgeon 
viewed the situation as dangerous and believed that the method the contract workers used to 
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empty the vaults could lead to an outbreak of yellow fever in the community.  The surgeon 
recommended that Fremont intervene to block any further work at the hospital. 
Together with his surgeon, Fremont confronted the alcalde who not only denied that 
Fremont had any power to intervene in his contracts but defied Fremont’s order to end the 
contract work.  Fremont believed that asserting American authority in this particular case was 
critical.  Fremont informed his headquarters that the town was aware of the dispute and that 
if the mayor succeeded in maintaining control of the sanitation work, in spite of his wishes, it 
could jeopardize U.S. influence in the town.54  While the correspondence does not indicate 
how the situation was resolved, it is doubtful that Fremont’s superiors would have sustained 
him.  Just a week prior to this incident, Fremont’s chain of command ordered him to “mind 
his own business” in reference to a much more volatile situation involving potential 
violence.55  If serious unrest did not provide Fremont with enough justification to intervene 
in the town’s municipal matters, control of the town’s sanitation projects seems an even less 
likely basis for intervention.  Fremont confirmed this conclusion in report ten days later, 
complaining that the alcalde retained complete control over the town’s civil affairs, refusing 
to even speak to him about any of the town’s official business.56 
Cuban control of public works contracts was not a universal state of affairs.  In 
Leonard Wood’s department, Wood maintained control of these contracts on the basis that 
Cuban civil officials allegedly lacked the expertise to oversee such projects.57  In Havana, 
General Ludlow (a professional Army engineer), likewise maintained tight control of the 
contracting process.  Ludlow controversially terminated a contract for public works 
improvement held by the American Dady Company.  The Dady Company sued in both 
Cuban and American courts to have their contract rights restored or to be compensated for 
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the lost work.  The dispute damaged the already fragile relations between Ludlow and 
Havana’s ayutamiento.58  Significantly, both Wood and Ludlow remained ardent 
annexationists who argued that Cuba was inadequately prepared for the rigors of self-
government.  In their minds, this included the ability to negotiate and implement basic 
sanitation projects without American oversight.  Brooke’s decentralized method of command 
allowed both approaches to flourish simultaneously.   
Finally, the Cuban government confirmed and exercised its authority by maintaining 
independent control over the police and by subjecting American soldiers to the rigors of the 
Cuban justice system.  In March of 1899, Leonard Wood complained to the War Department 
that the legal status of U.S. citizens and soldiers after the war seemed ill defined.  He 
explained that “The military codes of the United States seems not to have been constructed 
with any consideration of the needs of an army in occupation of foreign territory in time of 
peace.”  Wood characterized the situation as a “defect” in policy and recommended the 
authorization of military tribunals to handle American legal cases.  He claimed that unless 
this situation was addressed quickly the “spectacle” of American officers and soldiers on trial 
in Cuban courts would damage Cuban-American relations.59 Wood’s analysis of the situation 
was correct in one aspect. There was legal ambiguity on the status of U.S. soldiers and 
civilians working on contract for the army.  How this problem was resolved demonstrated 
that the Cuban government under General Brooke possessed real power, even when that 
power was directed against the Army of Occupation. 
Like all armies, the U.S. Army in Cuba possessed its fair share of malcontents.  Their 
crimes ranged from minor incidents involving property damage to murder.  Two methods of 
dealing with American criminal activity quickly emerged.  First, Cuban authorities relied on 
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the army’s officers to discipline their own soldiers and thus sought to avoid direct 
confrontation with nearby garrisons.  When this failed, civil officials often appealed to the 
island’s judicial system to indict American soldiers.  When Cubans resorted to the second 
method, the American Army of Occupation cooperated with the prosecution of their own 
soldiers.   
Typical of this dynamic was the relationship between the alcalde of Guanajay, 
Francisco Oberto, and Captain Frank deL. Carrington, the commander of the garrison outside 
Oberto’s community.  In the fall of 1899, American soldiers were involved in multiple 
scuffles with the town’s police and civil officials.  At first, the mayor informed Carrington 
that several soldiers had been involved in robbing local graves, had stolen two skulls and 
then brought them into a local brothel.  Oberto pleaded with Carrington to discipline his 
soldiers in order to prevent further problems.60  Whatever discipline Carrington applied to his 
soldiers, it was not enough to discourage other incidents.  Ten days later U.S. troops stole 
twenty bottles of liquor from a nearby saloon and then went to another bordello, where they 
brawled with the town’s rural guard.61  Dissatisfied with Carrington’s response, Oberto 
notified the local criminal court of the need to take further action. 
On October 21, 1899, Filomeno Rodriguez, the Judge of the First Instance in 
Guanajay issued a summons to his court for six American soldiers in order to investigate the 
grave robbery incident.62 Following the saloon brawl, Rodriguez asked Carrington to produce 
a soldier for a deposition.63  There is every indication that Carrington cooperated in both 
investigations and others.  He confined soldiers accused of crimes in Cuban courts and held 
them until their trial.64  Moreover, Carrington’s soldiers participated in the criminal 
proceedings of Rodriguez’s court both as witnesses and defendants.65  Further illustrative of 
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the cooperation between the Americans and the local courts, Rodriguez even solicited the use 
of Carrington’s interpreter when American soldiers or civilians were on trial for serious 
criminal offenses like assault or robbery.66  Carrington’s correspondence also indicates that 
his soldiers elsewhere on the island were likewise subjected to the rigors of the Cuban legal 
system when they crossed the law.67  Carrington was not alone in responding to the demands 
of the Cuban justice system.  Other commanders answered Cuban requests to provide 
information about their soldiers held for trial.68  Thus, individual U.S. soldiers and their 
commanders recognized the authority of Cuban officials and most importantly their power to 
punish Americans guilty of transgressing Cuban law. 
 To Assist A Patriotic People  
Like Brooke’s instructions from McKinley and his design of Cuban civil 
administration with real authority, the U.S. Army of Occupation’s discussion of the purpose 
of intervention in Cuba illustrates the unsettled nature of American intentions toward the 
island.  The military government’s understanding of its mission varied among the assorted 
levels of the chain of command.  At the garrison level, almost without exception, 
commanders described U.S. aims as limited to providing Cuba assistance in the 
establishment of a free and independent government.  Department commanders, however, 
had more diverse opinions.  Some believed that the true American purpose in Cuba was to 
prepare the island for annexation.  Others believed that the only legitimate and legal goal of 
the army’s involvement in Cuban affairs was to secure U.S. economic interests and to leave 
as soon as a new Cuban government could be organized. In short, annexationists in the army 
in Cuba existed and forcefully argued their views but they represented only one perspective 
among many about the island’s future.   
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At the very beginning of the occupation, U.S. garrison commanders were somewhat 
divided about the purpose of the army’s chief mission.  Some officers believed that Cuba’s 
independence remained contingent on a demonstration of the capacity for self-government.  
One such individual, Captain Frederick Mann Page, was the American representative to the 
evacuation commission (a joint U.S.-Spanish body that determined the timing of the 
American assumption of sovereignty throughout the island). Page, acting on behalf of the 
evacuation commission, took command of the city of Trinidad after he relieved the town’s 
Spanish garrison.   
Page decided that it was appropriate to mark the occasion with a speech and offered 
several disquieting speculations about the island’s future.  Page proclaimed, “By this act 
Trinidad and Casida become an integral part of the colony of Cuba, from which Spanish rule 
disappears forever, and marks the beginning of a new order of things.”  Page’s use of the 
word colony and its significance was likely not lost on the local population attending the 
ceremony.  The wording was intentional.  The captain had originally written the word 
“island” instead of “colony” but replaced it in a revision of his speech.  His choice of 
language implied that he believed that Cuba was not intended for independence but was 
merely in a state of colonial transition from one empire to another.69  
Page also offered his own description of America’s mission in Cuba.  Page claimed 
that army’s purpose was, “to grant to the inhabitants of the Island of Cuba, the same 
privileges of consciousness and liberty enjoyed by its own citizens, without destruction of 
Nationality or political opinions during the time they are worthy of such distinction and for 
that purpose intends to head this Island in Wardship, establishing a firm and stable 
Government.”  In other words, it was up island’s inhabitants to prove that they were 
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“worthy” of independence.  This could be achieved, according to Page, by demonstrating a 
working knowledge of a government founded on liberty and its associated virtues. Page 
described societies and individuals who possessed liberty as “enlightened,” “civilized,” and a 
“demi-God.” He warned that liberty, however, had limits and that it was easy for societies to 
take liberty too far, becoming “license.”  Page contended that license was dangerous, “[a free 
man] whether through ignorance or design gives way to unbridled passions, is a beast and as 
such, is a danger, which must be suppressed or lopped off like a rotten branch.”70   
Page claimed that until the island demonstrated that it understood the difference 
between these two political conditions, the United States would remain in control.  In case 
his audience missed the threatening undertones about the necessity of suppressing “license,” 
he uttered this warning, “Let all who are inclined to differ make no allusions [sic] to 
themselves: They will find the gentle hand so willing to raise Cuba to the height of true 
freedom, is ready to strike with crushing force.”71  Page’s conditions on Cuba’s political 
future and his requirement that Cubans demonstrate American style virtues, validates some 
of the previous historical scholarship of the army in Cuba.  Significantly, however, he offered 
this official view of America’s role before either McKinley or Brooke formulated U.S. policy 
for the island.  Once Brooke assumed command in Cuba, this kind of statement of purpose 
below the department level became almost non-existent. 
Page’s view of Trinidad’s role in the “new order of things” quickly ended when a 
more senior officer arrived to take command.  Colonel George Le Roy Brown relieved Page 
of his post and immediately indicated a change in direction. The new district commander 
sought cooperation with Cuba’s local government, not control of its affairs. In a proclamation 
to the citizens of Trinidad marking George Washington’s Birthday, Brown expressed a 
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competing vision of America’s purpose in Cuba.  The United States, he argued, was “sent 
here to assist a patriotic people in establishing a government similar to Washington’s. . .and 
who are now in the dawn of governmental foundation. . . .” Brown offered that if the Cuban 
people used Washington and his political principles as the basis of a new government that 
“Cuba may commune with all people who seek liberty and brotherhood.”72  Brown’s 
statement implied that Cubans, not Americans, ultimately had the final say in the type of 
government created for the island.     
If Brown’s speech left his audience wondering about American intentions, his actions 
four days later clarified them beyond misinterpretation.  He declared February 24-25 a 
district wide holiday to celebrate Cuban independence.  Brown ordered the local government 
closed and allowed the people of Trinidad to organize a parade, balls, games and a literary 
program commemorating Cuban independence.73  What had changed between Page and 
Brown’s statement of purpose was Brooke’s assumption of command and his articulation of 
the U.S. Army’s role in the occupation of Cuba.  Brown’s statement of purpose in the 
proclamation honoring Washington’s Birthday and Cuban independence capture this intent 
perfectly.  The American Army of Occupation’s chief purpose was to assist the island in the 
formation of its own government and to prepare Cuba for eventual independence. 
 Elsewhere on the island, U.S. garrison commanders characterized their mission in 
similar terms.  Captain Charles Wilson in Caibarien reported to his higher headquarters that 
the town accepted his troops in their role of maintaining basic order and acknowledged his 
instructions not to interfere in the local government’s civil affairs.74 Similarly, Major A.H. 
Bowman in Cienfuegos observed the municipal institutions of the town and maintained close 
contact with its principle officials but refrained from intervening in the town’s official 
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business.  He did not believe it was necessary, stating that his frequent conferences with the 
city’s administration led him to believe that the town was making good progress toward 
“stable” government.75 Bowman and Wilson confined their roles to promoting order and to 
ensuring that Cuba’s local civil institutions remained responsive to the needs of their 
communities.  Thus, like Brown in Trinidad, it appears that American post commanders 
believed that their main purpose was to assist Cubans in the creation of a stable government 
and to ensure that the basic conditions of order were met, not to run their affairs. 
 This view changes, however, as you move up the chain of command.  At the 
department level the U.S. Army remained divided over the purpose of the occupation of 
Cuba.  Two camps emerged among the department commanders.  Generals Lee and Wilson 
maintained that the United States Army had fulfilled the spirit of the Teller Amendment and 
should withdraw.  Generals Ludlow and Wood believed that the United States had vital 
strategic interests in Cuba and argued that the U.S. control of Cuba should continue 
indefinitely.  Brooke, as the commander of the Army, struggled to reconcile both factions.  
The bitter feud between these cliques further highlights the contested and ambiguous nature 
of the American Army’s of Occupation’s purpose in Cuba. 
 These contrasting views were on full display when Brooke called his commanders to 
Havana for a conference in June of 1899.  His intent for the meeting was to “obtain some 
concert of action” regarding the direction of future policy.76 U.S. troops had achieved most of 
the initial objectives that McKinley had outlined for them and now a decision had to be made 
about how, when, and to whom to transfer control of Cuba’s sovereignty.  Brooke and his 
senior most subordinates debated these questions. Brooke allowed his military department 
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commanders to present their opinions on the Army of Occupation’s future in Cuba and 
Brooke quickly learned that no consensus among his commanders was possible.  
One major source of controversy among Brooke’s subordinates was over the 
definition of “pacification.”  General Wilson defended the traditional understanding of the 
term.  Wilson argued that pacification meant the absence of unrest and resistance and 
consistently maintained this interpretation in his letters to both his peers and political 
acquaintances.  Writing to Brooke’s chief of staff, Wilson contended, “unless we are here as 
Conquerors, or to stay, our sole business was and is to pacify this country, (It is already as 
quiet as any southern state and a good deal more so than the State of Georgia)….”77 Wilson 
reasoned to Theodore Roosevelt that the American Army’s “pacification” mission came to an 
end when it defeated the Spanish Army and forced its withdrawal.78 Who else in Cuba 
needed to be pacified?  Conditions on the island remained peaceful and the people were 
waiting for the United States to fulfill its pledge under the Teller Amendment.  In Wilson’s 
correspondence, pacification was not an elastic term.  Instead it carried a very specific 
meaning that limited the scope of U.S. intervention in Cuba’s affairs.   
This definition of pacification informed Wilson’s views on the army’s role in Cuba. A 
self-described annexationist, Wilson took a narrow interpretation of the army’s mission.79  
After only seven weeks in command, Wilson wrote to a friend, “peace has been absolutely 
re-established.” As consequence Wilson deemed the army’s mission as coming to an “end” 
due to the voluntary limitation of goals prescribed under the Teller Amendment.80 The only 
permissible role for the army was to perform the duties of a “beneficent intercessor” or a 
“trustee” only handling Cuba’s affairs on a temporary basis.81  To this end, the United States 
only remained “to help them [Cuba] establish a government of their own.”82 In March of 
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1899, Wilson advocated this view directly to the Secretary of War, arguing that since the 
island was “pacified,” U.S. troops should remain only to maintain order and to assist in the 
formation of a Cuban civil government.83 Wilson expressed identical views to the other 
commanders at the Havana Conference.84   
While Wilson believed that Cuba deserved independence, that did not blind Wilson to 
the necessity of preserving American strategic and economic interests on the island. Wilson 
advocated a scheme where the army would transfer sovereignty to a newly independent 
Cuban government if it agreed to join a customs union—a “zollverein”—with the United 
States.85  Wilson rationalized this economic arrangement by reasoning that the United States 
remained Cuba’s most important foreign market anyway and that a customs union was the 
only way to circumvent Congressional trade barriers.  Wilson argued that, Cuba’s long-term 
economic self-interest would eventually lead it to voluntarily seek annexation by the United 
States.  The island, however, still had a choice.86 
As for the Cuban capacity for self-government, Wilson wrote that he believed that 
Cuba was “not fully grown in civic virtues” but that it could easily achieve a level of 
development equal to that of the American South.87  Wilson also stated explicitly that he had 
confidence “in the capacity of the Cubans to establish and run a just and stable government. . 
. .”88 Despite being deeply influenced by contemporary ideas about race, Wilson was the only 
general to express such confidence in the local people. While he still maintained hope that 
the island would one day become a part of the United States, Wilson was unwilling to use 
force to achieve this object.  Instead, the general believed that eventually the superiority of 
American institutions and the necessity of maintaining access to U.S. markets would lead 
Cuba to ask for admission to the United States of its own volition.89  Cuba, in short, 
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maintained the power to choose, an important distinction that many historians of American 
policy fail to recognize when describing Wilson and his plans for Cuba.  Furthermore, 
Wilson’s opinions illustrate that more than one perspective existed about the island’s 
capacity for independent government, even among self-identified annexationists. 
General Lee’s views were only slightly less complicated than Wilson’s. At the 
conference of commanders in Havana in June of 1899, Lee sided with Wilson even though 
Lee and Wilson’s opinions about Cuba’s future differed.  Like Wilson, Lee believed that as 
soon as possible the United States should allow the Cubans to form their own government.  
He contended that the Cubans were as ready now as they ever would be for self-government 
and that, “If they construct a ‘stable government’ strong enough to protect life and property 
and give confidence to capital, they should be entitled to control their own affairs.”90  Thus, 
despite important qualifications, Lee still supported Cuban independence.  
Lee maintained his commitment to Cuban independence albeit for different reasons.  
He was not optimistic about independent Cuba’s prospects for long-term success.  The 
former consul theorized, “the Cubans are not capable of self-government, and this generation 
never will be able to take care of themselves. It is safe to predict that any instructions issued 
to them for them to organize a separate and independent republic for the purpose of carrying 
the joint resolution of Congress will, in a few weeks thereafter, result in control of the Island 
by the United States Government.” In Lee’s assessment of the situation, once this experiment 
had been tried and allowed to miscarry, it would create political momentum for American 
annexation.  The important point that he emphasized, however, was that first, the Cubans had 
to be allowed the opportunity to fail.  Otherwise, the island’s overwhelming independence 
oriented political sentiment would never accept American rule.  In the interim, U.S. forces 
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should remain prepared to suppress the disturbances that would follow in the wake of Cuban 
independence.91  Like Wilson, Lee recognized that there were limits to what the United States 
could achieve.   
General Ludlow’s views on America’s mission in Cuba could not have been more 
different.  Havana’s governor contended that America’s true mission in Cuba was indefinite 
American rule.  When General Wilson confronted Ludlow about the basis of his ideas, 
Ludlow replied that his views were taken directly from President McKinley! The other 
commanders viewed this statement as a something of a revelation. Ludlow’s claim to know 
the President’s position on Cuba’s future and the commanders’ reaction to it, supports the 
assertion that up until this moment, U.S. policy was so ill defined that not even men 
sympathetic to annexation knew what McKinley wanted. Furthermore, Wilson maintained 
that even if this were Administration policy that it was illegal and would carry no weight 
with either Congress or the American people.92  In Wilson’s analysis, Ludlow’s advocacy of 
an indefinite occupation had to give way either to the “law of Congress” or the “law of 
Conquest.”93  Wilson later claimed that he was prepared to refuse to enforce any policies or 
orders he viewed as fundamentally at odds with the law.94  Thus, Ludlow’s alleged 
knowledge of President McKinley’s intentions toward Cuba is not definitive proof of U.S. 
intent to annex the island and even if it had been, there is evidence that the other commanders 
in Havana were prepared to oppose such an explicit break with Congressional law.   
Ludlow defended his ideas by staking out an expansive interpretation of the term 
“pacification.” Ludlow conceded that the island was “quiet and orderly” and “as satisfactory 
as the best ordered community anywhere.” Thus, Cuba, by traditional standards, appeared 
pacified.  Although he never explicitly offered a clear definition of pacification in his 
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correspondence, it is clear, as other scholars have noted, that Ludlow equated pacification 
with Cuba’s ability to form a stable government.  In the general’s view, this required Cuba’s 
electorate to be controlled by the “serious and responsible elements of the community” that 
were free from the vices of selfishness and corruption.  He argued that there were currently 
too few people in Cuba able to maintain such enlightened elements in power. Havana’s 
governor believed it would require years of education, if not an entirely new generation, to 
ensure the right people ruled the island. Consequently, he advocated a plan to continue U.S. 
control of Cuba’s central and provincial governments while delegating limited 
responsibilities to Cuban authorities at the lowest levels as a form of political tutelage.95  
Leonard Wood entertained similar views on the proper direction of U.S. policy in 
Cuba. Wood advocated indefinite military rule and adopted an equally malleable conception 
of America’s mission.  The United States’ purpose in Cuba, Wood wrote to Roosevelt, was 
not pacification but to install a stable government.  He offered a unique definition, “When 
people ask me what I mean by stable government, I tell them money at six per cent; this 
seems to satisfy all classes.”96  Ironically, Ludlow reported that Cuba had reached this 
particular milestone by October of 1899.97  Furthermore, in Wood’s opinion Spain’s 
antiquated legal system and cultural norms generated instability by encouraging hatred for 
the occupation government.  He claimed that this was a major source of popular discontent 
on the island.98 In other words, Brooke’s current strategic direction and methods were the real 
obstacle to Wood’s vision of “stability.” 
The solution, Wood offered, was to suppress Brooke’s government, “One year, or 
even six months, of decent, candid, courageous government here will turn public sentiment 
all our way and the problem will be solved, so far as Cuba is concerned. . . All we want here 
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are good courts, good schools and all the public work we can pay for. Reform of municipal 
government and a business like way of doing things."99 Of course, this view remained 
fundamentally incompatible with both McKinley’s instructions and Brooke’s interpretation 
of them.  In order to pursue a policy of annexation, the current military government and its 
design would have to be replaced.  Wood also knew that his plan would necessitate 
supplanting Brooke in command and he conducted a vigorous press and political campaign to 
this effect.100  Thus, Wood’s discussion of annexation and how to implement it only further 
illustrated that it remained significantly divergent from the current policy of the United 
States.   
Brooke’s views on the situation in Cuba, while difficult to determine, can be inferred 
from his growing disputes with his contentious subordinates in the summer of 1899.  He 
effectively combatted the creation of two programs that he felt might encourage the army to 
remain longer than necessary to transfer sovereignty to a future Cuban government.  Adding 
to his motivation was the knowledge that Brooke’s chief rivals for influence in Washington 
were advancing these plans.   
The first of these programs, promoted by General Wood, was to transform the 
island’s Rural Guard elements into Cuban Army regiments led by American Army officers.  
Wood’s intent was to Americanize the Cuban people.101  Brooke advised McKinley not to 
approve the program.  He objected that Wood’s intent remained patently obvious to everyone 
and would only serve to inflame the already considerable mistrust between the Cuban people 
and the Army of Occupation. The source of most of this mistrust was the lack of public 
acknowledgement by U.S. authorities that Cuba was going to be independent. Not only had 
Brooke failed to affirm such a direction for American policy but the recently signed Treaty of 
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Paris that ended the war with Spain also remained silent on the subject.  Wood’s plan would 
only have intensified Cuban fears about motivations in Havana and Washington.  Further 
complicating matters, according to Brooke, the Cubans were naturally distrustful, having 
seen lots of promises of change by the Spanish government.102  When he polled his 
department commanders (other than Wood) they too saw the program as likely to raise 
accusations that the United States sought more than stability.  Brooke’s arguments appear to 
have carried significant weight since both McKinley and Root favored the scheme prior to 
Brooke’s communication of his opposition.103 The plan was never resurrected, even after 
Wood succeeded in replacing Brooke.  
The second program Brooke fought was General Wilson’s plan for the development 
of an agricultural bank to make loans to local farmers to restart the island’s moribund sugar 
industry.104  Wilson had furiously lobbied both the McKinley Administration and members of 
the Senate to muster political support for his loan program and appeared to be making 
headway.105  McKinley and Root both believed that Wilson’s project had considerable merit.  
Brooke’s covert opposition to the plan, however, guaranteed that Wilson’s proposals were 
quickly ignored.  When Wilson decided to argue his case to the public in his report to the 
Secretary of War, Brooke blasted Wilson’s program in the same report to ensure that the 
program remained permanently defeated.   
Brooke presented three critiques of Wilson’s agricultural program.  First, Brooke 
argued Wilson’s loans might encourage the development of a paternalistic relationship 
between the central government and the Cuban people, a “most dangerous implanting of a 
spirit alien to a free people.”  His real objections, however, were the program’s cost and the 
time needed to implement it.  He believed that the island’s revenues were insufficient to 
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cover Wilson’s plan and the island’s other necessary expenses.  Additionally, Brooke noted, 
Wilson’s arrangements for the loans could take as long as five years to implement.106  
Brooke’s public denunciation of Wilson’s agricultural bank ended any further discussion of 
credit schemes for the island.   
Neither Wilson’s nor Wood’s plans conformed to the original guidance that President 
McKinley gave his senior commander in Havana. Both proposals potentially involved the 
United States more intimately in local affairs than Brooke’s interpretation of McKinley’s 
instructions allowed.  Brooke’s opposition to both programs and McKinley’s support of 
Brooke are important indicators that suggest that a permanent policy toward Cuba had yet to 
be decided.  At least for now, Brooke remained committed to only intervening in Cuban 
affairs where necessary and in ensuring that any future transfer of sovereignty remained 
unimpeded by obligations assumed by the American Army of Occupation. 
The U.S. Army’s conception of its mission and the policies its officials advocated 
demonstrated that American intentions in Cuba remained indeterminate.  Below the 
department level, commanders believed that their primary task was to assist the Cuban 
people while they formed their own government.  At the department level, the chain of 
command remained divided over the purpose of the American occupation.   These officers 
advocated distinctive courses of action that illustrated a diverse range of views about U.S. 
intentions and Cuba’s capacity for self-government. 
How Far Should I Go In Protecting Guiterrez? 
On the night of August 3, 1899 a mob led by the Sancti Spíritus chief of police 
surrounded the home of Primitivo Guiterrez, a Spanish resident of the town.  The mob 
demanded that the Guiterrez and his family leave the city immediately.  Earlier that day, a 
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similar mob stoned the Guiterrez children on their way to school.  After Guiterrez refused to 
come out of his house, the mob dispersed, satisfied that their point had been made.  The next 
day, Guiterrez met with the local American garrison commander, Captain Fremont, to 
formally request the protection of the U.S. troops. Fremont needed to make a decision about 
whether or not to protect Guiterrez before tensions escalated again.  He wired his immediate 
superiors in Mantanzas, “How far should I go in protecting Guiterrez?” 107  The question was 
a poignant one.  What could Spanish citizens in Cuba expect from the United States Army? 
Would the Army preserve their status in the developing Cuban state or stand aside and allow 
old scores to be settled? 
Prominent scholars of the American intervention in Cuba claim that one way the 
United States pursued political control over the island was by reaching an unspoken 
accommodation between Spain’s Creole and Peninsular population and the American 
military.  As historian Louis Pérez described the phenomenon, “there was inexorable 
choicelessness about this collaboration, wholly improvised but as pragmatic as it was 
politically opportune.  The old colonial elites in need of protection and the new colonial 
rulers in need of allies arrived at an understanding.”108  Pérez’s assertion is not groundless.  
Every single commander at the department level and above believed that the United States 
possessed friends and supporters among Cuba’s sizable Spanish population, its propertied 
elites, as well its merchant class.109  When this perception combined with American leaders’ 
desire to annex Cuba, one would assume that the United States would have pursued a policy 
favorable to these groups’ interests to encourage and sustain their political support for a 
program of annexation.  If this was the case, how did the United States pursue such a policy?  
The next section of this thesis argues that American commanders on the ground did in fact 
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have a choice and that more often than not the army’s leaders decided against the interests of 
Spain’s former colonial elites. Where the Army of Occupation did offer qualified support for 
the maintenance of this class’ privileges, the army’s support was always conditional.  If the 
continuance of these dispensations were likely to lead to violence or confrontation, U.S. 
commanders at the department and garrison level would not use troops to advance or protect 
the interests of the island’s former elites. 
One way that this incompatibility manifested itself was in the issue of concessions or 
monopolies conferred on businesses or individuals by the old colonial government.  When 
the United States took possession of Cuba from Spain, Brooke’s Judge Advocate, Major 
Edgar Dudley, was besieged by claims for the army to recognize a multitude of concessions, 
contracts, and grants that the former Spanish government authorized prior to its withdrawal 
from the island.  Dudley described the situation thus, “Some concessions granted by Spanish 
Government appeared contrary to public policy and the interests of the people, as giving to 
the concessionaires rights which were an incumbrance on the community and inconsistent 
with modern systems of government.”  The question, however, was more complex than a 
simple analysis of whether or not a particular concession was a hindrance to a community or 
not.  In considering the validity of each monopoly, the American Army of Occupation had to 
weigh considerations of Congressional policy as well as Cuban and international law.110 
Further complicating this process, the United States, when it signed the Treaty of Paris, 
agreed to protect Spanish property rights.  The chief trouble, as Dudley observed, was in 
determining which concessions were legitimate and which were opportunistic claims filed to 
take advantage of the chaos inherent in the establishment of a new political order. 
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One of the major concessions that came to the attention of American officials in 
Havana was a hereditary right to certain fees for processing local slaughtered cattle.  This 
monopoly, known as the O’Reilly Concession, had been in place since 1704.111  Trying to 
feed the city’s starving reconcentrado population, the army did not take a favorable view of 
these fees.  Brooke terminated the concession on August 10, 1899. He determined that the 
concession was “prejudicial to the lawful interests and general welfare of Havana” and that 
any similar concessions were now abolished. He also decreed that public employees could no 
longer maintain their offices as a form of property.  The two issues were linked since they 
both were treated in Spanish law as a hereditary privilege and a form of property.  When 
Brooke ended municipal employees’ rights to maintain proprietary interests in their offices, 
this altered one of the fundamental mechanisms that the Spanish government in Cuba had 
traditionally used to generate tax income.  These employees often worked for a percentage of 
the revenue they collected, avoiding the necessity of paying them regular salaries.  Now that 
these fees and entitlements were abolished, no incentive remained for these municipal 
employees to continue working for the Cuban government.  These employees and the 
services they provided had to be replaced and Brooke’s General Order authorized municipal 
governments to re-organize themselves accordingly.112  Brooke’s order was a form of 
expropriation that disproportionately hurt the social and economic elites who had benefited 
from Spanish rule. Whatever this group’s political sympathies, the Army of Occupation 
subordinated their interests to maintaining efficient government.  
Similarly, at the department level, the U.S. commanders in the provinces struggled 
with defining what constituted a legitimate concession that necessitated recognition under the 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris and how to manage monopolies that infringed on local 
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governance.  In Wilson’s department, the Adjutant General of Santa Clara requested 
Dudley’s legal opinion on whether or not to intervene in a dispute between the town of 
Cardenas and a Spanish telephone contract owned by the Villa brothers who were residents 
of the town.  Dudley wrote that the concession appeared to be a legitimate one, having been 
granted more than twenty years prior to the end of Spanish rule. This type of contract, under 
Spanish law, was a form of property and thus potentially obligated the United States to force 
the municipality to honor the contract.  This, however, required the Army to intervene in a 
local government’s affairs, something that the Army was reticent to do.  Dudley squared this 
circle by offering his legal opinion that the real question was not whether the concession was 
legitimate or not but who owned the contract, the municipality of Cardenas or the United 
States Government? If it was the municipality of Cardenas, the United States had to ensure 
that the brothers’ property rights were upheld.  If the contract was owned by the United 
States, as the heir to Spain in Cuba, then it became a question of Congressional law.  
Congress had forbidden the Army in Cuba from granting any monopolies and thus U.S. 
troops could not legally enforce the telephone contract.  Dudley stated that, in his opinion, 
this was in fact the case and that the Army should refuse to intervene to protect the Villa 
Brother’s interest in the contract with Cardenas.113  Consequently, by failing to intervene, 
U.S. commanders effectively allowed the newly developing Cuban state to make decisions 
that damaged the economic interests of the island’s former elites.  
A similar situation occurred in the town of Sancti Spíritus.  Before the end of Spanish 
rule in Cuba, a local Spaniard named Primitivo Guiterrez owned the rights to the local market 
place and collected fees from resident vendors to sell their produce in the market.  When the 
U.S. Army first occupied Sancti Spíritus, the town’s alcalde appealed to the nearby 
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American garrison to end Guiterrez’s monopoly on the town’s market place.  The mayor, Dr. 
Canncio, argued that Guiterrez’s concession had been granted during a “period of terror” and 
that local Spanish officials had suppressed any input from the town on the Guiterrez contract.  
Thus, Canncio argued, since the agreement had been entered into under duress, it was not 
valid.  The town, now that it could choose freely, did not want to continue the concession.114  
The garrison commander at the time agreed and ordered Guiterrez’s special license to the 
town’s market place fees to end.   
In the interim, Guiterrez appealed to General Wilson as the commander of the 
department and Wilson decided that Guiterrez’s concession was legitimate and that the 
garrison commander’s intervention in the town’s affairs was inappropriate.115  Wilson 
ordered his department Judge Advocate to review the legal merits of the case before reaching 
a final decision.  After his examination of Guiterrez’s petition, the department Judge 
Advocate agreed with Wilson and suggested that Guiterrez’s privileges should be restored 
since its loss had come about because of inappropriate American intervention in the town’s 
civil matters.116  Wilson then issued orders to the American garrison at Sancti Spíritus to 
restore Guiterrez’s lost rights.117 
Captain Fremont then ordered the alcalde to reinstate Guiterrez’s entitlement to the 
market place and ownership of its fees in compliance with Wilson’s orders.  The alcalde 
refused and notified Fremont that the ayutamiento had unanimously concurred with 
Canncio’s refusal to restore Guiterrez’s contract.118  Fremont urged his superiors to lobby 
Santa Clara’s civil governor in order to have the governor issue an order to reestablish 
Guiterrez’s proprietorship.  When Santa Clara’s governor began to make inquiries into the 
situation, the city council declared its intention to appeal the military government’s orders in 
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the Cuban court system and warned both Fremont and the Civil Governor of Santa Clara that 
if either ordered Guiterrez’s rights returned, that as a body, the ayutamiento would resign.119  
When Santa Clara’s Governor issued the order restoring Guiterrez the following day, they 
made good on their threat and quit, leaving Fremont to deal with its vexatious mayor as the 
town’s sole remaining representative of the municipal government.120  Canncio remained 
adamant, he would not allow the Guiterrez concession reestablished and he blocked 
Guiterrez from both collecting his fees and from using the local police to evict vendors from 
the market.   
 When Fremont, working in conjunction with Santa Clara’s provincial government, 
threatened the alcalde with criminal legal action, the mayor responded by issuing an order 
temporarily reinstating Guiterrez’s contract, then immediately suspended this order pending 
the outcome of the municipality’s appeal to the audencia in Havana.  The mayor then 
attempted to coerce Guiterrez into signing a legal statement recognizing the mayor’s actions 
as a fulfillment of the order by Santa Clara’s Governor.  Guiterrez, of course, refused.   
Fremont knew that Canncio’s reinstatement and revocation of Guiterrez’s rights was 
only a legal maneuver designed to avoid criminal sanctions and continued to pressure the 
mayor for a full restoration of Guiterrez’s rights.  Adding to his troubles, the alcalde 
threatened to resign and to take with him the leadership of the local police and rural guard 
elements.121  In another meeting with mayor, he denied that Fremont or the military 
government had any right to order the town to do anything and stated unequivocally that 
Cuba’s civil government was superior to the American military government and that now it 
was up to the audencia in Havana to decide.  Canncio concluded the meeting by telling 
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Fremont he intended to take the quarrel public by offering the newspaper La Lucha his 
version of the dispute.122 
 Soon thereafter, Canncio began to apply his own pressure to resolve the situation.  
The alcalde used Guiterrez’s refusal to sign the legal statement claiming his rights had been 
restored as the basis of a series of administrative proceedings against Guiterrez.  Canncio 
issued fines to Guiterrez for every day he did not sign the statement.  Fremont, for his part, 
viewed these extra-legal proceedings with alarm and even made inquires with the local judge 
to get his opinion as to their legality. The judge agreed with Fremont and notified him that 
Guiterrez’s fines were not only illegal but in excess of what the alcalde could legally impose 
in an administrative hearing.  On August 3, 1899 the local community escalated tensions still 
further, stoning Guiterrez’s children on their way to school and making Guiterrez and his 
family virtual prisoners in their own home.  That night, a mob led by the town’s local police 
demanded that Guiterrez leave town immediately.  The next morning, Guiterrez applied to 
the U.S. garrison for the formal protection of his home and family by American troops.123   
 Sometime during this period of increasing tension, Fremont’s chain of command 
ordered him to back off from his pressure on the alcalde and to “mind his own business.”  
How Fremont was to comply with his orders to restore Guiterrez and deal with a flat refusal 
to do so was left unexplained by his chain of command.124  The local commander had 
exhausted every possible avenue with the mayor to resolve the dispute and it had not been 
enough.  Now that the situation had dramatically escalated, Fremont inquired of his 
superiors, “How far should I go in protecting Guiterrez?”125  It was an important question and 
one relevant to whether or not the United States was interested in fostering a colonial 
relationship with Spain’s formerly privileged elites who remained in Cuba.  If the Army 
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would not act to protect this colonial class’ lives, let alone their property, it is doubtful 
whether such a policy was ever pursued during the first year of the occupation. 
 Unofficially, Fremont counseled Guiterrez that it might be best if he relocated his 
family to a neighboring town until tensions died down.  When Fremont reported this 
conversation with his chain of command, they responded with a rebuke.  Fremont’s superiors 
ordered him to tell Guiterrez on an official basis not to leave the town, that order would be 
maintained but that he would not receive any special protection.  Thankfully for the Guiterrez 
family, the town never directly tested American resolve to maintain order.  The alcalde, 
during the night of August 5, issued a handbill that repealed the town’s prohibition on 
vendors outside of the town market. Vendors could now relocate their stands wherever they 
wanted in order to avoid the fees that Guiterrez’s contract entitled him to collect. Guiterrez’s 
concession was now worth considerably less than before the dispute.126   
The mayor, however, still wanted to make a point about his authority, and allowed his 
chief of police to issue additional fines to Guiterrez for his signs not complying with the 
city’s codes regulating signage.  The town’s police chief issued the fines to Guiterrez, and 
then tore down all of his signs in the town market area.  While there was no more discussion 
of violence in the town, the police that same day made it a point to arrest an American wagon 
driver inside Fremont’s barracks.127 
 Fremont disclosed to his chain of command that he believed that the arrest was a 
deliberate display of power to the residents of the town.  The alcalde and the police had both 
been previously informed that arrests within the garrison was off limits to the local police.  
Cuban officials had to request to permission to arrest soldiers and employees if the accused 
were inside a U.S. military post. By flouting this restriction, the alcalde intended to send 
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Fremont and the town a message that U.S. backing of Guitterez was not forgotten and that 
Fremont was powerless to stop the town’s mayor from retaliating against anyone who 
worked with the garrison.  It was a lesson certainly not lost on Guiterrez, who took his family 
and left the town, abandoning his claim to his market concession.  Thus, even where U.S. 
commanders did uphold elite property rights, American authorities did not act forcefully on 
their decisions.  Fremont’s chain of command valued order above everything else and would 
not intervene in disputes where it might lead to a confrontation with the Cuban people.  It 
would appear that the Spain’s former colonial elites did not have friends in the American 
Army after all. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESTORED TO A NORMAL CONDITION 
General Brooke remained reluctant to publicly comment on what policy he thought 
appropriate to pursue in Cuba.  In his Civil Report to the War Department published in 
October 1899, he explained that “the kind of government to be established, and when, is not 
a subject which the military governor believes to be a matter which can be discussed in this 
report, if at all.” Instead, the general argued, “this must be determined by higher authority, to 
whom such matters properly pertain.”1 After his relief, Brooke was only slightly less reticent 
to offer his evaluation of the proper course in Cuba.  Testifying before the Senate, he 
recommended that the correct path of American policy was to maintain the military 
government until such time that “the island shall be restored to a normal condition.” He then 
explained that he was referring primarily to the island’s economic reconstruction, what he 
referred to as normalcy in the “business sense.” Brooke also recommended that the 
municipalities should continue to “attend to their own affairs through their own agents” until 
elections and a new government could be organized.2  
Although Brooke never articulated a similar statement of purpose with the same 
clarity as his testimony before Congress, it is possible to infer from the actual practices of the 
Army of Occupation, that they pursued, even if un-declared, his policy of restoring normal 
conditions to the island.  The army’s operations exhibited this impetus in several ways. First, 
the Army often avoided confrontation with Cubans even where such evasion threatened or 
damaged U.S. influence.  Second, the Army of Occupation’s decentralized command system 
tolerated deviations in island policy in order to account for local conditions and concerns.  
Local commanders remained free to act and innovate policy initiatives as long as these 
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proposals furthered the army’s goal of encouraging the island’s social and economic stability.  
Finally, the Army of Occupation confined its reforms of Cuba’s judicial system to the court’s 
organization but retained the traditional role and powers afforded to judges under Spanish 
legal traditions.   
Hopelessly Destructive Of Public Order 
The army at every level demonstrated their pledge to maintaining the social, 
economic, and political cohesion of Cuban society by carefully managing circumstances that 
might lead to confrontations with the Cuban people. For General Brooke, this meant 
centralizing municipal policy on the collection of back taxes and foreclosures despite its 
long-term negative effects on credit and municipality finances.  At the department level, 
elements of the Cuban press constantly provoked American commanders and challenged 
U.S. influence and intentions on a regular basis.  Instead of suppressing these newspapers, 
the department commanders generally limited their responses to protests. Lastly, at the local 
level, U.S. troops and commanders sometimes found themselves the target of deliberate acts 
of political provocation intended to demonstrate American fecklessness. Garrison 
commanders handled these circumstances by having local officials re-establish the 
boundaries between the local population and U.S. troops.   In each of these instances, these 
policies demonstrated that the United States Army remained dedicated to preserving Cuba’s 
fragile political stability rather than engaging in a struggle for control of the island’s political 
future. 
One of the worst issues that confronted the army was the condition of the island’s 
finances at every level of government.  Most of the municipalities and provincial 
governments were nearly bankrupt. Cuba’s financial condition and devastated economy 
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made taking on debt obligations impossible during the first few months of the occupation. 
Unable to float short-term debt, the municipalities turned to tax collection, including 
delinquent payments, as the primary means of restarting the basic functions of local 
government.   Collecting back taxes, however, entailed political risk.  The only form of 
wealth that many Cubans held was their home.  The war had devastated the island’s economy 
and few were prepared to pay any kind of debt, let alone their tax obligations.  Property 
seizures threatened thousands of local families, potentially contributing to the island’s 
already staggering number of homeless.  Foreclosing on these homes also inhibited the 
revival of the island’s predominantly agricultural economy.  The issue of credit, debt, and 
land foreclosures was so politically explosive that Brooke claimed to have spoken with 
nearly 1,000 individuals on this subject alone.3 
The American commander in Trinidad’s experience is representative of the 
challenges this presented local governments across the island.  The district commander, 
Colonel Brown, struggling to gain familiarity with the city’s issues, asked the town’s mayor 
why the city was unable to pay for the basic subsistence of patients at the community 
hospital.  Out of humanitarian concern, he suggested that the city should take responsibility 
for ensuring that the hospital had enough funding to care for and feed its indigent patients.  
The alcalde replied that the city lacked the money to assist the hospital.  Subsidizing the 
local hospital would have consequences elsewhere in the budget, “There will be no means for 
lighting the city, feeding the prisoners, and burying the dead….”4 Although Cuban officials 
recognized the problem in Trinidad and elsewhere, they lacked the means to address the issue 
without collecting taxes. 
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Trinidad’s alcalde, supported by Brown, reacted to the situation the only way he 
could, by attempting to collect the taxes owed to the city.  The mayor began notifying local 
property owners of their obligation to pay their delinquent assessments or to face foreclosure.  
Many in the city immediately challenged the mayor’s initiation of eviction proceedings.  
Primarily these opponents argued that a decree from Spain’s last Governor-General allowed 
them to redeem their property from foreclosure proceedings if they paid their debt to the 
municipality within one year of being notified of foreclosure.  Brown remained unconvinced 
and continued to support the alcalde’s efforts to generate revenue for the city.5   
Four days later, Brown received a letter from Brooke’s Inspector General (IG) asking 
the district commander not to take any further action on the subject of property redemption.  
The issue, the letter explained, was not confined to Trinidad.  The central administration had 
to consider the problem on an island-wide basis. The following day, Brown recommended to 
the city’s government that they sustain their foreclosure efforts but not pursue eviction.  
Instead, he suggested that the municipality should designate the occupants of the homes in 
question as “tenants of the government” to maintain the their claim to the property. This 
designation could be administratively reversed if needed when Brooke and his Cabinet came 
to a decision.6   
Brooke, upon the recommendation of his Cabinet, initially opted to extend the 
Spanish moratorium on debt collection (both civil and private debt) at least through the end 
of March while he discussed the matter with the War Department.7  He proposed a plan 
developed by his Secretary of Finance that divided the debt payment losses between the 
island’s creditors and debtors.  Brooke reasoned that this way, local farmers could begin to 
access badly needed credit but remained obligated to pay off the full amount of their original 
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debts.  The McKinley Administration opposed any changes that interfered with any of the 
existing contracts on the island.8 The final decision came in April.  After considerable 
consultation between the Secretary of War, President McKinley, General Brooke and his 
Cuban Cabinet it was finally decided to lengthen the suspension of all debt payments 
contracted before December 31, 1898 for two years, allowing the Cuban people to remain in 
their homes with a chance to redeem their property.9   
This decision came at the expense of two important groups on the island.  First, 
Cuban municipalities were now almost completely dependent on the central administration’s 
revenue disbursement to fund their basic operations until the economy recovered.  Second, it 
made credit almost impossible to obtain for individual landowners.10 Despite these 
consequences, it was the best deal the U.S. Army could get to forestall island-wide 
foreclosures and most importantly prevented clashes between local governments backed by 
U.S. troops and the Cuban people. 
The Army of Occupation demonstrated a similar commitment to order by avoiding 
engaging in public battles with the advocates of Cuban independence.  Most of the 
department commanders at one time or another ran afoul of the Cuban independence 
movement, some more than once.  Yet, the department commanders avoided direct 
confrontations with the island’s more radical supporters of independence, believing that such 
conflict would only legitimize their complaints against the military government.  Instead, the 
department commanders opted to pursue the most serious political agitators through the court 
system, if at all. 
In late June of 1899, Brooke opened an investigation into General Wilson’s 
involvement in a dispute with a Cuban newspaper.  Wilson’s enemies in Havana asserted that 
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he had suppressed La Tribuna in retaliation for criticizing his handling of an incident 
between American troops and a local Spaniard that resulted in the Spaniard’s death.11 The 
allegation against Wilson presented Brooke with an opportunity to undermine one of his 
chief rivals. Brooke knew that Wilson was aggressively angling for his job and was working 
his extensive political contacts back in Washington to lay the foundation for Brooke’s 
eventual replacement.12 If there was any to substance to these allegations, Brooke could use 
the inquiry as a means to embarrass Wilson and undermine his ambitions to command.  
Wilson’s response to the investigation was indignant denial.  Wilson flatly declared 
that he had not “suppressed” La Tribuna.  Instead, according to Wilson, he sent an officer to 
the newspaper’s editorial office to object to their characterization of American actions both 
during and following the incident.  Wilson described the episode as an attempt to set the 
record straight, which at worst might be considered as a warning.  General Wilson then 
intimated to Brooke that any perceived unrest in his department was not the product of harsh 
censorship but of the McKinley Administration’s continued failure to announce a fixed 
policy for Cuba.  Wilson argued that the longer the United States remained in Cuba, the more 
suspicious Cubans became of American intentions.  Wilson closed his formal reply to 
Brooke’s inquiry with a restatement of the proposal he offered Brooke at the Havana 
commander’s conference as a way to relieve the political tensions on the island.13   
While it remains unclear what conclusions, if any, Brooke’s investigation drew about 
the incident, it is unlikely that Brooke ever found proof to substantiate the accusations 
against Wilson.  If he had, Brooke certainly would have employed that evidence to upset 
Wilson’s ambitions. Brooke had attempted, with varying levels of success, in fending off 
General Wood’s political machinations using similar tactics.14 Brooke’s climb to the top of 
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the Regular Army’s glacial command structure probably eliminated any remaining political 
naivety he possessed about how to deal with ambitious subordinates determined to advance 
at his expense.  Since Brooke concluded the investigation without further comment, it seems 
likely that his inquiry probably found evidence to corroborate Wilson’s version of events.   
The entire episode is a significant for two reasons.  First, it demonstrated a U.S. 
commander’s restraint in dealing with criticism of the military government, even where that 
criticism was potentially damaging or dangerous.  Wilson’s discussion of simmering political 
undercurrents makes that point explicitly. Despite this, Wilson allowed La Tribuna to 
criticize American troops even though this might further aggravate Cuban impatience toward 
the American occupation.  Second, Brooke’s response to allegations of suppression suggests 
that this restraint was the norm in how U.S. commanders were expected to deal with the more 
confrontational elements of the Cuban populace.  Taken as a whole, the incident revealed that 
while the American military government certainly did not like criticism it was willing to 
tolerate it for the sake of preserving the island’s political and social stability.  
Wood’s views on critical Cuban newspapers varied with the targets of their censure. 
Newspapers played a central role in the opening skirmish between Generals Brooke and 
Wood over the island’s customs revenues.  Wood wanted to maintain control of Santiago’s 
customs fees in order to ensure his continued operational independence from the newly 
appointed General Brooke.  Wood mounted a vigorous press and political campaign in an 
effort to tie Brooke’s hands over the issue before he even assumed command. Wood, 
however, failed when McKinley refused to intervene directly.  After Brooke’s appointment 
and the publication of his orders on the subject, Wood’s campaign went private.15  Thus, 
when newspapers in his department began to parrot Wood’s calls for maintaining control of 
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Santiago’s customs revenues, rather than surrendering them to the central government in 
Havana, the origin of this criticism was highly suspect.     
Only nine days into command, Brooke decided to rein in Wood’s insubordination.  
His Chief of Staff, Adna R. Chaffee, rebuked Wood in a letter whose formality and tone 
made clear its underlying intent.  The letter stated that any further criticism of Brooke’s 
customs revenue policy by Santiago’s newspapers would not be tolerated, particularly if 
these papers advocated public demonstrations against Brooke’s orders.  Chaffee lectured, 
“Exercising tact and discretion, you, as Commanding General, will be expected to conduct 
the affairs of your Department along the lines prescribed for guidance [emphasis original], 
repressing with your influence, power if necessary, all acts that tend toward interference….” 
The letter’s strident language was not a blanket endorsement of Wood’s authority to suppress 
criticism of the military government but an assertion of Brooke’s authority over his 
insubordinate department commander.  Chaffee’s abrupt end to the letter, “By command of 
Major General Brooke” only further served to illustrate this point.16  Even here, however, 
Brooke’s orders emphasized restraint, ordering Wood to employ “tact and discretion” and to 
use his “influence” before escalating further.   
Whatever his reasons, when Wood became the object of criticism in the press, Wood, 
like Wilson, responded with restraint.  In the fall of 1899 Wood wrote to his wife, “The Cuba 
Libre is preaching blood and war and talking of revolution sure to come in the near 
future…they say frankly that they want to raise a spirit of revolution. Personally they like me 
here but I represent the perfidious U.S. and hence they intend to oppose anything I advocate, 
etc….”  Wood concluded his letter by stating that he referred their cases to the local Cuban 
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court system.  He thought that it would be better to work within the civil system before 
resorting to his powers as a department commander.17   
Wood expressed similar sentiments to his peers in the Army of Occupation.  In a 
letter to Brooke’s Adjutant General in late October, he confirmed his philosophy of dealing 
with political dissent in his department stating, “We still have in several towns local papers 
whose principal object seems to be to produce discord and trouble.  These papers are 
generally edited by men without character or any honorable antecedent record. Their 
influence, if it ever was great, is rapidly diminishing.” Wood believed that these papers 
criticized his administration with a mixture of personal and political goals in mind.  The 
general wrote that, “Their principal object is notoriety and nothing would so much delight 
them as to have their papers suppressed and thus enable them to appear of some 
consequence.”18  In both instances, Wood acknowledged that confrontation with elements of 
Cuba’s political establishment was something to be avoided even though this allowed Cuba’s 
independence movement to not only survive but to flourish. 
The one exception to the general rule of restraint adopted by the American 
department commanders in Cuba appears to be General Ludlow in Havana, who openly 
confronted the city’s newspapers.  He believed that his political enemies both in Cuba and in 
the United States used Havana’s newspapers to attack and discredit his administration. 
Havana’s military governor complained that most of the negative press was retaliation for his 
revocation of the Dady Contract.19  In particular the general singled out La Lucha and El 
Cubano as fundamentally misrepresenting his efforts and waging a “campaign of slander and 
vituperation” that was “hopelessly destructive of the public order.”20 Nevertheless, Ludlow 
found his efforts to muzzle the critical press within the city overruled by General Brooke.   
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Despite Ludlow’s efforts to silence Havana’s antagonistic press, the city’s papers 
remained almost gleefully critical of him, publishing thirteen editorials attacking his 
administration in both English and Spanish over a period of twenty days. Local newspapers 
embarrassed him in other ways as well.  La Lucha attempted to drag Ludlow into a Cuban 
court for libel over remarks the general made to the American press about the paper’s editor 
while on leave in New York.  As Ludlow’s frustration over the situation mounted, he 
appealed first to his military chain of command and then ultimately to Secretary Root to 
overrule Brooke’s prohibition of censorship. Brooke, and then his successor General Wood 
both denied Ludlow permission to order the papers suppressed.21  In an effort to intimidate 
the hostile newspaper editors, Ludlow issued extra-legal fines only to have the fines 
invalidated by Wood once he assumed command of the Military Division of Cuba.22  The 
general only found relief from the mockery of the Havana dailies when Wood intervened in 
the dispute and negotiated an informal truce between city’s military governor and its 
newspaper editors.23 
Ludlow’s ineffectual attempts at suppressing Havana’s critical press are 
demonstrative of overall American concerns during the occupation.  Brooke’s first priority 
remained maintaining the island’s stability.  Any move to suppress some of the largest 
newspapers in Havana would only have contributed to the already considerable distrust many 
Cubans felt toward the American Army of Occupation and aggravated the island’s delicate 
political situation. Brooke’s entire edifice of government relied in large part on the voluntary 
cooperation of thousands of Cubans to assist Brooke’s subordinates in the day-to-day 
governance of the island.  Anything that threatened this cooperation, not only made his 
system of government impractical, but also made any near term transition to a newly 
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sovereign Cuban government highly improbable. Stability had to be maintained at all costs.  
Restraint, whether imposed or voluntarily observed by U.S. commanders was a component of 
that policy and remained Brooke’s general rule, even where it likely reduced U.S. prestige 
and with it the ability to influence elements of Cuba’s political class.   
Ludlow also expressed a similarly hostile attitude toward the island’s labor 
movement.  From mid-August through September 1899, Cuba’s nascent labor unions 
organized citywide protests and strikes to bargain for increased wages and eight-hour 
workdays.  For the most part, Havana’s military governor stood aside and allowed the city’s 
police to quell the strike.  On September 24, 1899, however, Ludlow’s subordinates informed 
him that an estimated 4,000-8,000 people were in Little Square Balboa promoting a citywide 
strike.  Fearing disorder, he moved to end the movement before it grew any larger.  When 
small-scale arrests of the labor movement’s leadership failed to end the protests, Ludlow 
dispatched the city’s Rural Guard to disperse the labor activists.  The general’s Cuban 
auxiliaries severely beat the picketers and made over 150 arrests.  He then intimidated the 
arrested labor leaders, threatening them with indefinite detention in Havana’s prisons unless 
they renounced their support for continuing the strikes.  The strikers’ leadership capitulated 
and authorities released them after three days, temporarily ending the labor movement’s 
protests.24 
Although Ludlow’s defeat of the strike seems to be an example of American 
willingness to use force to impose an ideological outcome on the Cuban people, some 
perspective about the army’s role is required.  The U.S. Army had experience in dealing with 
labor violence in the United States, often acting to prevent or suppress riots and disorder.  
Whatever the sympathies of the troops and their commanders, U.S. troops followed their 
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orders and dispersed workers whenever requested by local authorities.25 These confrontations 
were often violent and on occasion, lethal.26 The Army’s severe response to labor strikes and 
boycotts were a reflection of the broader attitudes of their leadership. 
 The Army’s leaders abhorred the tactics that the labor movement employed as both a 
cause and a symptom of disorder.  The Army’s commanding Major General Nelson A. Miles 
made this attitude explicit:  “[the interruption of commerce by strikes and boycotts] would be 
like cutting the great arteries between the heart and brain of the physical system.”  Miles later 
emphasized this point by referring to the threat that Chicago’s Pullman Strike posed as one 
likely to lead to “famine, pestilence, and death.”27 During the strike, Miles frequently 
badgered his superiors in Washington for permission for his troops to open fire on the 
strikers claiming that the protesters employed bundles of dynamite against U.S. troops.28  
Similarly, General Schofield informed the Secretary of War that the Army had been required 
to suppress strikes in more than half of the states of the union, across more than two-thirds of 
the nation’s territory.  Schofield contended that these disturbances were severe enough to 
qualify as “insurrections” that required continual Federal intervention.29  These and other 
experiences undoubtedly informed Ludlow’s treatment of the Havana strikers. 
Ludlow’s description of how and why the strikers posed a threat to stability in 
Havana shared much in common with General Miles’ description of the Pullman strikers.  
Ludlow decried the unions’ efforts to “paralyze the life and movement of the community.”  
Strikers blocked access to Havana’s docks and threatened to halt the delicate economic 
recovery just gaining momentum in the city.  Ludlow believed that if allowed to continue that 
the strike would eventually disrupt Havana’s food and water supply.30 Once Ludlow 
identified the unions and their use of economic disruption for bargaining leverage as a threat 
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to stability, it is unsurprising that the general ordered the city’s police to disperse the strikers 
using force and mass arrests. Although violent, Ludlow’s methods in dealing with the 
Havana strikes were no worse than similar episodes back in the United States.31  
Ludlow’s violent dispersion of the strikers, however, was an exception that proved 
the rule.  Brooke moved immediately to head off future confrontations between businesses 
and workers by recommending to provincial and local governments that they change their 
labor regulations to authorize no more than a ten-hour workday as a compromise.32  Events in 
Havana would not be repeated elsewhere.  General Wilson too viewed the incident with 
barely concealed distaste. Wilson wrote, as he often did about outbreaks of violence, that 
Ludlow’s methods of ending the strike demonstrated a failure of his leadership and noted 
disapprovingly that it was rumored that McKinley approved of the tactics employed in 
Havana to suppress the strike.33  Direct clashes with segments of the Cuban population 
remained something to be avoided. 
Another way that the American Army of Occupation demonstrated its commitment to 
stability was by allowing a diverse range of political dialogue to develop between and among 
Cuba’s newspapers, some of it distinctly suspicious and hostile toward the United States.  
The United States Army allowed newspapers that voiced opposition to Cuba’s annexation or 
the establishment of an American protectorate over the island to challenge and debate the few 
newspapers that tried to remain neutral about Cuba’s political future.  U.S. commanders in 
Cuba, it would seem, remained uninterested in interfering in these domestic squabbles, 
although intervention in these debates might have changed the outcome.  
In November of 1899, El Cubano challenged its sister publication Diario Del Marino 
to take a public stance on Cuban independence.  The paper’s editor, a recent immigrant from 
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Spain, maintained a friendlier attitude toward the United States than most papers in Havana 
but nonetheless avoided committing to any one political solution for Cuba’s future. Did 
Diario Del Marino favor independence, annexation, or the establishment of an American 
protectorate over Cuba? El Cubano left no doubt as to its own political sentiments and 
implored Diario Del Marino that now was the time to, “marshal its strength with us to live in 
peace under a Cuban Republic.” In order to achieve this, however, Diario Del Marino, like 
El Cubano, had to oppose “everything calculated to menace Cuban sovereignty.”34  With 
Spanish forces long gone from the island, it was clear what menace El Cubano meant.  
Diario Del Marino’s answer to El Cubano’s challenge was equivocal.  The editor 
replied that his commitment to any particular political course depended largely on the 
policies adopted both by the United States and by Cuba’s citizens.  Until either position was 
clarified, the paper would remain politically neutral.  Diario described the political situation 
in a metaphor, “For a few, the Cuban barque of State was rescued by a passing stranger too 
good to either demand or accept salvage. But to many, the picture appears of an old Corsair 
who has long chased a coveted prize, reappearing upon the scene during a fearful storm and 
just in time to throw a cable to the Cuban craft and tow it into a Pirate port.” Diario believed 
that both political outlooks, despite how radically they differed, were authentic Cuban views.  
For itself, Diario declared “And we, not having belonged to the crew of the ship during the 
storm, owe neither thanks to the ‘good stranger’ nor abuse to the ‘tricky corsair.’ But as 
passengers…we feel as much interest in her voyage as the old crew. And yet have no 
ambitions to usurp the functions of the navigator or pilot.  Does our contemporary 
understand?”35   
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This political neutrality, however, even for a Spanish owned newspaper was not to 
last.  Rumors that President McKinley intended to appoint a civil governor took Cuba by 
storm in early November.  Similar speculation had periodically swept the island before but as 
the U.S. occupation neared its one-year anniversary without a clear statement of American 
support for Cuban independence, many people on the island accepted the latest newspaper 
gossip as truth and a pre-cursor to annexation. By mid-November, even Diario questioned 
the wisdom of maintaining faith in the Teller Amendment to secure Cuba’s future and 
remained skeptical of American intentions thereafter.36  While this furor overtook the island’s 
editorial pages, U.S. commanders continued to allow the increasingly hostile local press to 
rally support for Cuban independence.  The only explanation for such indifference is that the 
Army remained committed only to a policy of maintaining the island’s delicate political 
stability and this meant tolerating a diverse array of robust opinions, even if antagonistic to 
the United States.  
Perhaps one of the most dramatic illustrations of just how committed the American 
Army in Cuba was to avoiding confrontations with Cubans over questions of political 
influence and power was Captain Fremont’s battles with the alcalde of Sancti Spíritus.  The 
mayor had, as already discussed, rebuffed Fremont’s efforts to manage the town’s sanitation 
work, to remain informed about its budget and, in conjunction with the police chief, had 
driven Spanish concession owner Primitivo Guiterrez from town.  Most serious of all, the 
town’s police chief and mayor had publicly challenged American authority within the 
confines of its own barracks.  Fremont now had to manage the political consequences of this 
affront to U.S. authority within the community.  How Fremont resolved this crisis is further 
indicative of American reticence to engage in confrontations with the Cuban population.  
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Fremont assumed that the arrest of the American teamster was not a coincidence or 
mistake.  Both the alcalde and the police knew that the American garrison was outside of the 
city’s judicial and administrative authority.  Fremont theorized that both the police chief and 
the mayor’s provocations were an effort at galvanizing political support for their 
administration.  Rather than initiate a public confrontation, he solicited the support of the 
local criminal judge and then confronted the alcalde in a private meeting.  The commander at 
Sancti Spíritus allowed the judge and the mayor to discuss the circumstances of the arrest but 
found himself reliant on the judge’s support, and the implied threat of his legal sanction in 
the Cuban courts, to re-establish the boundaries the mayor and the town’s police chief 
transgressed.  Ultimately, the alcalde and the police chief agreed to a more scrupulous 
observation of U.S. authority in the future, averting a further escalation in tensions within the 
town.37    
The incident revealed the depth of American commitment to avoiding a potentially 
de-stabilizing struggle for power and influence. Fremont, when forced to respond to the local 
police’s public challenge to his authority, worked within the established channels of the 
existing civil leadership and leveraged their support for a peaceful and private resolution.  
While his confidential meeting did resolve the latest source of problems in the city, such a 
solution would not have mitigated the political damage wrought by the police chief’s actions. 
In order to counter the perception of U.S. weakness in the community, Fremont would have 
had to extract some sort of concession from the local government that forced them to 
acknowledge American authority.  Instead, he settled for a future recognition of U.S. power 
within their local garrison but allowed the arrest to stand. The result, however, makes sense if 
the American Army of Occupation’s main concern was maintaining order and stability, not in 
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pursuing a positive political agenda.  When viewed in the context of Brooke’s aversion to 
major foreclosures on the island and the department commanders’ tolerance for criticism 
toward the American Army and its leadership, Fremont’s actions in Sancti Spíritus seem like 
an applied version of the examples set by his higher headquarters.    
Actions As The Conditions Seemed To Demand  
Aside from his initial guidance not to intervene in the civil administration of Cuba’s 
individual cities and towns, the commanding general left his garrisons largely to their own 
devices in how to assist in the development of Cuba’s lowest levels of government.  
Confronting the municipalities were a variety of challenges that required immediate action 
dictated by local conditions.  No two municipalities were alike.  Brooke recognized this and 
decided to “take such action as the conditions in each department seemed to demand and the 
finances permitted.”38 U.S. garrison commanders assumed the role of advisors for their 
communities and offered many of their alcaldes and ayutamientos access to resources and 
organizational methods otherwise unavailable to their communities.  Rather than stifling 
local innovations in policy, the American Army of Occupation embraced this necessity.  
Brooke understood that stability required the adaptation of laws and regulations to local 
realities and gave policies developed at the municipal level considerable deference.  This 
important bottom-up driven impetus revealed itself in three prominent ways: municipal tax 
policy, the establishment of public schools, and in curtailing Church interference in 
municipal affairs.   
 In Trinidad, the economic devastation of the city and its surrounding sugar production 
had been similar to other agricultural areas of Cuba. The city faced a near total economic 
collapse.  One of the first areas of agreement between Colonel Brown, the official 
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representatives of the city, and the area’s elites had been the necessity of reviewing the 
town’s municipal regulations in an effort to simplify the town’s fee structures and to find the 
resources necessary to ensure basic levels of subsistence for the population.39   On the 
recommendation of a commission of local Cubans, Brown suspended a 20% war tax on all 
the goods sold within the city and initiated several other commissions to continue examining 
local taxes and regulations to find others ways to reinvigorate economic growth.40  
Brown’s unilateral suspension of this kind of duty is significant for several reasons.  
First, Brown’s decision effectively nullified a levy that the municipality collected on behalf 
of the central administration in Havana. His deferment of this excise's collection was sure to 
bring his deviation in policy to the attention of authorities in the island’s capital.  Second, 
Brown acted on his own responsibility without any prior consultation with the central 
administration or his superiors.  He asked the town’s officials what measures they believed 
could provide the town immediate economic relief and implemented their decision.  Finally, 
not only did the administration in Havana not overrule Brown, it actually endorsed his 
judgment by adopting it as an island-wide policy designed to help ease economic 
stagnation.41  In effect, Brown’s individual interruption of the war tax in Trinidad 
demonstrated that American garrisons not only remained responsive to local conditions in 
their towns but that General Brooke encouraged low level initiatives within the chain of 
command to address problems affecting the stability of their partnered communities.  
 Similarly, U.S. commanders were not idle in reviewing the basic concerns of the 
communities where they were stationed.  One of the first things the American Army did in 
the various outposts it established throughout Cuba was to evaluate the educational 
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opportunities available to the island’s children and adults.  They were appalled at what they 
found.   
Public schools in the American sense simply did not exist.  Teachers often taught in 
leased buildings or in rented-out rooms in private homes with only the barest resources, in 
some cases without textbooks.  In many instances the teachers had not been paid in years. A 
combination of private fees, donations, and charity funded the island’s haphazard school 
system.42  These challenges, not withstanding, departmental and garrison commanders set to 
work in establishing a rudimentary school system.  These efforts varied by location but 
amounted to a considerable collective effort that laid the foundation for future efforts by the 
central administration in Havana. 
 In Trinidad, Colonel Brown and the ayutamiento agreed to create a local school board 
to organize public education almost immediately after the United States Army took control of 
the city.43  Despite a lack of municipal buildings in the town to house a school, Brown 
negotiated with the municipality's local clubs (private fraternal social organizations) to use 
their facilities. By the end of January, the colonel had managed to get the city’s first high 
school running.  He assigned an American lieutenant as the school’s superintendent and 
another as an instructor to ensure the community’s exertions to resuscitate its education 
programs maintained its momentum.44   
Brown, in cooperation with Trinidad’s local government, did not stop there.  
Trinidad’s district commander planned an adult education center in order to complement the 
city’s high school.  Funding, however, remained an issue. Despite a cash shortage, the 
ayutamiento of Trinidad voted to turn over the profits from public land sales in the nearby 
Jibaca Valley over to Brown, or any charity of his choosing, to run two “industrial schools” 
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for the city, one for men and the other for women.45  These industrial schools were to be 
devoted to literacy and job skills training needed by the community’s local adults.  Brown’s 
labors were entirely independent of both the guidance and resources of his chain of 
command.  He saw a need in Trinidad, and working with the city council, combined 
American organizational know how with the district’s resources and charity to get the 
region’s schools up and running.   
U.S. commanders in other garrisons and departments remained similarly committed 
to ensuring that education remained high on the Army’s agenda for the reconstruction of 
Cuban society.  General Ludlow referred to education as the “vital question” that had “fallen 
short of satisfactory adjustment.” He advised abandoning current efforts to centralize the 
education system and instead to give the municipalities primary responsibility for 
maintaining and supervising their own schools, albeit subject to the funding requirements of 
the central administration.46  Likewise, General Wood found the current system of instruction 
entirely inadequate to demand.  The governor of Santiago thought the “immediate 
establishment of a good school system imperative,” and recommended a school organization 
modeled after the states of New York, Massachusetts, or Ohio to remediate Cuba’s deficient 
system.47  How to pay for such an expansion remained the question.   
The American Army of Occupation did not have a ready answer but knew what they 
did not want.  In Guanajay, the U.S. garrison commander intervened in a dispute between the 
town’s teachers and the local ayutamiento.  The municipality, in compliance with General 
Wilson’s orders, had forbidden teachers from collecting extra fees from students from 
wealthy families.  The collection of these fees had been a legitimate source of income for 
many of the island’s teachers under Spanish law.  The military government when it banned 
 113 
the practice, however, failed to provide local educators with any compensating salaries.  The 
teachers took the city council to court to force the municipality to restore their right to collect 
their fees or to be paid directly by the local government.  The lower Cuban courts sided with 
the teachers and ordered the ayutamiento to pay their salaries since they were forbidden from 
collecting their traditional fees. The issue attracted the attention of General Wilson, who in a 
rare intervention into the island’s court system, voided its decision.  Wilson justified his 
intervention on “the fundamental principle of sovereignty that no state or government permits 
its funds to be garnished.”48  
These funding disputes not withstanding, U.S. commanders cobbled together local 
taxes, occasional funds from the central administration, and private charity, to establish a 
basic public school system where none had existed previously.  In six months time school 
attendance rose from 13,834 in January of 1899 to 23,742 in June, an increase of more than 
72%.49 There was still enormous work to do to educate Cuba’s children, but at least some 
communities had begun the process of recovery.  Furthermore, these decentralized efforts, 
while endorsed by Brooke, did not receive any regular material or legal support until 
December of 1899. At that time, Brooke appointed a superintendent for the island’s public 
school system and inaugurated its first school codes, arranging what many communities in 
consultation with their American advisors had already been implementing on their own.50  
The American Army of Occupation’s creation of a public education system demonstrated 
that individual garrison and department commanders mattered in the development of critical 
state infrastructure.  Their initiatives laid the foundation that authorities in Havana would 
later build on in order to achieve one of the most important legacies of the American Army in 
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Cuba.  More importantly, education mattered as much for what it offered as for what it 
represented, a restoration of the island’s civil life.  
Another way that the lowest levels of the chain of command influenced important 
policy decisions of the Army of Occupation was in negotiating the boundaries between 
municipal authority and the traditional privileges afforded the Catholic Church by the 
Spanish colonial government in Cuba.  While the Brooke administration debated the best 
method to sever the Catholic Church’s involvement in the island’s civil life without 
scandalizing the McKinley Administration, Cuba’s municipalities were struggling with the 
same issue.  At the center of most disputes between the Church and the Army of Occupation 
was the question of what property belonged to the Church and what property belonged to the 
Spanish state.   
When the United States occupied Cuba, it inherited these unresolved property 
questions.  For local governments, one of the most important questions stemming from these 
property disputes was who controlled Cuba’s cemeteries? Under the previous regime, the 
Catholic Church controlled not only the island’s graveyards but burial practices as well.  The 
Church did not want to cede any control in the cemetery question, likely animated by the fear 
that the precedent might be invoked in other property disputes between it and the emerging 
Cuban state. The municipalities for their part wanted control over where cemeteries were 
located, the ability to regulate internment practices, and finally the power to authorize the 
burial of individuals, including Catholics, in secular graveyards if needed. Further illustrating 
the complex inter-play of state and religious interests, some of these cemeteries, despite not 
being ecclesiastically managed, were on church lands or utilized Church owned buildings.  
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The problem of who controlled the island’s cemeteries came to head during the initial 
phase of the occupation. Many Cuban officials believed that cemetery management should be 
a civil affair. The Church disagreed and argued that under Spanish law it controlled the 
details of burial arrangements and that since many of these cemeteries used Church lands or 
property that it deserved compensation.  Brooke’s Secretary of State and Government 
Méndez Capote called the issue “a most delicate one, due to the traditional customs of the 
country.”51 Nor was the strain on the municipalities a small one; Méndez Capote 
characterized the burden of the Church’s control as an “ancient tyranny.”52 While this was 
perhaps an exaggeration during ordinary times, this was not a normal time in Cuba.  
Hundreds if not thousands of reconcentrados continued to die during the initial months of the 
occupation due to the effects of prolonged disease and malnutrition.53  The Church’s dispute 
with local governments around the island could not have made burial arrangements for these 
unfortunate people easy or efficient.  Sensing that the American Army might be more 
sympathetic than the Cuban court system, the municipalities appealed to U.S. garrison 
commanders to support their assertions of authority over the island’s cemeteries. 
Despite the legal complexity of the situation, the American Army of Occupation 
attempted to break the deadlock.  In Trinidad, Colonel Brown decided that the ayutamiento 
of Trinidad had the better argument and declared the municipality empowered to control all 
of the cemeteries and burials within the city.  Furthermore, he prohibited the Church from 
charging any fees or accepting any salaries for funerals or burials.  Additionally the colonel 
ended the Church’s control over who could be buried where by ordering “all persons are 
entitled to respectable burial in the cemeteries, without regards to faith or creeds or accidents 
of death.”54  While he remained silent on who owned the land and buildings the cemeteries 
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used, Trinidad’s district commander made it clear that the Church’s interests had limits and 
that when its privileges conflicted with the newly developing Cuban state, those rights could 
be circumscribed.   
Brown’s support for Trinidad established a precedent on how to negotiate the 
boundaries between the Catholic Church’s traditional rights and the needs of a secular Cuban 
state. Twenty-nine other municipalities soon followed Trinidad’s example and appealed to 
American authorities and the provisional Cuban government for control of their cemeteries.55 
Brown’s order abolishing the Catholic Church’s right to control the burial process in 
Trinidad preceded Brooke’s orders to the same effect by nearly four months.56  Also, like 
Brown, Brooke refrained from weighing in on the ultimate fate of each piece of property but 
rather left the issue for the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. Brown and other U.S. 
commanders’ support for municipal challenges to the Catholic Church again demonstrated 
just how important low and mid-level commanders were in the development of Cuba’s new 
civil institutions.  Furthermore, the American role in secularizing Cuba’s cemeteries revealed 
that policy initiatives in the Army of Occupation traveled up as well as down the chain of 
command in Cuba. 
The American Army of Occupation’s garrison and district commanders influenced 
the development of the Brooke administration’s policies in taxation, education, and in its 
relations with the Catholic Church. Brooke allowed his subordinate commanders tremendous 
discretion in the modification of political and economic power within their communities. 
This at times required either significant deviation from the island’s traditional policies or for 
the wholesale production of new ones.  Brooke’s toleration of his municipal governments’ 
limited re-ordering of political, social, and economic authority within their jurisdictions 
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demonstrated his commitment to the pursuit of stability where adaptation to local conditions 
remained essential to success.   
Changing The Customs Of A People 
The American Army of Occupation demonstrated its commitment to stability in one 
final aspect; Brooke and his subordinates only pursued organizational reforms of the island’s 
legal institutions while maintaining Cuba’s inquisitorial system of justice despite tremendous 
pressure for additional reforms. The final section of this thesis will explore what those 
reforms were, why other reforms were rejected, and how these reforms related to stability 
within Cuba. 
One of the most controversial aspects of Brooke administration policy among his 
contemporaries was his commitment to maintaining the inquisitorial character of the Spanish 
legal system.  In an inquisitorial system, judges participate in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes and thus are not neutral in court proceedings.  Furthermore, these less 
than impartial judges wield tremendous power in the Spanish legal tradition, incarcerating 
people without even informing them of the charges against them.  The Army of Occupation, 
however, was not wed to maintaining the system exactly as it was under Spanish rule.  
Brooke willingly reformed and rehabilitated elements of the Spanish system that he and his 
advisors thought did not function effectively.  
Army officers, however, realized there were theoretical and practical limits on their 
ability to pursue these reforms without destabilizing Cuba’s legal system.  Brooke’s legal 
advisor, Major Dudley explained:  
Radical changes in the law which might be made in territory wholly subject to the 
United States, with a view to the introduction of American systems of law or 
procedure, cannot well be made in a country which we are holding, as a friendly 
territory, under belligerent rights acquired through our war with Spain, with the object 
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of enabling a stable government to be established.  It is necessary to consult the views 
of the representatives of the people who are to form the new government as to such 
changes, and to act in accordance with what will be for the best interest of their 
future, setting aside our own personal views; for they have grown up under an 
entirely different system of government from our own, are accustomed to their own 
laws and methods of procedure, and it is not easy to change the entire customs of a 
people, even for the better, until they are educated to the necessity therefor and the 
wisdom of doing it. It is necessary also, before such changes are made, to consider the 
effect upon the entire system of laws, as some proposed changes, if many in number, 
would result in the necessity for a complete change of the system, and for that the 
people are not yet prepared.”57   
 
Dudley expressed in a single paragraph the entire philosophical premise of American Army 
policy under Brooke. His reforms attempted to reinvigorate Cuba’s justice system, to make it 
more effective in the administration of justice, but not to change its core functions without 
popular consent.  Brooke’s handling of the issues of incommunicado, habeas corpus, and the 
re-organization of Cuba’s court system are all illustrative of this phenomenon.  The general’s 
changes were aimed at liberalizing Cuba’s administration but without fundamentally 
changing its inquisitorial character in order to ensure continued legal stability on the island. 
One of the first Spanish legal traditions Brooke addressed was the custom of holding 
accused criminals incommunicado.  Incommunicado allowed judges and police to hold 
criminal suspects sequestered in jail until the local judge of instruction and his notaries could 
examine them to their satisfaction.  Suspected criminals were not allowed to communicate 
with anyone outside of the local jail until this examination had taken place. If the judge 
decided the man was guilty, the judge then referred the man’s case to the next level court, the 
nearest audencia, and kept the suspected criminal in jail until the provincial court could try 
him.  The first judge’s decision of likely guilt had no legal effects other than a continuation 
of the process.  If, however, the judge ruled the man innocent, the suspect would be 
released.58  In practice, men often languished in jail for months or even years without even 
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knowing what they were charged with while awaiting the arrival of additional evidence or 
witnesses the judges and notaries required before examining defendants.   
Americans found this legal practice abhorrent.  Major Dudley described it as “a relic 
of the dark ages, with a slight touch of the inquisition.”59  Brooke thought that the practice 
was an important element in the general corruption of the court system that served primarily 
as a form of black mail by court officials.60  If it was possible, the American press was even 
more hostile to the custom and considered its banishment an essential reform in the 
redemption of Cuba.61  This hostility was in part born of the popular conception of America’s 
mission to liberate Cuba from Spanish tyranny.  For many, the continuance of 
incommunicado remained at odds with this duty.  Adding further fuel to the fire, the Cuban 
people too appeared to express their intense dislike of the practice.  Strikers in Havana 
incorporated the prohibition of incommunicado as one of their demands to U.S. and Cuban 
officials.62   
When these factors combined, the political pressure to ban the practice of 
incommunicado became too great and some reform had to be initiated.  Initially, Brooke left 
it to his department commanders to mitigate the worst aspects of incommunicado and 
supported their efforts at releasing individual prisoners held unjustly.  Ludlow confined this 
policy to Americans being held by the Cuban authorities, resulting in yet another lawsuit 
against him before the Havana courts.63  The more thorough and systematic General Wilson 
reviewed his prison rolls in Mantanzas and Santa Clara and released anyone who did not 
have charges registered against them in their prison records.64  Wood made similar efforts in 
Santiago and Puerto Principe.65  While the department commanders’ individual exertions did 
meet with some limited success, the non-recognition of military authority (aside from 
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General Brooke) in this matter by Cuban officials sometimes resulted in the re-incarceration 
of previously released defendants. 
The debate within the military government over the introduction of writs of habeas 
corpus followed a similar trajectory as the debate over incommunicado.  Brooke and his 
subordinates clearly believed that the island’s legal system would benefit from a direct 
introduction of the concept.66  General Wood, during his brief tenure in independent 
command, had initiated habeas corpus in Santiago’s courts, only to have Brooke suspend his 
work and restore Spanish law.67  The American press, too, again applied tremendous pressure 
to Brooke to implement habeas corpus, describing it as “the very essence of human liberty as 
it is understood by the Anglo-Saxon races.”68 The Washington Post went so far as to demand 
Brooke’s resignation over the issue claiming, “so far as regards personal liberty; so far as 
regards the restoration of individual rights and the civilized methods of free government, 
Brooke has not improved one iota the situation as it existed under Weyler.” The Washington 
Post believed Brooke was not willing to make the necessary changes to Cuba’s political 
structure to “meet the demands of modern civilization.”69  As far as habeas corpus was 
concerned, they were right.   
The chief obstacle was the opposition of the Cuban legal profession.  Brooke’s local 
legal advisors argued that the Anglo-American concept of habeas corpus was unnecessary 
and that the Spanish legal system already provided criminal defendants similar legal 
remedies although through a different procedure.  The Cubans claimed that instead of a 
summary proceeding, Spanish criminal law allowed for a special “method” of appeal, which 
resulted in the same effect, the release of illegally detained defendants.  Brooke continued to 
hope, right until the end of his administration, that his advisors could devise a reform in this 
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method of appeal that might end the widespread practice of indefinite detention but without 
conflicting in a serious way with the normal functions and administrative procedure of Cuban 
criminal justice.70   
In an attempt to placate his critics, in July of 1899, Brooke issued General Order No. 
109.  Section one explicitly forbade the practice of incommunicado, while sections two 
through eleven conferred rights and protections for accused criminals that more or less 
matched American conceptions of justice but otherwise did not alter the operation of the 
Cuban justice system. Among these rights were the right to remain silent, the right to obtain 
legal counsel, and the right to a public hearing and bail under most circumstances.71  These 
protections, however, remained subject to the function of the traditional Cuban justice 
system, i.e. Cuba’s inquisitorial judges still had the final say in interpreting when and how 
these protections applied.  Thus, the order fell well short of the reforms Brooke’s critics 
wanted to see enacted. His subordinates, however, did not universally condemn his limited 
approach to judicial reform.  In a letter to Senator Foraker, General Wilson wrote, “if we 
were going to start out in this world to impose courts upon all the people who we might like 
to deal with, we would have a larger contract than we should be able to carry out.”  He 
concluded his letter by stating that the courts in Cuba were already as good as the courts in 
the American South.72  
The difference between the reform of habeas corpus and incommunicado lay in the 
remedies attempted by Brooke’s advisors and in the level of popular support for reform.  
Brooke refrained from introducing habeas corpus because he did not believe that he had 
exhausted the possibility of a more limited approach to reforming the Cuban justice system 
on this issue.  Furthermore, introducing writs of habeas corpus was neither popularly 
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understood nor supported.  In contrast, eliminating incommunicado had some popular 
following in Cuba, as is evidenced by the Havana strikers listing it as one of their demands.  
Moreover, Brooke’s other more limited attempts at mitigating the worst aspects of the 
practice had already been exhausted.  Thus, Brooke supported the elimination of 
incommunicado while resisting the introduction of habeas corpus. 
While he conceded that legal reforms were required, the commanding general 
adopted the position that it was not the law that was necessarily defective but the quality and 
competence of the judges and other officers of the court whose jobs were to oversee it. 
Brooke’s belief that Spanish law provided adequate legal protections for defendants led him 
to examine the structure of the Cuban court system and the credentials of its judges and 
officials.  The primary problem, he argued, was that the officers of the court were paid too 
little and too haphazardly to draw the best men of the legal profession.  Private legal 
practices remained too lucrative to compete with the court’s fee system to entice the island’s 
best legal minds and effective administrators.73  Furthermore, the system of charging litigants 
fees seemed to incentivize the creation of an ever more elaborate and byzantine system of 
court procedures that functioned less to provide justice and more to provide judges and their 
subordinate employees a steady source of revenue to pay their salaries.  Major Dudley 
claimed “that the methods of collection of such illegal fees had through long years of use, 
attained the highest point of perfection, and it is difficult to say what official was free from 
it."74 Brooke wanted to professionalize Cuba’s courts by standardizing their organization, 
their jurisdiction, and by removing their incentives to obstruct the completion of judicial 
proceedings.  
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Brooke began with a re-structuring of the Cuban court system.  He consolidated the 
responsibilities of the “tribunal local contencioso administrativo”—a court with ill-defined 
jurisdiction over government administrative functions—and transferred their responsibilities 
to the provincial audencias who now had the primary role in assessing initial appeals to 
annul an established legal judgment.75 The general also abandoned the divided court 
organization of the audencias he had inherited from Spain.  Previously, only three of the 
island’s six audencias could hear both civil and criminal cases.  Instead, Brooke empowered 
all of the audencias, one in each province, to have both kinds of jurisdiction.76  Furthermore, 
he created a Supreme Court for the island so that decisions from the island’s audencias could 
be reviewed for correctness and uniformity.77   
Brooke’s reforms addressed three important complaints about the Cuban justice 
system’s efficiency.  First, by providing an unvarying court organization with well-defined 
jurisdictions and responsibilities, the courts and litigants could now pursue legal action in a 
predictable and, ideally, economical fashion.  Moreover, the standardized jurisdiction and 
statement of court responsibilities eliminated, in theory, needless interference from un-related 
courts or officials who obstructed the advancement of litigation.  Under the Spanish system, 
jurisdictional ambiguity had been a major boon to court officials soliciting fees.  Finally, by 
creating a Supreme Court with the responsibility of overseeing the function of the island’s 
lower courts, Brooke provided the Cuban court system with a mechanism to ensure some 
uniformity of legal precedent was established throughout the island.  Most importantly, 
however, judges retained their traditional roles and authority. 
The final major reform Brooke initiated of the Cuban court system was his decision to 
abandon Spanish methods of paying for the courts. Brooke and his advisors assigned each 
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court a fixed number of authorized employees, each with defined responsibilities in the 
administration of justice. Everyone who worked for the courts would now be a salaried 
employee.  Anyone not listed as a salaried public employee in an authorized position was 
forbidden from working as a court official.  The collection of the traditional fees that the 
court system had previously solicited, the American Army of Occupation prohibited. Even 
the suggestion of a gift or fee to an officer of the court could be prosecuted under the island’s 
penal code.78   
Brooke’s reforms achieved a dual purpose. Now that the Cuban court system offered 
regular compensation to its employees, the courts could now compete with private legal 
practices for the best legal minds.  Additionally, Brooke hoped that by giving court 
employees a salary, it would eliminate the incentive to deliberately draw out cases in the 
hope of collecting additional fees.  These reforms, like the re-organization of the courts, 
aimed not at changing the functions of the court system but at increasing its efficiency by 
attracting competent employees and incentivizing the efficient administration of justice.  
Cuba’s distinctive role for its judges and their powers remained largely intact.   
 Brooke’s limited reforms of Cuban justice revealed several important aspects of how 
the American Army of Occupation viewed their responsibilities in Cuba. The Army 
recognized that the types of legal reforms that an outside power could impose were limited.  
Radical legal changes imposed by the United States would have sowed chaos in Cuba’s 
fledgling legal system.  The narrowly tailored modifications that Brooke did undertake were 
aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the existing legal system in Cuba, not in altering it to 
better suit American tastes. Significantly, with the sole exception of banning the practice of 
incommunicado, Brooke largely left the traditional practice of Spanish-style legal procedure 
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in place.  While he did consolidate some functions of the Cuban court system, he ensured that 
it retained its basic inquisitorial character, despite tremendous political pressure to the 
contrary.  Consequently, Brooke’s legal reforms illustrated that his pre-eminent concern, 
above all else, remained preserving Cuba’s fragile political and legal stability. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: I FIND IT WISE TO PROCEED SLOWLY 
 In the fall of 1899, there were signs that McKinley was reconsidering American 
policy and strategy in Cuba.  Brooke must have sensed something was up. As early as the 
end of September, he offered a pre-emptive defense of his government to the President.  The 
general explained what his administration had accomplished, and most importantly, why it 
had not achieved more.  He wrote to McKinley that he had acted in accordance with his 
understanding of his instructions and inferred his priorities from the President’s editing of his 
initial proclamation establishing the military government.  Brooke claimed to have achieved 
everything that McKinley asked of him, with the sole exception of mixing with the island’s 
elites.  He complained it was impossible to form relationships with the leading men of Cuban 
society without committing the United States to one faction or another.  The commander of 
the American Army of Occupation then indulged in a bit criticism of the President and his 
advisors.  He claimed that the rumors circulating in Washington about his replacement were 
having a negative effect on the domestic political situation in Cuba, and not to the benefit of 
the United States.  Brooke concluded his letter by stating, “I have not been able to do all that 
I wanted to do, for many reasons; chief of which is the very peculiar people with whom I 
have had to deal; and the others may be comprised in one short sentence: I find it wise to 
proceed slowly. The reason for this is obvious."1 
 Unfortunately for General Brooke, not everyone in Washington agreed with his 
assessment that the need to proceed slowly was indeed obvious.  In fact, a sizeable cabal in 
Washington, working in conjunction with Brooke’s most ambitious subordinates (Ludlow, 
Wilson and Wood) instigated rumors about replacing Brooke. The American press began to 
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report that the McKinley Administration intended to appoint General Wood to command but 
as a civil governor of the island.  The implications of such a move, if true, were obvious to 
the Cuban people; the United States intended to annex the island.  The result was an 
immediate outpouring of Cuban support for independence.2  Whether there was any truth to 
the idea that McKinley wanted to appoint Wood as a civil-governor for the island is 
unknown; what is known is that McKinley did agree that it was necessary to change the 
strategic direction of U.S. policy in Cuba and with it, the leader who set that direction.   
 Aware that Administration reluctance to discuss Cuba’s political future was de-
stabilizing the island, Root finally published a statement of American plans to end the 
occupation.  Root described U.S. control as “temporary” and suggested that the American 
military government would continue to facilitate a census, which would allow for elections of 
the ayutamientos and representatives to a Constitutional convention.  Root then suggested 
that after such a convention and the formation of a national government, the United States 
would “surrender the reins of government.”3  The census was already half completed.  
Theoretically, this made elections possible within the next year.  This was the first time the 
McKinley Administration had announced anything like a timeline for its mission in Cuba or 
laid out policy milestones for the public to evaluate.  Root’s publication of specific goals to 
prepare Cuba for independence achieved its purpose and quieted the up-roar in Havana. 
 Root’s clarification of U.S. policy in Cuba was also significant in that it confirmed a 
new strategic direction.  Root argued that any future government had to be built from the 
bottom-up, and in a back-handed condemnation of the Army’s efforts during it’s first year, 
Root denied that the island had any experience of “real self-government.”4  This, of course, is 
a matter of contention.  U.S. policy during the first year of the occupation had been explicitly 
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designed just for that purpose.  To what degree the Cuban people achieved this, under 
Brooke, is of course debatable but what is undeniable is that Cubans had far more control 
over their own affairs than under Spanish rule or under the military government that was to 
follow Brooke.  
 Root disingenuously argued that the island’s political factionalism and instability 
required a slow transition to Cuban independence.  While Root publicly committed the 
United States to transferring sovereignty over to a Cuban government in the future, the 
McKinley Administration decided that this did not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
future annexation by the United States, albeit on a voluntary basis.  This plan, which Wood 
characterized as “annexation by acclamation,” involved uprooting the government that 
Brooke created and allowing the American Army in Cuba unfettered rule. Wood believed 
direct American control was needed to implement the changes required to impress the Cuban 
people with the benefits of annexation by the United States.5   
Such a policy, of course, was inimical to what Brooke had pursued and required a 
change in leadership.  McKinley ordered Wood to assume command in Cuba on December 
20, 1899 and ended the American Army of Occupation’s brief experiment in Cuban control 
over multiple levels of government simultaneously. While ultimate authority always 
remained with Brooke, the general still allowed his Cabinet to govern Cuba’s day-to-day 
affairs and delegated to them extraordinary responsibilities and power.  At the local level, 
Cuban authority determined the direction and course of their affairs.   
In General Wood’s new government these gains in local control were reversed.  The 
central administration and its Cuban members still had a voice in the island’s affairs but 
never advanced or implemented significant policy initiatives without Wood’s direction.  
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Wood alone determined what was best for Cuba. Representative of this shift in mindset, he 
altered the formula of the orders published by the military government.  Under General 
Brooke these orders read, “The military Governor directs the publication of the following 
order….” Instead, under Wood’s leadership, the military government’s orders declared, “I, 
Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, by virtue of the authority vested in me, direct the 
publication of the following order….”6 Furthermore, Wood made every level of Cuban 
government subject to American veto, gradually removing the Cuban people’s ability to 
appeal his decisions.7 The only area of responsibility where Wood tolerated marginal levels 
of Cuban control over their own affairs was at the municipal level, but even here, Wood 
interfered.  He mandated reforms in municipal constitutions, forcing cities to adopt new 
charters according to Wood’s interpretation of the best elements of American law.8    
The legitimacy of Cuba’s new government was a secondary concern for Wood.  
Cuban desires mattered only in so far as they advanced Wood’s agenda and in that respect 
contrasted starkly with his predecessor. His methods and the positive press they received 
established what would become the U.S. Army’s standard model of large-scale democratic 
nation building: a methodical transition from the bottom-up managed from the top of the 
occupation government, with a decided emphasis on reforming or modernizing an occupied 
nation’s civil institutions to suit American tastes.  But did it need to be this way?   
The American Army of Occupation’s record speaks for itself.  When Brooke departed 
Havana in December of 1899, the United States only required 11,000 troops to maintain 
order on an island of over a million and half people.  While Brooke does deserve some of this 
credit, his subordinates in U.S. outposts large and small also deserve their fair share of the 
honors associated with the Army’s accomplishments.  For historians with the benefit of 
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hindsight, it is worth asking, how did the Army manage such a complex task and why were 
its inaugural efforts widely considered a failure?  The answer lies in the evolving view of 
American policy objectives in Cuba and the means available to obtain them. 
 The American Army of Occupation during its first year pursued a limited policy goal 
of stability in Cuba.  U.S. legal reforms of Cuba’s judicial system typified this commitment. 
General Brooke and his subordinates offered important reforms of the island’s court system 
but he narrowly tailored the scope of the Army’s proposals to enhance the legitimacy of 
Cuba’s existing institutions.  Brooke’s re-organization of the Cuban justice system changed 
its form but retained the most important elements of Spain’s legal traditions and character.  
Cuban judges retained their broad investigative powers and continued to function in a way 
consistent with their origins in an inquisitorial system.  The debate over the introduction of 
habeas corpus and the end of incommunicado only further illustrated that Brooke only 
accepted reforms that were considered legitimate by the Cuban people and their leaders and 
only after more modest efforts to curtail these customs’ worst effects failed.  When 
considered as a whole, Brooke’s conservative approach to changes in the island’s system of 
justice, even where it undoubtedly cost him professionally, confirmed his commitment to 
preserving the island’s stability above all else.   
Similarly, Brooke encouraged his subordinates to understand and respond to the local 
circumstances of their communities and endorsed many of his junior commander’s 
initiatives.  His later adoption of many of these proposals proves that every level of the chain 
of command remained relevant in the development of island-wide policy.  The American 
Army created public schools despite significant shortages in funds, teachers, and materials, 
all without any central direction or significant support from Havana.  Additionally, U.S. 
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commanders at the garrison and district level empowered ayutamientos to establish new 
boundaries between the Catholic Church and the secular institutions of the budding Cuban 
state.  Finally, Brooke empowered his subordinates to adapt to the conditions of their 
communities resulting in adjustments in tax policy across the island.  He not only overlooked 
his subordinates’ decisions to ignore Spanish law when it contradicted the best interests of 
their partnered communities, but often adopted these bottom-up generated policies as his own 
once they were proven effective. Brooke’s toleration of policy deviations allowed the Army 
of Occupation to create and maintain stability under conditions of extreme economic, 
political, and social uncertainty. 
 The American Army of Occupation demonstrated its commitment to stability in other 
ways as well.  They scrupulously managed circumstances that might lead to confrontations 
with the Cuban people, even where such an evasion damaged U.S. influence. Captain 
Fremont’s battles with the mayor of Sancti Spíritus and the alcalde’s politically motivated 
testing of the garrison’s patience and Fremont’s constrained response revealed just how 
important stability was to the United States. The American Army’s department commanders 
likewise exhibited a similar dedication to avoiding clashes by their endurance of substantial 
criticism and scrutiny.  American restraint in dealing with such hostility, despite the political 
damage attendant in such criticism, can best be explained by a commitment to a policy of 
promoting long-term stability on the island.  A similar problem confronted General Brooke 
and the issue of managing foreclosures.  Ultimately, he accepted uncertain but adverse 
financial consequences rather than risk the prospect of U.S. troops evicting Cuban families 
from their homes.   
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 While the Army maintained its emphasis on promoting stability, one of the things it 
did not do was attempt to mobilize local support for a policy of annexation. Contentions that 
the United States Army attempted to replicate Spain’s colonial system in Cuba by developing 
a political alliance with Spain’s former colonial elite appear baseless upon the examination of 
records from different levels of the chain of command.  At the garrison and department level, 
the United States rarely upheld Spanish colonial property rights.  Even where they did, the 
Army was never prepared to use force to maintain Spanish privileges. Captain Fremont and 
General Wilson’s problems in re-instating the Guiterrez contract over the objections of the 
local community are representative of this reluctance.  This reticence to exercise American 
power on behalf of Spain’s former colonial elites did not change further up the chain of 
command.   In Havana, the American Army remained hostile to colonial Spanish interests, 
invalidating property rights and concessions without fanfare or payment to soften the blow.  
These policies remained fundamentally at odds with American attempts at recreating Spanish 
systems of colonial control in Cuba. 
 Similarly, U.S. commanders’ discussions about what their mission was and should be, 
reveal the shortcomings in previous historical characterizations of the Army’s operations as 
being premised on a policy of annexation.  All discussions of annexation within the Army of 
Occupation took place among the department commanders and General Brooke.  Brooke and 
his senior leaders could not agree among themselves about what their mission was or how 
they should pursue their conception of U.S. interests on the island. When annexationists did 
advocate preparing Cuba for permanent union with the United States, they also demanded 
radical changes in Brooke’s system of military government.  Below the department level, 
however, almost no one ever discussed their mission as one related to annexation.  
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Americans at the garrison level overwhelming characterized their task as one of temporary 
assistance to the Cuban people.  
 Underscoring this limited understanding of America’s mission in Cuba was the type 
of government that the United States Army instituted.  The Army of Occupation developed a 
dual-civil military government that gave the Cuban civil government wide authority in the 
formation of important policies at both the local and the central government level.  In 
Havana, the Cuban Cabinet governed the island.  Their control of Cuban affairs was 
complete enough that it antagonized U.S. department commanders sufficiently to lobby the 
War Department in order to preserve their authority to suspend civil employees from the 
Cuban Cabinet’s encroachment. At the local level, U.S. commanders were ordered not to 
interfere except during emergencies that threatened to create unrest.  This prohibition on 
intervention was so strong that it frustrated garrison commanders’ ability to impose their 
preferred policy outcomes on recalcitrant Cuban civil authorities and in some instances 
enabled Cuban officials to keep garrison commanders completely ignorant of their 
community’s basic concerns. 
 Finally, these policies developed as the direct result of the ambiguity in American 
intentions toward Cuba. While McKinley studiously avoided a public statement of support 
for Cuban independence, it was an explicit component of his instructions to Brooke.  Most 
importantly, Brooke signaled both in his letters to McKinley and in the design of his military 
government that he interpreted his guidance that way.  Equally important, the President 
tolerated, even if he did not support, Brooke’s plan to conform to his orders.  In essence, 
Brooke undertook to build Cuba’s capacity for self-government but refrained from saying so 
publicly to maximize the McKinley Administration’s political flexibility.  Brooke recognized 
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that there were political limitations to what McKinley could support and when.  His designs 
for Cuban self-government and the army’s role in it was a plan ideally suited to these 
political circumstances.  Consequently, rather than a year of directionless drifting, army 
policy during this first critical year of the occupation was both reasonable and largely 
successful in both maintaining the island’s fragile stability and in preparing Cuba for 
eventual independence.   
 These conclusions suggest several important implications for understanding the 
American Army and its role in unconventional military operations and studies of American 
empire abroad.  For military historians, this thesis should emphasize the importance of 
recognizing the contributions of different elements of the chain of command to the 
development and execution of national objectives abroad.  Previous military historians have 
either ignored the role that these different elements played during the occupation or confined 
their contributions in policy development to their participation in the grand schemes of 
officials in Havana. American soldiers and officers at all levels are interpreters of American 
policy.  How soldiers understand their mission and their role in the Army’s operations often 
influences the methods that these soldiers employed to deal with challenging circumstances.  
In Cuba, widespread understanding of Brooke’s intent by his subordinates not only likely 
prevented numerous confrontations but also gave the Cuban people enough confidence in 
American intentions to allow the re-establishment of basic civil life and institutions in Cuba.  
 Additionally, this study validates Brooke’s desire to “proceed slowly” as a realistic 
assessment of the practical limitations of armies attempting to create or restore governments 
overseas. If changes must be made, they must be made incrementally and only if accepted as 
legitimate by the local population.  This necessitates the careful cultivation of political 
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consensus and occupying armies historically have had limited success in encouraging this 
consensus if the army’s proposed reforms are too numerous or radical for the people to 
accept.  This was what Brooke meant when he complained to McKinley that he had to 
“proceed slowly.” This fact, which Brooke found “obvious,” continues to elude political and 
military thinkers into the modern day.  
Similarly, an analysis of the Army during this period reveals an alternative model of 
reconstruction government.  Brooke and his subordinates fabricated an organizational 
structure capable of performing the basic functions required of any government (tax 
collection, regulation, administration, and maintenance of order) in less than a year and with 
only low levels of political resistance to the entire process.  He took care only to alter the 
aspects of Cuba’s culture and institutions where these reforms were likely to be accepted as 
legitimate by the occupied population.  Brooke’s delegation of authority to the Cuban people 
also allowed Cuba’s political institutions room to develop and make mistakes without U.S. 
interference.  In short, Brooke allowed the Cuban government to gain invaluable experience 
while U.S. troops were able to manage the consequences at no additional cost to the United 
States.  How much the Cuban government would have benefitted from two more years of 
similar experience remains pure conjecture, but the possibility is intriguing.   
Wood’s more vigorous approach to governance and liberal use of American power to 
intervene and direct Cuban affairs, not only failed to engineer “annexation by acclamation” 
but also left behind an un-stable republic without the legitimacy to command the loyalty of 
its people or its army.  The American Army would return to occupy Cuba again in 1906, with 
the same model of direct governance and with similar results.   Brooke’s government and the 
Army’s role in preparing Cuba for self-government offers military historians a glimpse into 
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the development of occupations based on realistic limited objectives that neither ignores the 
political realities of occupation nor the limitations of the Army asked to carry it out. 
 For historians of American empire, the myopic focus on unabashed imperialist 
sentiment in the United States and its uncritical projection onto the American Army has 
serious limitations for historical understanding.  Elements of the U.S. Army were no doubt 
sympathetic to these ideas but these views existed on a continuum with other values.  Men 
like General James Wilson intensely desired Cuba’s annexation but they subordinated that 
wish to following their own interpretation of Congressional law.  Honor and duty took 
precedence over politics for Wilson.  It is doubtful that he was the only one.  The bulk of the 
Army appears to have loyally attempted to implement their instructions, including those that 
prepared Cuba for independence.   
Scholars should also never assume that any dominant idea or ideology in a historical 
period was ever implemented in the way its proponents intended. Unfamiliar circumstances 
often challenge people’s preconceived ideas and values, including their views about politics, 
race, gender, and civilization.  The outcome of such processes should never be anticipated.  
Wilson’s experiences are again illustrative.   
Wilson began the occupation believing the assimilative quality of American 
institutions would guarantee U.S. success in ruling its overseas possessions and he requested 
copies of educational articles summarizing the American Constitution, the Declaration of 
Independence, and the Articles of Confederation to distribute to the Cuban people to further 
that process along.9 While retaining his faith in the era’s racial ideas about societal evolution, 
he soon adopted more practical solutions to achieve his goals, namely the negotiation of 
binding trade agreements to tilt the island’s interests in favor of the United States. Wilson, at 
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one point, even defended the most distinctly un-American of Cuba’s institutions: its justice 
system.  Clearly, Wilson’s experiences and the circumstances of the occupation changed his 
assessment of the value of some of his preconceived ideas.  Similar challenges and their 
results have to be accounted for in the historical record otherwise history follows an 
ideological determinism that does not reflect the complexity of life as it existed.  
Consequently, scholars of this era would be well served by moving the focus of their studies 
away from Washington and into the field where the Army operated in order to understand its 
attitudes and better establish the boundaries between imperial ideology and the mechanics of 
its implementation.   
Potentially rewarding areas of future research remain for scholars of the American 
intervention in Cuba. The portion of the U.S. occupation covered by this thesis leaves 
unexamined the entire administration of General Wood. Undoubtedly, as the longer serving 
Governor General, his administration should be of equal interest to historians. While Wood’s 
role during this period is well documented, historians have yet to consider the rest of the 
Army’s contributions to the development of American policy.  Likewise, how individual 
soldiers shaped the strategic environment in Cuba remains mostly unanalyzed.  As the most 
visible symbol of American power, how these soldiers influenced and interacted with the 
Cuban people promises insight into important context about how American policy developed.  
The larger story of the American Army of Occupation and its interaction with the Cuban 
people remains untold. 
Despite the Army’s success in achieving the limited objectives the President outlined, 
later accounts of the Army during this period viewed it as a failure.  General Wilson called it 
a “government of conquest” and claimed that its only redeeming feature was that under 
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Brooke “it was honestly and humanely administered.”10 David Edelstein wrote that by the 
end of 1899 Brooke and the Army’s efforts were “foundering,” necessitating his 
replacement.11  This perception of the Army of Occupation’s first year, does not take into 
account the Army’s actual objectives as understood by General Brooke.  The starvation and 
disease that the Army found when it initially occupied the island was under control.  The 
military government in cooperation with the Cuban people and their representatives in 
Brooke’s government governed the island, giving them substantial experience in self-
government.  Despite periodic bouts of unrest, the Army of Occupation’s ability to maintain 
order in Cuba was never seriously in question.  In short, the Army had pacified the island and 
had set the conditions for a transition to eventual Cuban independence, achieving everything 
that the President and Congress required.  The Army’s operations and the policies it adopted 
were not only appropriate for such objectives but effective.  If the McKinley Administration 
had maintained these limited goals, rather than attempting to rapidly Americanize the island 
in preparation for annexation, the first year of the Army of Occupation’s efforts would have 
been seen in a much different light.  
Reflecting on the ambiguity of the initial circumstances of the occupation, General 
Wilson described the conclusion of his initial interview with General Brooke after taking 
command, “[General Brooke] gave me no specific instructions, but left me to take my own 
way through the maze which surrounded us both.”12  Wilson did not offer this depiction as a 
criticism but as a statement of fact.  It was, however, an apt metaphor.  The ultimate policy of 
the military government, like the end of Wilson’s metaphorical maze, was invisible at its 
entrance.  Once this obscurity is restored to historical understanding, Brooke’s occupation by 
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“induction” and the ongoing process of experimentation in policy that it implied, seems a 
much more reasonable approach than most scholars realize. 
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